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The 1967 devaluation of sterling has been the subject o f considerable academic interest. 
However, its aftermath represents one o f the great silences in the literature. This thesis aims to 
rectify this deficiency. The principal argument is that the devaluation may have been 
avoidable in the short-term but in implementation; the shift in parity was not a  significant 
event in itself. It must be viewed as a setting change rather than an instrument shift. 
Therefore, its real importance rest in its legacy because its implementation was to greatly alter 
the context within which sterling’s managers operated. In the aftermath, the problem o f 
sterling was actually far greater than it had ever been before and the solutions proposed were 
far more radical.
During 1968, the Treasury and the Bank o f  England devised three main solutions to the 
problem o f sterling. The first, Operation Brutus, was designed to block the sterling balances 
to ensure that the pound would maintain parity with the dollar. The operation would have» 
necessitated the re-introduction o f rationing, a ban on foreign travel and strict controls over I) 
imports. During the gold crisis o f March 1968 the core executive came close to implementing I 
the plan. Second, in September 1968, the Bank and Treasury implemented the Basle 
agreement. Under the terms o f the agreement, sterling area countries undertook not to 
diversify their reserves any further, on the understanding that the British government would 
write up their balances if the pound was again devalued. This agreement marked the 
implementation o f a fresh instrument with which to stabilise sterling’s parity within the fixed 
rate Bretton Woods system. Consequently, it was o f far greater importance than the 
devaluation. Third, by the end of 1968 members of the core executive began to question the 
sanctity o f Bretton Woods and devised Operation Hecuba, which was a plan to float the 
pound. Although it was not implemented during the Wilson government’s term o f  office, it 
formed the basis o f the 1972 operation to float sterling.
8Chapter 1 Introduction
In the analysis o f British external economic policy during the 1960s, academics have become 
obsessed with the 1967 devaluation to the exclusion o f all else. This is understandable 
because while sterling’s journey during that decade is an interesting story, particularly 
dramatic is the Labour government’s ability to hold the parity o f the pound for three long 
years, until it finally devalued November 1967. The academic debate has centred on why the 
decision to devalue was not taken sooner, the measures that could have been utilised to avoid 
it and why a move to floating rates was not considered.1 However, the literature on the 
devaluation is grounded in the traditional orthodoxy that Labour came to power in 1964 and 
both refused to consider the possibility o f  devaluation or to plan for it.2 O f course, this is only 
a half-truth. Between 1964 and 1967, the Treasury in consultation with the Bank of England 
(the Bank) embarked on full scale contingency planning so that they would be prepared for 
the ‘great unmentionable’3, should the traditional deflationary packages fail to improve the 
position of the currency.
The drama with sterling does not end with the devaluation however, and scholars who have 
ignored the late 1960s and have instead turned their attention to the implications for sterling 
following the break up o f Bretton Woods in the early 1970s have missed some exciting and 
important developments during 1968. The conventional view amongst scholars is that ‘the
' See for example Bale, T. ‘Dynamics of a Non-Decision: the ‘Failure’ to Devalue the Pound, 1964- 
67’, Twentieth Century British History. 10 (1999). p.192-217; Bruce-Gardyne, J. and Lawson, N. The 
Power Game: An Examination of Decision-making in Government. (London: Macmillan, 1976);
Burk, K. ‘1967 Devaluation Symposium’, Contemporary Record. 1 (1987). p.44-53; Davis, W. Three 
Years Hard Labour: the Road to Devaluatioa (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1968);
Hirsch, F. The Pound Sterling: A Polemic. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1965);
Shipman, A. ‘Falling with the Pound: The Labour Party’s Exchange Rate Problems 1947-76’, 
Contemporary Record. 5 (1991), p.105-114 and
Stewart,M. Politics and Economic Policy in the UK Since 1964: the Jckvll and Hvde Years (London: 
J.M. Dent, 1977).
2 Ponting, C. Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 1964-70. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), p.189- 
190&292.
3 This was the phrase used by Harold Wilson, to refer to the possibility of a sterling devaluation. See 
Caimcross, A. Managing the British Economy in the 1960s: A Treasury Perspective. (London: 
Macmillan, 1996), p.105.
9new $2.40 parity seems not to have come up for reconsideration before President Nixon’s 
speech on 15 August 1971’4, when Bretton Woods collapsed. However, this is simply not 
true. As the official papers show, the repercussions of the devaluation were highly significant.
In this thesis, I propose to rectify the deficiencies in the existing literature. This account will 
make use o f both archival documents and oral histories and the devaluation will provide a 
starting point for an analysis that focuses on the immediate aftermath. Particular emphasis 
w ill be placed upon the relations between ministers, the Treasury, and the Bank and their 
attempt to manage sterling during 1968.The principal argument is that although sterling was 
devalued in November 1967, the devaluation was not forced and could have been avoided in 
the short-term. Furthermore, as the table below suggests and as chapter two will elaborate on, 
the fact that sterling was devalued is o f little significance in itself. It only amounted to a first 
order setting change to the second order fixed but adjustable peg instrument.5 It did not 
constitute the abandonment o f that instrument nor did it represent a withering o f the 
underlying goal o f stable exchange rates. In short, in the terminology o f  Peter Hall, there was 
neither a third order paradigm shift nor even an instrument shift.
Table 1.1 Orders of Change
Third Order 
Goal
Second
Order
Instruments
First Order 
Instrument 
Settings
International: IMF, GAIL- _► Drawing Rights
SDRs.
/ Domestic-External: Fixed but
/ adjustable exchange rates,------ ».Devaluation/revaluation;
Exchange ( Exchange Control, Import level o f  current and capital
Rate Stability v Controls. account convertibility etc
\ Domestic-Internal: Prices __
and Incomes Policy, Credit Tax and interest rate settings
Controls, Domestic Taxation, Etc
Public Spending, Interest
Rates
4 Tew, B. International Monetary Cooperation. (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1970), p.315.
’ Adapted from Hall, P. ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: the Case of Economic 
Policy-making in Britain’, Comparative Politics 25 (1992), p. 275-296.
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Consequently, it is difficult to understand why the build up to devaluation has attracted so 
much attention. One supposes that in contrast to interest rate management, policymakers 
regarded sterling’s parity ‘as a matter o f national pride-almost as a national virility symbol- 
and devaluation or revaluation as a national disaster if  not a national disgrace’.6 In short, it 
was a setting change that had emotional and moral connotations and this explains somewhat 
the reluctance to use it. However, the real significance o f  the devaluation rests not in the event 
itself but in its aftermath and in the way that it altered the context within which economic 
policymaking was conducted. Once the setting change was made, it was to have grave 
repercussions on the management o f the pound. Firstly, the resultant J-curve effect was to 
exacerbate the balance o f payments difficulties.7 Secondly, because the confidence of the 
Overseas Sterling Area was greatly reduced, the sterling balance holders sought to diversify 
into dollars and gold.8 This meant that the meagre foreign exchange reserves faced pressure 
from two sources simultaneously. The problem of managing sterling was actually greater in 
the period after devaluation than it had ever been before. The solutions proposed were far 
more radical and amounted to an instrument shift rather than a mere setting change.9
The Structure and Argument o f the Thesis
In order to show the originality o f  this work, it is first necessary to provide an overview of the 
existing literature on the aftermath o f the devaluation and to explain how this account differs 
and builds upon it. Furthermore, to understand the environment in which economic 
policymaking was conducted in the late 1960s it is also necessary to highlight the nature o f 
the economic crisis that sterling’s managers faced. These tasks will be completed in the 
remainder o f this chapter, which concludes with an examination of the principal actors
6 National Archives: Kew, [henceforth PRO] T267/36 ‘THM: The Break up of Bretton Woods’, p.27.
7 PRO T230/1052 Papei by Economic Section ‘The Domestic Prospect after Devaluation’, January 
1968.
* Bank of England Archive [Henceforth Bank] OV44/I59 C. W. McMahon ‘The Future of the Sterling 
Balances', February 1968;
9 Bank G3/287 Parsons to Armstrong 7/3/68
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involved in external economic policymaking. Chapter two outlines the theoretical framework 
that is used in this investigation. It is divided into two parts. The first deals with the deductive 
assumptions upon which this inquiry is based. These are that w hilst the world exists 
independently o f  our perceptions o f it we only come to understand it though those 
perceptions. This means that academic inquiry must be interpretative and that the scholar 
must attempt to reconstruct the constructions o f  those that are being observed so that they can 
be described in detail. Consequently, the project is qualitative in its research design and the 
role o f theory is to provide a vocabulary with which to make sense o f the data and to place it 
in an intelligible framework. The second part o f  the chapter concerns itself with the inductive 
premises, which were teased out only after data collection ceased. These are (1) that the 
relations between economic policymakers are best conceptualised using the core executive 
prism combined with a variant o f  policy network theory. (2) That agents act in response to the 
possible or actual onset o f crisis conditions and (3) their choice o f action is guided by self 
interest which manifests itself in the form o f a shared institutional interest or a departmental 
view.
The third chapter analyses the contingency planning conducted by the Treasury and Bank in 
the mid-1960s. It them moves on to assess the build up to and implementation o f the 1967 
devaluation. The aim is to provide a base point from which an analysis o f post-devaluation 
policy can proceed. The central arguments are that whilst the devaluation was clearly planned 
for in advance, its implementation could have been avoided in the short-term. However, once 
the decision to devalue was taken, it was to have severe consequences and to greatly alter the 
context within which economic policy was conducted. This was because after devaluation, 
imports became more expensive thereby worsening the balance of payments. Furthermore, the 
sterling balance holders, stung by the reduction in purchasing power o f  the currency, began to 
diversify. Therefore, the problem o f managing sterling was greater than it had ever been
before.
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Chapter four begins by outlining the shape of post-devaluation economic policy. It then 
moves on to assess the origins and consequences o f the gold crisis that erupted in March 1968 
and which had the potential to have more long lasting repercussions for sterling than the 
devaluation. The gold crisis was to lead to such a drain that the reserves were actually far 
lower than on the eve o f  devaluation and it seemed unlikely that the new $2.40 rate would be 
maintained. In response, the Treasury advocated blocking the sterling balances by force under 
the code name Operation Brutus, as a means of stopping the outflow and maintaining parity 
with the dollar. The Bank, which recognised the severe implications o f  blocking to its clientj 
groups, objected and instead suggested that sterling should be moved to a floating rate. 
However, the Treasury w as fearful that floating would dent its reputation. This was because it 
would put undue pressure on the dollar, probably culminating in the destruction o f Bretton 
Woods. Thankfully the Labour government was saved from either course of action by timely 
financial assistance from the United States and the G10. However, without that assistance it i£ \ 
likely that Brutus would have been implemented. This was because the Treasury had 
overruled the Bank’s objections and was therefore able to shape the context within which /  
ministers made their decisions. '
Even though the meltdown o f the currency had been averted, the Treasury recognised that 
unless confidence amongst the sterling balance holders was to increase and the balance o f  
payments improve, it would only be a matter o f time before another crisis materialised. 
Because o f this, it continued to hone the Brutus scheme, with the reluctant acquiescence o f  
the Bank, between March and July 1968. Chapter five assesses this. The argument is that 
although the Treasury initially favoured blocking, the horrors o f it became apparent after it 
began to plan for it in-depth. The Treasury quickly realised that for the block to be totally 
effective, it would require the abolition o f  the sterling area, import controls, the imposition o f 
food rationing at home, and a total ban on foreign travel. In short, the British government 
would have been forced to  raise the drawbridge, to implement a siege economy, and descend 
into a financial little England. It was because o f  this that the Treasury’s initial enthusiasm was
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quickly mitigated. However, Treasury officials also recognised that during an emergency 
there still might be no alternative to blocking, because if the currency was allowed to float the 
sterling balance holders would quickly rid themselves o f sterling, pushing the exchange rate 
to a very low level.
The Bank with its intense dislike o f Brutus had begun work on a more palatable alternative of 
its own, which culminated in the 1968 Basle agreement. This is discussed in chapter six. 
Under the agreement, concluded in September 1968, the sterling area official balance holders 
agreed to hold a minimum percentage o f their reserves in sterling, in exchange for the UK 
guaranteeing their balances against devaluation. In short, they had agreed to voluntarily block 
their balances in return for compensation, should the rate again fall. It is argued that although 
the Bank began with the aim of dismantling the reserve currency role, the agreement actually 
reinvigorated it for a short time. Consequently, it is more significant than the devaluation. 
This is because it involved the crafting o f a new instrument, in order to protect sterling, rather 
than the tweaking of an old one.
The Basle agreement also altered the context within which contingency planning was 
conducted. In implementation, it met the central objective o f Brutus, as it made a large 
portion o f  the sterling balances inconvertible. In the aftermath o f  Basle, the Treasury 
recognised that the move to a floating rate would not necessarily result in the sterling balance 
holders divesting, because the agreement would protect them against a fall in the rate. 
Consequently, it was possible that if  sterling faced an insurmountable crisis it would be 
possible to let the rate float rather than block, as the rate would not fall too far. Therefore, the 
Bank and Treasury began to plan for such a possibility under the code name Operation 
Hecuba, from September 1968. This is discussed in chapter seven. The principal argument is 
that although policymakers were not prepared to consider floating as a policy in its own right, 
they were finally prepared to consider it as the least worst alternative, instead o f blocking, 
under conditions where the reserves were clearly inadequate. Thus, September 1968 is an
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important watershed in official thinking and one that paved the way for the eventual float in 
1972. Chapter seven also examines the French devaluation crisis o f November 1968 and its 
ramifications for sterling. The impact o f this crisis seemed less severe, because officials had 
learned from the past and were not caught off guard, but it is a juncture at which sterling 
narrowly missed moving to a floating rate. The conclusion is divided into two parts. The first 
summarises the main arguments within the context o f  the theoretical framework and the 
second provides an overview of sterling between 1969 and 1972. There is also an appendix, 
which outlines how the thesis was researched and written.
The Existing Literature
The construction of a literature review is never an entirely straightforward process. This is 
because it involves the marshalling of a large amount o f  data. Furthermore, for the sake o f 
clarity, it is necessary to catalogue the various approaches and interpretations to whatever 
academic conundrum one is investigating, and place them into boxes that they do not quite fit 
within. Fiowever, there are generally two things which ensure that no matter how much 
literature there is to review and no matter how many competing interpretations exist, the 
process is not as cumbersome as all that. First, in any given sub-field, there is usually 
widespread agreement between practitioners on what the facts are. Second, the disagreements 
that do arise are over how those facts are to be interpreted. In short, they are disagreements 
over the significance o f  the event, the motivations o f  participants, and the theoretical 
underpinnings that should be used to make sense of them.
Fiowever, in the analysis o f  sterling in the aftermath o f  devaluation scholars are not quite so 
lucky. For it is a topic area where there is no established tradition of research. In fact, as 
Bulpitt attests, practitioners o f  British political science have made little attempt to develop an
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historical research paradigm.10 Thus it is arguable many political scientists lack interest in the 
governing regimes that operated before the 1980s, except when they are viewed in macro 
terms as the prologue to the break up o f the supposed post-war consensus." Consequently, 
very few political science accounts o f the Wilson governments’ have been produced and of 
these, most focus on the issue of industrial relations.12 Clearly, the state’s relationship with 
trade unions is connected to the management o f sterling, because wage increases that are not 
matched by improvements in productivity will undoubtedly harm the balance o f payments 
and hence destabilise the currency. However, whilst sterling and industrial relations are 
symbiotically linked, the existing political science accounts tend to place sterling on the 
peripheries o f their trade union centred analysis. The only real exception to this is the work of 
Rob Stones, which uses policy network theory as a conceptual prism with which to explain 
the fact that sterling was not devalued between 1964-67." The theoretical framework that 
Stones employs is useful as a means o f theorising about the various international players that 
came to the aid o f sterling and the way that these alliances unravelled in 1967, prompting 
devaluation. There are, however, two principal problems with Stones’ accounts. Firstly, they 
rely entirely on secondary sources. Secondly, analysis is not extended into the period beyond 
devaluation.
The few accounts of the post-devaluation period that do exist have generally been produced 
not by political scientists, but by historians, economic historians and by the politicians and
10 Bulpitt, J. ‘Historical Politics: Macro, In-Time, Governing Regime Analysis’, paper given at the PSA 
Annual Conference, University of York, Easter 1995, in the Political Science Specialist Group Panel on 
‘Politics, Contemporary History and History’. See also Johnson, N. The Limits of Political Science. 
(Oxford, 1989), p.35-56.
" See for example Kavanagh, D. and Morris, P. Consensus Politics from Attlee to Thatcher. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989).
12 See Coates, D. The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), p.97-129; Coates, D. The Crisis of Labour: Industrial Relations and the State in 
Contemporary Britain. (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1988), p.37-57; Hall, P. Governing the Economy: the 
Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.85-88; 
Panitch, L. Working Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State. (London: Verso, 1986), 
p.79-104;
"  Stones, R. ‘Labour and Industrial Finance, 1964-1967’ in Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. Policy Networks 
in British Politics. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p.200-225 and Stones, R. The Mvth of Betrayal:
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officials that participated in the events. However, almost without exception, they are devoid 
o f any explicit theoretical backbone or for that matter any real argument. They prove to be 
little more than potted histories that veer firmly away from attempts to explain or theorise. 
Furthermore, because the files at the PRO have not yet been systematically pillaged, these 
published accounts are also often factually inaccurate. There is no widespread agreement on 
what the facts are; or rather, scholars working without reference to the archives simply do not 
realise that they have it wrong.
It is impossible to distinguish between the existing accounts o f the period based on their 
differing interpretations o f  events. The only real way to differentiate between them is in terms 
o f their data type. Broadly, there are three types o f literature on this period. Firstly, published 
diaries and memoirs written by those who took part in the events. Secondly, accounts written 
by academics, which are based on these published diaries and memoirs. Finally, more recent 
reports that are grounded either on interviews or a limited number o f PRO files. The table 
below shows the accounts that fall under each heading. The rather scant collection o f names 
listed shows how little research has been done.
Table 1.2 The existing literature
Memoirs and Diaries (MD) Secondary work based on 
MD
PRO and interview based 
accounts
Barbara Castle* 14 Alec Caimcross15 Anthony Dunne"1
Alec Caimcross17 * Clive Ponting" Peter Hennessy19
- - Jon Davis20
Structure-Aaencv in the Labour Government’s Policy of Non-Devaluation. 1964-67. (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Essex, 1988).
14 Castle, B. The Castle Diaries: 1964-70. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984).
15 Caimcross, A. Managing the British Economy in the 1960s: A Treasury Perspective. (London: 
Macmillan, 1996).
16 Dunne, A. “The Pound in vour Pocket” A Study of the Economic Policy of the Wilson Government 
and the Devaluation of Sterling 1964-1970. (Unpublished M.Litt. thesis, University College Dublin, 
2000).
17 Caimcross, A. The Wilson Years: A Treasury Diary 1964-69. (London: Historians Press, 1997).
"  Ponting, C. Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 1964-1970. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989).
’’ Hennessy, P. The Prime Minister and its Office Holders since 1945. (London: Penguin, 2000).
Davis, J. “Staring over the Precipice and Into the Abyss" An Anatomy and an Analysis o f ‘Operation 
Brutus’ November 1967- July 1968. (Unpublished MA thesis, University of London, 1999).
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The earliest published account that contains references to the management o f sterling post­
devaluation is that o f Barbara Castle. Although less than 1% of the work is devoted to 
discussion o f Brutus, Hecuba, and the Basle agreement, the following positions can still be 
clearly gleaned. Firstly, that according to Castle, Brutus and Hecuba were intended purely as 
contingencies that would be implemented from a position o f weakness and that the 
administration hoped that it would never be forced to execute the plans.21 Secondly, during 
the French devaluation crisis, in the winter o f 1968, blocking no longer seemed to be 
considered as a serious contender for implementation should total meltdown o f the reserves 
have been reached. Instead, the Chancellor and the Prime Minister were more inclined to float 
the pound.22 Thirdly, that during the French devaluation crisis members o f Mise 205, the 
secret Cabinet committee that dealt with economic issues, asked the Chancellor to prepare for 
them a paper on floating.23 However, he was reluctant to do so and it was not until the 4 
February 1969 that operation Hecuba was presented to the Cabinet.24
Factually the Castle account is very interesting, if a little on the short side, but theoretically it 
is decidedly lacking. However, because the work is in fact the published diary o f an ex­
cabinet minister who was a key participant in the events themselves, it could almost be 
characterised as a primary source in its own right. Thus to criticise Castle for presenting little 
more than a potted history is somewhat misguided. O f course, because Castle was a serving 
politician, her obsession with macro issues looms large and no matter how factually accurate 
her account is it fails to provide the essential details. Words like ‘blocking’, ‘floating’ and 
‘guarantees’ are used continually, yet no attempt is made to explain how the various schemes 
would have been implemented.23 Furthermore, because Castle was not made a member of 
Mise 205 until June 1968, her diary is unable to provide any information on the build up to
21 Castle, p.463
22 ibid, p.552
23 ibid, p.557
24 ibid, p.600
23 See for example Castle's diary entry for the 13 June 1968, p462.
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devaluation or the March 1968 gold crisis, and thus the context under which planning 
commenced and evolved.
Perhaps then, the work of Sir Alec Caimcross can fill in the gaps that exist within the Castle 
account? After all, during his time as head of the Treasury’s economic section Caimcross kept 
a detailed diary and this was later published. As well as this, twenty-eight years later, he was 
to produce his lengthy work on the British economy in the 1960s. Within this short literature 
review, it is best to treat both works as a single entity. As Caimcross himself admits, his 
scholarly interpretation o f economic policy in the 1960s is more memoiris/i than he would 
have liked.26 Whilst his analysis o f the years 1960-67 was based on a detailed examination o f 
PRO documents, his account o f policy making during 1968 and 1969 is based almost entirely 
on his own personal recollections as recorded in his published diaries. This was because the 
archive material required to produce a more sophisticated account was still restricted under 
the thirty year rule. In fact, the documents would not be released until after Caimcross’s 
death.
It is unfortunate that, like Castle, Caimcross does not provide an explicit theoretical 
framework. His book and diary do however provide a useful overview o f  the events leading 
up to the March 1968 gold crisis and the conditions under which Brutus was developed. 
However, depth is sacrificed for breadth and his descriptive treatment is limited. For example, 
he explains that during the March crisis the Treasury developed three blocking schemes, 
Brutus I, II, and III, and that they were planning to implement Brutus I if  the situation did not 
improve.27 However Caimcross does not explain what the schemes were designed to block, 
why blocking was necessary, how they would have been implemented or for that matter what 
the key differences between the schemes were.
“  Caimcross, A. Managing the British Economy, p.x (preface) 
ibid, pp.207-210.
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Furthermore, after the March 1968 crisis Caimcross was to work almost exclusively on the 
development o f  plans to  reduce the level o f imports to Britain. He was no longer privy to 
information on the problem o f sterling and was no longer involved in discussions about the 
development o f  the contingency plans or the proposed Basle agreement.28 Without the 
availability o f PRO documents to fill in the gaps, his diary and book present a skewed picture 
o f the management o f  the currency.29 Therefore, whilst Caimcross’s work does build upon 
Castle’s in so much as it provides more detail and an insight into the mindset o f economic 
policymakers, it would be wrong to categorise it as the definitive work on the management of 
sterling in the aftermath o f  devaluation.
The other account o f the period, based on secondary sources, is that o f Clive Ponting. 
However, his work is little more than a flawed regurgitation of what Castle wrote in her own 
published diary.30 For example, he states that in early February 1969, Treasury economists 
devised Hecuba, which he describes as ‘the usual deflationary package’.31 It was to comprise 
a wage freeze, a considerable increase in taxation and severe public expenditure cuts.32 
However, Ponting has misinterpreted the events. Firstly, Hecuba was not devised in February 
1969 but during the autumn o f  1968. It was simply that the Chancellor would not allow Misc 
205 to examine the plan earlier, possibly because he was fearful o f a leak. Secondly, Ponting 
has also misunderstood the nature o f the Hecuba proposal. It was not a set o f deflationary 
measures but was in fact the plan for the floatation o f  sterling. Ponting’s account more than 
any other illustrates that an analysis o f the period by an individual that was not a party in the 
events, which does not use archival data, is likely to be factually inaccurate.
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Anthony Dunne’s thesis, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with answering the 
following question: Why did the Wilson government devalue the pound in November 1967? 
In that respect, much o f what he has to say is only o f passing relevance to this project. His 
work contains no mention o f Hecuba, pays scant attention to both the Basle agreement and 
the French franc crisis o f November 1968, just as one would expect from a thesis on 
devaluation. It does however contain an entire chapter on Operation Brutus. His account o f it 
does two things that the previous works have failed to do. Firstly, it uses material from the 
Bank o f England archive that suggests that the Bank had considered Brutus type plans as 
early as September 1967 and had dismissed them.32 3 Secondly, he attempts to explain in detail 
how Operation Brutus would have been enacted.34 However, because the Treasury files were 
not available at the PRO when Dunne was researching, he had to rely entirely on Prime 
Ministerial (PREM) files. Consequently, his discussion o f  Brutus is deficient.
Firstly, he does not recognise that Brutus I did not constitute either full blocking or the wind 
up o f the sterling area but was in fact a proposal to make the sterling balances inconvertible. 
Secondly, he fails to see that the definition and function o f  No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 accounts, which 
formed an integral part o f the schemes, changed in each version o f the plan. Thirdly, he does 
not explain how and why the Brutus proposal evolved from version I to version III but more 
importantly, like Caimcross, he does not recognise that there was any development o f the 
plan post-Brutus III. This is odd considering that the PREM files that he examined contained 
clear references to Brutus IV and V. There are further factual errors within his work. For 
example, he states that the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, advised the Prime Minister that 
Brutus should be renamed so that more officials could be included in the planning exercise.33 
However, Dunne concludes that the change o f name never occurred. Whilst he is correct in 
saying that Trend called for the re-branding, he is incorrect when he states that it never
32 ibid
33 Dunne, A. Op. Cit. p.212-213
34 ibid, p221-235.
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occurred. In June 1968 the operation was renamed Cranmer. He also misinterprets Trend’s 
motives for advocating the change. It is not clear how simply renaming the scheme would aid 
further inclusion. Nor is it clear that an expansion in personnel would have been desirable, 
because if more individuals participated, there would be a greater chance o f  leakage. If the 
proposal had become public knowledge, it would have undermined confidence in the 
currency, thereby necessitating its implementation. It is more likely that the operation was 
renamed in order to maintain secrecy. After all Brutus, with its Ides o f March connotations, 
conjures up images o f backstabbing. It would not be too difficult for the uninitiated to 
decipher from the name alone, the nature of the plan. What was needed was a more neutral 
code word. Cranmer would well fit that brief.
Dunne’s account also significantly fails to examine why political actors called for Brutus to be 
devised in the first place. He is content to assume that desperate times call for desperate 
measures, that liberal democracies are likely to procrastinate longer over tough economic 
decisions that could loose the incumbents votes and as a result o f indecisiveness, tougher 
action has to be considered later.35 6 His assessment o f actors’ motives and his theoretical 
framework is no more complicated than this. Finally, the entire work is marred by severe 
structural deficiencies. The story is not told chronologically but instead thematically. The 
chapter on Brutus does not explain why the March 1968 crisis lead to the consideration o f the 
measures, how the plans developed over the coming months and why Brutus was not 
considered seriously during the November crisis.
The remaining accounts are those o f  Peter Hennessy and Jon Davis. O f the two, Hennessy’s 
contribution is barely worth noting. It amounts to little more than two descriptive paragraphs 
in his book on post-war British Prime Ministers.37 His real contribution was to highlight the
35 'Indeed at one time the Cabinet secretary suggested that the operation be renamed because o f the 
necessity to extend details to a greater number of people’, Dunne, A. p.238.
“ ibid, p.211.
37 See Hennessy, P. p.316-319.
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fact that one o f his students wrote an unpublished MA dissertation on operation Brutus. That 
student was Jon Davis. The Davis account is a narrative history on the March 1968 gold 
crisis, although it is a good one. It is factually correct, fairly detailed, and makes use of both 
archival documents and oral histories. Its main arguments are (i) that during the gold crisis, 
the British government intended to  use Brutus as leverage in order to cajole the US into 
providing much needed foreign exchange.38 (ii) If the US failed to co-operate and Britain had 
to block, it was expected that this would put pressure on the US to develop a solution to the 
problem o f the sterling balances.39 (iii) If no solution were found it was believed that the 
dollar would be forced to float and (iv) that in response, the pound would peg itself against 
the dollar. It was also hoped that the economic instability created in Europe would lubricate 
Britain’s entry to the EEC.40
However, the account is deficient in a number o f  respects. Firstly, it is broadly narrative and 
contains no theoretical framework. Secondly, although much consideration is given to the 
behaviour o f ministers in the Labour government, little emphasis is placed on the Treasury or 
the Bank and the way in which they shaped ministerial action. Thirdly, it does not properly 
analyse the content o f the Brutus plan or consider the likely domestic effects o f 
implementation. Finally, it also fails to  consider the wider context. Little attention is paid to 
either the role o f devaluation before the crisis or the changing shape of economic policy in the 
aftermath.
It is clear that the existing research into the management o f sterling in the aftermath of the 
devaluation is virtually non-existent. The few accounts that do exist are wanting. Without 
exception, they are lacking in terms o f  the provision of theory. The vast majority also lack in 
terms o f argument and there are significant factual errors. From the existing literature alone, 
a synthesis could not be drawn. W hat is required is a fresh account that is able to provide a
N
N
Davis, J. p.26 
ibid.
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detailed overview o f  the whole period and one that is both factually accurate and theoretically 
underpinned.
The Problem of Sterling
In order to understand the environment in which economic policymaking was conducted in 
the late 1960s it is necessary to highlight the nature o f the economic crisis that sterling’s 
managers faced. That is the task o f  this section. Between 1945 and 1971, the UK was bound 
by the Bretton Woods system. Under it, British policymakers undertook to do two things in 
relation to the sterling exchange rate. First, they agreed to fix the foreign exchange value of 
sterling in terms o f gold at $35 per ounce and declare a par value, or parity, expressed in 
terms o f the US dollar. Secondly, they agreed to intervene in UK exchange market to prevent 
the value of sterling moving more than 1 per cent above or below its declared parity.41 The 
aim o f Bretton Woods was to promote stability within the international monetary system 
(IMS) by introducing a system o f  ‘fixed, but adjustable parities’.42 Ostensibly, parities were 
fixed as a means o f promoting regularity in international transactions. However, the founding 
fathers recognised that over time, it was likely that currencies would become under or over 
valued and their parities would have to be adjusted.
In reality, only the fixed part o f  the agreement was adhered to because countries were 
reluctant to adjust their exchange rates. Both devaluation and revaluation were treated as dirty 
words, and in Britain, the pound’s parity was regarded as national virility symbol.43 Equally 
abhorrent was the idea o f returning to flexible exchange rates, because it was believed that 
this would represent the restoration to laissez faire system o f the 1930s.
"  Ibid, p.26-27
PRO T267/36 ‘Treasury historical memorandum on the Break up of Bretton Woods', undated.
42 ìu .a
hHowever, during the 1960s economic policymakers within the UK were finding it harder to
manage sterling and to maintain its parity. The consensus is that sterling’s weakness was the
result o f  four inter-related variables:
■ Firstly, that in terms o f foreign trade Britain seemed, since the end of World War II, to be 
in constant balance o f payments deficit.44
■ Secondly, in its role as banker to the Sterling Area the UK held on deposit in London 
sterling liabilities that far outstripped the reserves available to back those claims. The 
ratio o f assets to liabilities was thought to be somewhere in the region of 1:4 and should 
the sterling holders have decided en-mass to cash in their holdings, the sterling ship 
would have been sunk.45
■ Thirdly, that these two weaknesses undermined confidence in the currency to such a 
degree that speculation against it from the non-sterling area (NSA) was rife. It is thought 
that speculative attacks led to the haemorrhaging o f nearly $12 billion dollars from the 
exchange equalisation account between 1945 and 1965.46 O f course, the Bank o f England 
usually recouped much o f the dollar outflow when confidence returned.
■ Finally, that the foreign exchange reserves held by the United Kingdom to maintain its 
parity were woefully inadequate and they could not cope with the pressure placed upon 
them from these three sources.47
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Financial Statistics. (CSO: No.93, Jan. 1970), p.95.
PRO T267/29 ‘THM: the Sterling Balances Since the War’, undated.
“  Hirsch, F. The Pound Sterling. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1965), p47-49.
47 PRO T318/I88 ‘Breakdown of Gold and Convertible Currency Reserves’, January 1968.
nEach o f these weaknesses will be assessed in more detail in the remainder o f this section. It 
will be argued that the balance o f payments, reserve position and speculation proved to be 
real constraints on the management o f sterling throughout the whole o f the 1960s. Whereas 
the sterling area balances only became a cause o f concern after the 1967 devaluation, making 
the management o f the currency in 1968 more difficult than it had ever been before.
Balance o f  Payments
Figure 1.3 outlines the UK balance o f payments for 1960-1969 as estimated at the time. The 
table demonstrates that in terms of physical goods, the UK imported fai more than it exported 
and was in continual visible deficit during the 1960s. Yet, this was no way a new 
phenomenon. The available data suggests that Britain only ever achieved a visible surplus on 
seven occasions, namely, 1797, 1902, 1816, 1821, 1822, 1956 and 1958.48 However, the 
current account balance, as a whole, generally recorded a surplus because the visible deficits 
were offset by surpluses in the invisibles. During the 1960s, the UK balance o f payments did 
not buck this trend. In fact, the invisible surplus was so large that it was also able to 
compensate for fluctuations in the capital account. Only during 1964 was a deficit recorded 
on the balance of current and capital transactions and in many o f the remaining years there 
were sizeable surpluses. Nevertheless, the balance of payments as a whole (as recorded at the 
time) was in deficit during the 1960s; except in 1961, 1962, and 1969. The cause o f this 
deficit was government overseas spending, which averaged at £692m per annum. The nation 
having made a surplus on its private dealings in goods, investments and services proceeded to 
overspend this income on overseas military and economic aid.49 It was Britain’s role as world 
policeman and not the inefficiency of her industry that was the cause o f her deficits 
throughout this period. None o f this however detracts from the fact that based on the
25
41 See Imlah, A. Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica. (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1958). 
Manser, W. Britain in Balance. (London: Longman, 1971), p.29.
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estimates produced at the time, the balance o f payments was to siphon £ 1933m from the 
reserves during the 1960s.
However it is important to recognise that, unlike unemployment or price change figures, the 
balance o f  payments statistics are subject to constant revision.50 There is also a tendency for 
more recent figures to be more positive, or less negative, than those previously published. 
This is because when the statistics were originally compiled the officials at Customs and 
Excise rarely had complete data.51 There was a tendency for imports to be recorded 
immediately but exports only with a time lag. More recent surveys by the Office of National 
Statistics suggest that whilst the balance o f payments still tended towards deficit, this was 
over recorded by at least £749m throughout the 1960s as a whole.52 Therefore, the total deficit 
was a third lower, somewhere in the region o f  £1184m. Although, this is still a sizeable figure 
and one that would undermine the solidity o f  the currency.
Mosley, P. The Making of Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence from Britain and the United 
States. (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984), p.243.
1 Interview with Sir Kit McMahon 
52 ‘Summary of Balances 1944-2003’ ONS data set
waw,statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=209 accessed 10/8/04.
Figure 13 UK Balance of Payments as Estimated at the Time 1960-1969 and a Revised Total £ million
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Visibles
Imports -4 138 -4 043 -4 095 -4 362 -5 003 -5 042 -5211 -5576 -6807 -7153
Exports +3 732 +3 891 +3 993 +4 282 +4 486 +4817 +5168 +5122 +6273 +7056
Balance -406 -152 -102 -80 -517 -225 -43 -454 -534 -97
Invisibles
Payments -1 546 -1 541 - 1 576 - 1 697 - 1 880 -2016 -2051 -2160 -2530 -2657
Receipts +2 117 +2 185 +2 297 +2 405 +2 566 +2783 +2832 +3028 +3561 +3967
Balance +571 +644 +721 +708 +686 +767 +781 +868 +1031 + 1310
Current
Balance
( +165 +492 +619 +628 +169 +542 +738 +414 +497 + 1210
Long-term 
Capital 
Exports (Net)
-89 +113 +6 -44 -247 -117 -32 -82 -110 + 116
Current and 
Long-term 
Capital 
Balance
+76 +605 +625 +584 -78 +425 +706 +332 +387 +1326
Government
Current -430 -496 -507 -514 -550 -592 -674 -736 -806 -847
Long-term
Capital
-103 -45 -104 -105 -116 -85 -80 -57 +21 -95
Total -533 -541 -611 -619 -666 -677 -754 -793 -785 -942
Government 
and Private 
Balance
-457 +64 +14 -35 -744 -252 -48 -461 -398 +384
Revised
Total -397 +154 +100 +21 -684 -208 +70 -396 -310 +458
Source: Original estimates from CSO publications (1965/1971) and revised total from ‘Summary of Balances 1944- 
2003' NSO data set www.statistics, gov,uk'STATBASE/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=209 accessed 10/8/04
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The Sterling Area Balances
The perception of the sterling area balance ‘problem’, as recorded in the Treasury historical 
memorandum that explains their development, was that they
‘..were a source o f  embarrassment to the Treasury. Throughout there was 
a  danger that they would be run down at a rate which would be damaging 
to sterling’.53
In short, it was believed that these balances, which existed because o f  sterling’s role as a 
reserve currency, constituted an excessive burden on the British economy and the strength o f  
the pound during the post-war period. This was because there was thought to  be a poor ratio 
o f assets to liabilities.54 It was obvious that if the sterling area, en masse, attempted to convert 
its holdings, that the UK would be bankrupted.
One can only suppose that the fear o f a run on the sterling manifested for two reasons. The 
first is that the balances were thought to be a mass o f liquid assets that could be withdrawn 
from London, almost at the click of a finger. Second, because it was assumed that after 1945, 
the balances were more precarious than before. This was because it was believed that they 
had not been built up by the free will o f their holders but were instead amassed as the result o f 
UK war debts to a number of commonwealth countries.55 Consequently, it was felt that these 
reluctant sterling holders would be likely to convert to dollars at the earliest possible 
opportunity. Both assumptions are misplaced. In fact throughout all o f the 1950s and much o f 
the 1960s the sterling balances were stable and represented little threat to  the stability and 
strength o f  the pound.
53 PRO T267/29 “Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 16: Sterling Balances Since the War”, January 
1972.
54 Stones, R. The Myth of Betrayal: Structure-Agency in the Labour Government’s Policy of Non- 
Devaluation. 1964-67. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Essex, 1988), p.58.
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Indeed by 1950 the major war time creditors, India and Egypt, drastically reduced their 
sterling assets and these balances had been replaced by the holdings o f other Overseas 
Sterling Area (OSA) countries, that had freely chosen to use the pound as their reserve 
currency.5 6 It is also clear that at anyone time, less than 40% of the balances were held in a 
liquid form (see table 1.4). As Schenk has pointed out, the colonial balances were earmarked 
for a variety of specific purposes that greatly reduced their liquidity.57 For example, one third 
o f these balances existed because o f the requirement that local money supplies had to be 
backed by 100% sterling reserves and in reality most kept 110% reserves. Colonial 
governments also controlled a number of special funds, which were set aside for specific 
purposes and they had limited liquidity. These included post office savings funds, pension 
schemes and development funds.
Table 1.4 Length of maturity of sterling area balances, 1954-6 £m
Liquid 0-5 yrs 6-10vrs 1 l-15yrs >15yrs Total
1954
1955
1956
1201 (43) 
1054(39) 
938 (36)
618(22) 
700 (26) 
807 (31)
319(12) 
361 (14) 
247 (10)
319(12) 
332(12) 
373 (14)
304(11) 
226 (9) 
239 (9)
2761 (100) 
2673 (100) 
2604(100)
Source: Adapted from C. Schenk (1994), table 2.7, p 43 
Note: Percentages are in brackets
Furthermore, during the 1950s the OSA was usually in balance of payments surplus with the 
Non Sterling Area (NSA) and was a net dollar earner. When this is combined with the fact 
that members o f the OSA were required to pool their foreign exchange earnings in London, it 
becomes evident that during the 1950s it was actually a contributor to the foreign reserves 
rather than a burden on them. In fact throughout the 1950s, the net contribution of the OSA to 
the UK central reserves averaged £29.6m a year.58
55 Interview with Dudley Allen” ibidSchenk, C. Britain and the Sterling Area: From devaluation to convertibility in the 1950s. (London: 
Routledge, 1994), p.22.
58 ibid
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However, if  it is to be convincingly argued that the sterling balances were stable during much 
of the 1960s, it is necessary to outline the potential causes o f  a drain and demonstrate that the 
threat was in no way real. The balance ‘overhang’ could have been damaging to sterling in 
two possible ways.59 The first was if the OSA had a run o f disastrous trading years and 
continually got into balance o f payments deficit with the NSA. This could have intensified 
pressure on the British reserves as the OSA might have attempted to convert its sterling 
balances in order to cover the deficit. The second possibility would have been straight 
diversification on the part o f the OSA. In other words, if either official and or private holders 
decided that they wanted a more balanced portfolio comprising some NSA currencies and 
securities, this too would have led to a drain via conversion. It will be argued that during the 
1960s the first was never a possibility and that the second only became so after the 
devaluation.
Figure 1.5 shows the overall balance o f payments for the OSA’s trade with the NSA for the 
period 1960-68. What it demonstrates is that unlike Britain, the OSA as a whole had a leaning 
towards continual and hefty deficits on its current account. In spite o f this, it managed to stay 
in overall surplus with the NSA in almost every year, with 1964 and 1965 being the 
exceptions. This was primarily due to the net inflow o f capital to the OSA, an inflow that far 
outstripped the deficit on current account.
59 Adapted from Cohen, B. The Future of Sterling as an International Currency. (London: Macmillan, 
1971), p.147.
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Table 1.5
Overseas Sterling Area Balance of Payments with NSA 1960-1968_______ £m
Year Current Balance Capital Balance Overall Balance
1960 -401 +406 +5
1961 -194 +355 +161
1962 -200 +440 +240
1963 -289 +530 +241
1964 -633 +604 -29
1965 -1005 +883 -122
1966 -469 +623 + 154
1967 -734 +1056 +322
1968 -686 +1237 +551
Source: Central Statistics Office, Economic Trends
This almost continual surplus ensured that it was not necessary for the OSA to draw on its 
sterling balances to meet deficits. Although during 1964 and 1965 when there were deficits 
the Bank o f England noted that ‘many countries tended to use their IMF drawing rights to pay 
o ff deficits and this tended to limit the extent to which they drew on their reserves’.60 One can 
only conclude that OSA balance o f payments considerations did not in anyway jeopardise the 
position o f sterling as an international currency during the 1960s.
What then of diversification? It is clear that during the 1960s, the OSA did begin the process 
o f  diversification. In 1964, the sterling balances made up 83% o f the reserves of the sterling 
area. By 1966, this figure had fallen to 75% and by 1967, the sterling percentage o f  their 
reserves had been reduced a further 5%.61 However the process o f  diversification was indirect 
and did not actually lead to any drain on the reserves held in the EEA. This was because the 
OSA did not actually offload sterling and replace it with NSA currencies and gold. Instead, 
when it ran a balance of payments surplus, it failed to deposit the newly acquired foreign 
exchange in London in return for sterling. Instead, it began to build up substantial holdings o f
“ Bank of England Archive [henceforth Bank] OV44/152 “The Problem of the Sterling Balances”, 
1/12/63.
61 Bank OV44/159 C. W. McMahon ‘The Future of the Sterling Balances', February 1968.
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alternative reserves. In fact ‘at the end of 1965, the net balances of the sterling area were at 
about the same level as the end of 1951’.62
However table 1.6 does show that there was a degree of direct diversification taking place 
between 1962 and 1967, which resulted in the loss o f £320million from the official balances. 
Nevertheless, it is worth bearing two things in mind: Firstly this loss occurred over five years 
and would not have put the reserves under the same strain as if it had been presented all at 
once. Secondly and more importantly, this fall in the official balances was matched by a 
significant rise in the private balances which offset it completely in every year bar 1967. In 
fact, up until the 1967 devaluation, the total balances of the Sterling Area were on an upward 
rather than a downward trend.
Table 1.6
U J ^ G ro s ^ L ia b i l i t ie ^ ^ h « ^ te r l in g A re ^ W 6 ^ 9 6 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n i
Year Official Private Total
1960 2,029 656 2,685
1961 2,097 715 2,812
1962 2,056 810 2,866
1963 1,898 1,044 2,942
1964 1,947 1,101 3,048
1965 1,911 1,150 3,061
1966 1,855 1,129 3,084
1967 1,736 1,246 2,982
1968 1,650 1,231 2,881
1969 2,039 1,134 3,173
Source: PRO T267/29 "Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 16: Sterling Balances Since the War”, 
January 1972.
The fact that the sterling balances remained stable throughout much of the 1960s is 
attributable to a number o f factors. The first is that significant proportions of balances were 
still held in forms that were not immediately realisable. During the 1960s, the Bank’s 
Economic Intelligence calculated that ‘certain sterling funds are not intended to be moved, for 
various reasons...leaving a residue that is m ore volatile’.63 That residue was thought to be in
62 Bank OV44/152 ‘The Problem of the Sterling Balances’, 1/12/65.
61 Bank EID10/I4 ‘Liquidity of Sterling Funds of RSA Countries’, 23/8/61.
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the region o f £300-£600 million.64 The second reason for durability was that interest rates in 
London were significantly higher than in the NSA. It was therefore not in the interest of 
balance holder to move their funds.65 This coupled with the fact that membership o f the OSA 
gave official holders freer access to the British capital market and that the OSA still did a 
considerable amount o f trade with the UK, made the continued holding o f  sterling necessary 
if  not desirable.66 Furthermore, the OSA private balances could be counted upon to remain 
stable because local exchange control restrictions often prevented the possibility of 
conversion. Although in practice, these balances increased in size because of the attractive 
interest rates.
With the conclusion in 1966 o f the Basle agreement to provide a standby facility o f  over $1 
billion to protect the British reserves from short-term fluctuations in the balances, confidence 
amongst the holders could only be increased.67 The only way in which the sterling area 
balances could have been a danger to the stability o f  sterling was in terms o f reducing 
confidence in the currency amongst NSA holders. It was only after the devaluation that the 
balances proved to be a threat and then merely the official ones. The reduction in parity, it 
appears, finally reduced the resolve o f  the sterling area to hold the currency. As the 
government command paper on the 1968 Basle agreement testifies
‘The financial links between the United Kingdom and the rest o f  the 
sterling area were felt to have been loosened still further [as a result of 
devaluation]. Diversification o f reserves by sterling area countries 
increased and, in contrast to earlier periods there was a significant fall 
in the total o f  officially held sterling balances as considerable sums 
were switched into other forms o f reserves. This movement was
MIbid. See also Livingstone, J. Britain and the World Economy. (London: Penguin, 1966), p.42.
65 Bank OV44/159 C. W. McMahon ‘The Future of the Sterling Balances’, February 1968.
66 ibid.
67 ibid R. Raw and C.W. McMahon ‘The Extension of the Basle Arrangements’, 16/1/68.
particularly marked in the second quarter o f 1968, when holdings of 
sterling by central monetary institutions of the sterling area were
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depleted by £230 million.’68
However, with the enactment o f the 1968 agreement to guarantee the sterling area’s official 
holdings against further devaluation, in an exchange for a pledge by the holders not to 
diversify any further, the movements out o f sterling stopped and actually reversed. In truth 
then it was only the period between November 1967, when the devaluation occurred, and 
September 1968, when the agreement was put into force, that sterling was actually made 
vulnerable by the actions of the OSA. Although it is likely that if the agreement had not been 
put into effect, that diversification would have continued. It is fitting then, that it is the 
analysis o f this period to which the majority o f subsequent chapters are devoted.
NSA Speculation
The OSA was not the only significant holder of sterling. The non-sterling area also held a 
large portion o f the currency and its balances were divided into official and private holdings. 
Of these, the official holdings can be largely ignored because they were not prone to 
speculative movements. They were held by international organisations such as the IMF and 
the central banks o f Western Europe and the US, which possessed sterling because of their 
swap arrangements with the Bank of England.69 Therefore, these balances were unlikely to be 
run down during times when there was low confidence in the pound. In fact, the swaps were 
designed to help shield the reserves from the pressures o f speculative attacks and because 
these holders were able to obtain forward cover, they were to all intents and purposes 
guaranteed against the possibility o f devaluation.70
68 Cmnd3787, The Basle Facility and the Sterling Area. (London: HMSO, 1968), p.2-3.
Cohen, B. The Future of Sterling as an International Currency. (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 150.
70 Bank OV44/159 C. W. McMahon ‘The Future of the Sterling Balances', February 1968 and PRO 
T312/1636 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Guarantees', 2/9/66.
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This then leaves only the private balances of the NSA. These balances, by contrast, proved to 
be anything but stable. Unlike the private balances of the OSA, they were not subject to 
exchange control restrictions and it was remarkably easy for holders to convert them. Table
1.7 shows the composition o f  the balances from 1960-69. It is clear that holders had no 
particular loyalty to sterling and that movements in the balances were erratic. Indeed, during 
1960, they stood at £ 1078m, the following year they had fallen by almost £400m, only to rise 
and fall again throughout the rest of the decade. In short, they constituted hot money and were 
sensitive to changes in interest rates, the balance of payments, and the relative merits o f 
alternative currencies. As the Bank o f  England report on ‘The Problem o f the Sterling 
Balances’ attests
‘Withdrawals [of NSA private balances] tend to occur because of lack 
of confidence due to the balance of payments position or because o f a 
belief in the revaluation o f other currencies or gold.’71
When confidence in sterling returned, many private holders would switch back into sterling; 
this explains the fluctuations in the balances. However, because the flight from these balances 
usually coincided with a payments deficit, and was in fact often triggered by it, the pressure 
on the reserves was intensified.
71 Bank OV44/152 ‘The Problem of the Sterling Balances’, 1/12/65.
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Table 1.7
UK Gross liabilities to the NS A 1960-1969 £m
Year Official Private Total
1960 499 1078 1557
1961 440 680 1120
1962 375 689 1064
1963 437 853 1290
1964 379 [114] 847 1226
1965 303 [366] 845 1148
1966 332 [606] 724 1056
1967 365 [1246] 656 921
1968 161 [2010] 537 698
1969 107 ri4101 546 653
Source: PRO T267/29 “Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 16: Sterling 
Balances Since the War”, January 1972.
Note: Figures in brackets denote central bank assistance.
The Reserves
Conan has argued that the reserves available in the exchange equalisation account were 
adequate to back the currency.72 This was because very few o f  the sterling balances were 
readily convertible and many o f those funds that were liquid, if used at all, would be utilised 
to fund payments to the UK for exports. In his view, ‘liabilities that were stable did not need 
to be back by £ for £ liquid resources’.73 I accept that the reserves were large enough to cover 
the sterling area balances, shifts in hot money or the balance o f payments. Nevertheless, they 
were not large enough to deal with pressure from all three sources simultaneously. In every 
year, apart from  1961, it is clear that if pressure had borne down on the currency from all 
three directions, the reserves would have quickly become exhausted. On average, the ratio of
i
 assets to volatile liabilities was 1:1.5 throughout the 1960s. Although this was far better than 
the 1:4 ratio o f  assets to all liabilities, it is clear that there was on average a gap o f £500m 
between what was available and what would have been needed to cover movements in the 
more volatile balances.
72 Conan, A. The Rationale of the Sterling Area. (London: Macmillan, 1961), p.13.
75 ibid
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However, Conan also argues that the total reserve position was actually far better than the 
published figures made out. This was because they excluded Britain’s second line o f  reserves, 
namely, the dollar securities that were acquired during WWII by the British government.74 
These were held in the form o f 9.5 million shares, which were invested in 198 US 
companies.75 By 1965, the dollar portfolio was valued at £500m and it would seem that it 
plugged a considerable gap in the reserves.76 However by August 1966, £325m had already 
been converted from equities into dollars and had been drawn upon.77 Therefore, it is clear 
that the dollar portfolio did not close the breach in the ratio between assets and volatile 
liabilities. It actually comprised a part o f that ratio.
There was of course a third line o f reserves. In times o f absolute emergency, there was the 
possibility o f mobilising UK citizen’s private portfolio holdings. The 1965 Bank o f England 
review put the value o f the private portfolio at £3,600m-£4,000m.78 In theory, the British 
authorities could have compulsorily purchased these equities and converted them into foreign 
exchange to feed the reserves. In fact, the Treasury planned for such an eventuality from 1965 
onwards, under the code names Bootstrap and Androcles.79 Nevertheless, it would have 
proved extremely difficult to mobilise the third line reserves. Firstly, it would have taken 
many months for the Treasury to acquire ownership of portfolio. Secondly, it would have 
made the Wilson government very unpopular with the equity owning middle and upper 
classes, which would have been forced to sell their holdings to the government. Finally, the 
process o f conversion into foreign exchange would have to have been engaged in slowly. For 
if all the shares were cashed in simultaneously the returns would be have been low.
74 ibid, p.14.
75 Schenk, C. Britain and the Sterling Area, p.41.
PRO T312/1827 ‘The Possible Short-term Reflux Following a Devaluation, Table II’, undated.
77 ibid
71 PRO T295/256 Rawlinson to Radice ‘Bootstrap’, 24/11/65.
79 ibid
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Year Volatile OSA 
Balances*
Volatile NSA 
Balances
Balance
Payment
o f Total possible Available 
drain to Reserves 
reserves
Ratio
assets
liabilities
1960 300-600 1078 -397 2075 1154 1:1.8
1961 300-600 680 + 154 1126 1185 1:0.9
1962 300-600 689 + 100 1189 1002 1:1.2
1963 300-600 853 +21 1432 949 1:1.5
1964 300-600 847 -684 2131 827 1:2.6
1965 300-600 845 -208 1653 1073 1:1.5
1966 300-600 724 +70 1254 1152 1:1.08
1967 300-600 656 -396 1652 1088 1:1.5
1968 300-600 537 -310 1447 1145 1:1.3
Sources: NSA volatile balances PRO T267/29 “Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 16: Sterling Balances Since 
the War”, January 1972; OSA volatile balances Bank EID10/14 “Liquidity of Sterling Funds of RSA Countries”, 
23/8/61.; Reserve figures PRO T318/188 ‘Breakdown of gold and convertible currency reserves’, undated; 
Balance of payments, NSO data set. • It has only been possible to compile this data for 1961 and it is assumed 
that the liquefiable portion of the balances stayed relatively stable throughout the whole of the 1960s.
It is clear that the context in which sterling’s managers controlled the currency was a difficult 
one. They faced almost constant balance o f payments deficits and the continual risk o f flights 
in hot money. The reserves available to protect the currency from these tw o  sources o f 
pressure were at best slim. After the devaluation, diversification from the official sterling area 
balances was to provide a third source o f pressure and because o f this, th e  risks to the 
currency were greater than at any other time. For whilst the ratio of assets to liabilities during 
1968 looks better than during 1967, it is important to note that throughout 1968, the reserves 
were composed almost entirely o f IMF and central bank borrowings.80 In short, by this stage 
the till was actually empty.
Principal Actors81
Allen, Douglas/Lord Croham (b.1917)
Left the LSE with a first in economics in 1938 and joined the Board o f Trade. By 1966, he 
had risen to become permanent under-secretary at the DEA and in April 1968 became
80 PRO T312/189 ‘Reserve Position’, 14/3/68 and PRO T312/2132 Paper by the Bank of England 
“Potential Drain on the Reserves and facilities to meet it”, 11/10/68.
"  Biographical data obtained from various editions of Who's Who
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permanent secretary to the Treasury. He chaired the ‘Allen group’, which focused on sterling 
contingency planning, and he form ed a small internal think tank headed by Posner and 
Rawlinson. Rawlinson’s first impression of him was that ‘he could not understand how a man 
with such a clear desk had got such a grasp of the issues’.82 Allen remained at his post in the 
Treasury until 1974, when he becam e head of the home civil service. He was made a life peer 
in 1978.
Goldman, Sir Samuel (b.1912)
Studied economics at the LSE, w here he was taught by Hayek.83 After a spell in the Bank of 
England, he entered the Treasury in 1947. By 1968, he had risen to the rank of second 
permanent secretary, with special responsibility for overseas finance. During 1968, he played 
an important role in sterling contingency planning and he also co-ordinated the negotiations 
with the sterling area countries, w hich culminated in the Basle agreement. He retired from the 
Treasury in 1972 and took up a num ber of directorships.
Jenkins, Roy/Lord Jenkins ofH illhead (1921-2003)
After gaining a first in PPE from Oxford, he was commissioned into the army and during 
WW1I was drafted for code breaking duties at Bletchley Park, which he admitted he did not 
always understand. In 1948, he w as elected as a Labour MP and at 27, was the youngest 
member o f the House. When Labour won the 1964 general election, he was appointed 
Minister o f Aviation and then H om e Secretary. After the 1967 devaluation, James Callaghan 
resigned as Chancellor and Jenkins replaced him. He presided over economic policy in 1968 
and with Treasury assistance managed to avoid both a further devaluation and the floatation 
of sterling. Later he was to becom e the President o f the European Commission, in 1977. 
When he returned to British politics in the 1980s, it was as a member o f the SDP.
“  Interview with Anthony Glover 
13 Interview with Sir Samuel Goldman
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McMahon, Sir Christopher 'Kit’ (b. 1927)
Entered Oxford as a Rhodes scholar and graduated with a first in PPE in 1953. Became an 
economics assistant in the Treasury the same year and a fellow and tutor in economics at 
Oxford in 1960. He entered the Bank o f England as an advisor in 1964 and was advisor to the 
governors between 1966 and 1970. During 1968 he strongly opposed the Brutus plan and 
argued vehemently for a floating pound. He was also heavily involved in the development o f 
the guarantee scheme that formed the foundation o f the 1968 Basle agreement. In 1970, he 
was made an executive director at the Bank and by 1980, he had become its deputy governor.
O ’Brien, Leslie/Lord O ’Brien o f Lothbury (1908-1995)
Entered the Bank o f  England straight from school in 1927 and by 1964 he had risen to the 
rank o f deputy governor. He was made full governor in 1966 and was the first to be promoted 
from the ranks. His appointment came as a surprise to him but he was widely respected within 
the Bank because he encouraged freethinking.84 Although he did not take a close interest in 
sterling contingency planning, he was heavily involved in the development o f the 1968 Basle 
agreement. Initially he rejected the idea o f  using the agreement to implement a sterling 
guarantee but he soon came to see the benefits o f it. He left the Bank in 1973 and held a 
number o f directorships.
Posner, Michael (b. 1931)
Cambridge economics don, seconded to the Treasury as economic advisor from 1967-69. He 
worked on the development o f operation Brutus during the summer o f  1968. Although, after 
the successful conclusion of the 1968 Basle agreement, he recognised that a floating rate for 
sterling was no longer out o f the question and he turned his attention to Hecuba. He was later 
to become the chairman o f the SSRC, 1977-83, and the secretary-general o f the European 
science foundation, 1986-93. He is now retired and lives in Oxford.
41
Rawlinson, Sir Anthony (1926-1986)
Son of the Bishop of Derby, graduated from Oxford with a first in classics in 1949. He 
entered the Treasury in 1953; was assistant secretary from 1963 to 1968, when he was 
appointed under secretary in the finance group. He developed considerable expertise in the 
field of exchange control and was initially an enthusiastic supporter o f operation Brutus. He 
also advocated the abolition of the sterling area. After a distinguished career in the Treasury, 
he became the joint permanent secretary at the DTI. A keen mountaineer and a member o f the 
Alpine Club, he died in 1986 after falling from mount Snowdon.
Wilson, James (Harold)/Lord Wilson ofRievaulx (1916-1995)
After graduating from Oxford with a first in PPE, he became a lecturer in economics at New 
College in 1937. In 1945, he was elected Labour MP for Ormskirk and between 1947 and 
1951 he was President o f  the Board o f Trade. In 1963, he became the leader o f the Labour 
party and after the 1964 general election victory, Prime Minister. Between 1964-67, he took 
little interest in the Treasury’s contingency planning operations, but this changed after the 
devaluation. Whilst it is unclear what Wilson’s preferred course of action for sterling would 
have been in the wake o f a crisis, it is clear that he used the Treasury’s planning dossiers as 
leverage to cajole the international financial community into backing sterling. After Labour 
lost the 1970 general election, he became leader o f the opposition. However, success at the 
polls led to a second term of office from 1974, although he resigned in 1976.
,4 Interview with Sir Jeremy Morse
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, I will outline the theoretical framework that will be utilised to make sense of 
our object o f investigation. This inquiry begins with the premise that the political and 
economic spheres are socially constructed entities.1 In other words, although at an ontological 
level it is presumed that the world is made up o f  brute data, at the epistemological level, this 
account recognises that agents interpret and make sense o f that world through their thought 
process, perception, language and beliefs. This means that, from such a perspective, the 
political realm operates within a web o f constructions and that political science is the study of 
those constructions.2 What then, are the implications of this particular set o f assumptions for 
the conduct o f this research project?
Firstly, because it is assumed that agents within the political realm operate within a web of 
their own constructions, what we call out data are really only constructions. This means that 
analysis must be interpretative. The aim o f the inquiry must be to understand the meanings 
that the agents themselves ascribe to their surroundings and their behaviour.3 The 
development o f theory on the basis o f some sort o f principle o f scientific causation is 
something to be avoided. This is because: (a) many of the important relationships between 
social phenomena within political institutions cannot be directly observed since they have no 
direct physical embodiment and (b) scientific theories only serve to simplify a complex social 
reality for the purpose of developing predicative hypotheses.4 Parsimony can only be 
achieved at the cost o f  sacrificing the realism o f ones theoretical assumptions.5
1 Searle, J. The Construction of Social Reality. (London: Penguin, 1995), p.165; Brown, C. 
Understanding International Relations. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.52 and Taylor, C. Philosophy 
and the Human Sciences. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.19-21.
21 do of course recognise that these theoretical assumptions are not empirically testable. They do 
however, provide a useful perspective from which the observer can make sense of the events that they 
observe. See Hay, C. Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.64
3 Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures. (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p.20.
4 Hay, c. Political Analysis, p.29.
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Therefore, academic inquiry o f this sort must be interpretative.* 6 The scholar must attempt to 
make sense of the constructions that emerge from the interactions of the agents that are being 
investigated. The observer reconstructs the constructions of those that are being observed, so 
that they can be rendered and described in great detail.7 The aim is to record the discourse that 
emerges from agent interaction and to turn it from a passing event that exists only in its own 
time frame and into an account that is preserved, albeit imprecisely, for study.8 However, that 
fact that this sort o f exercise is a reconstruction is something that cannot be emphasised 
enough. What it means is that the observer is forced to engage in the double hermeneutic.9 
Our analysis is made up o f ‘our construction of other people’s constructions o f what they and 
their compatriots are up to ’.10 1 This means that the inquiry itself is a second order 
interpretation o f other people’s first order interpretations.
It also means that methodologically, the research gathered and utilised in this project is by its 
very nature qualitative: unstructured elite interviews and archival analysis were the principal 
methods of data collection employed. However, the interpretative method also has 
implications for the process o f  theory generation. As the aim of the inquiry is to reconstruct a 
particular set o f  events, it means that the role o f theory must be to provide a vocabulary in 
which the observer can make sense o f their observations and place them within an intelligible 
framework." If such theory is to be a useful vehicle through which to reconstruct, it needs to 
stay as close to the ground as possible, to avoid being overly abstract. It cannot be either 
inductive or deductive but must be both inductive and deductive. By this, I mean that if  the 
researcher begins entirely upon a deductive basis, then their a priori categories and
King, G., Kohane, R„ and Verba, S. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.20. Whilst King et al draw this conclusion 
they do believe that there is some place for parsimony in the political sciences.
6 Winch, P. The Idea of the Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1958),
p.93-94.
Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures, p.l 5. 
ibid, p. 19
9 Marsh, D. and Furlong, P, ‘A Skin Not a Sweater’, in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.). Theory and 
Methods in Political Science. (2nd ed.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 19.
10 Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures, p.2.
11 ibid, p.24.
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conceptions will cloud their ability to immerse themselves in the constructions o f the actors 
they investigate.12 Instead, there is the danger that the observer will merely project their 
worldview onto those being observed, rather than attempt to make sense of reality from the 
perspective o f those they observe.
The alternative is to operate inductively, to begin with no preconceptions, to finely comb the 
available data and to then search for a theory that best renders it. However, I accept that such 
an approach is equally dubious. Without some prior theoretical assumptions, no matter how 
basic, it would be impossible for the scholar to have any conception of politics, to decide 
which events are worthy of empirical investigation and upon what basis that investigation 
should proceed.13 It is because o f  this that the solution is to bum the candle from both ends 
and to operate both inductively and deductively. The inquiry must be deductive to the extent 
that some sort o f basic theory is required to get the enterprise o ff the ground in the first place. 
In fact, in the preceding discussion I have broadly outlined the deductive assumptions that 
framed this inquiry. The only deductive assumptions that have not yet been explicitly stated 
are:
■ That this project proceeds on the basis that the study o f British economic policy in the 
1960s is a fruitful endeavour and that the topic area should be studied for its own sake.
■ In terms o f structure-agency, this account must place more emphasis on agency. For the 
institutional structures that agents work within and which are seen as constraining or 
shaping their actions are actually created by them through their interaction and have little 
physical embodiment outside agents’ own mental conceptions. This does not mean that 
institutional structure is irrelevant or that it does not constrain. It simply means that 
structures that restrict agents in their choice o f  institutional action are in reality those that
” Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. (London: Routlege, 1969), p.53.
Weber, M. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. (New York: Free Press, 1969), p.29.
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they have mentally created themselves and that those institutional constraints are wholly 
perceived. When agents bring about institutional alteration or transformation, the strategy 
they employ in that process will be greatly influenced by the imagined institutional 
constraints that they collectively adhere to. Yet, in bringing about such change they are in 
effect doing little more than altering their collective mentality. However, this new 
institutional mentality will in turn alter the framework within which future institutional 
change is brought about.14 The most striking aspect o f this process is that agents treat 
these perceived constraints as real brute entities, which clearly they are not.15
In theoretical terms, the rest o f this work proceeds inductively. The grounded theory that has 
been used as an aid in the formation o f my second order interpretation of the first order 
interpretation of those I observe16, was developed only after data collection ceased. As much 
of the pre-existing theoretical literature as possible was mined in order to determine which 
theory or theories best illuminated the object of study. However these theoretical formulations 
hover so low over the interpretations they are used to make sense of that they may not make 
much sense or hold much interest outside that framework.17
After data collection had ceased the process o f developing an empirically grounded 
theoretical framework was embarked on. In the search for the most appropriate framework, 
and given my ontological and epistemological assumptions, three questions were posited:
1. How are we to conceptualise the relations between the various actors that take part in 
the policy process we are investigating?
2. What makes it necessary for our actors to act?
14 See Pierson, P. ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’,
Comparative Political Studies. Vol.23, 1996, p.122-63.
16 Searle, J. The Construction of Social Reality, p.42.
Geertz, c. The Interpretation of Cultures, p i 5-
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3. What is it that motivates them to choose one kind of response over another?
Within political science, these issues would normally be conceptualised within the bounds of 
a theory o f the state. This is because theories o f the state generally contain within them an 
account o f how the state is organised (1), assumptions relating to the interests that state actors 
pursue (3) and an explanation o f why crises occur and consequently why it is necessary for 
the state to exist (2).17 8 However, it is not self evident that the state is the most appropriate unit 
of analysis for this inquiry. Firstly, although the state is a concept that is inter-subjectively 
recognised within most facets o f British society, there is little agreement upon what exactly is 
within, or for that matter outside, its bounds.19 In other words, there is a problem o f  definition.
Secondly, theories o f the state tend to be couched in very abstract terms and this means that it 
is difficult to plug them into empirical reality in a way that makes them useful vehicles for the 
analysis of relations between political actors. One possible solution would be to accept that 
there is no commonly agreed account o f the state, with respect to our three questions, but to 
maintain the concept as our principal unit o f  analysis. If this tactic were pursued much o f the 
proceeding discussion would centre on how the state is defined and how a theory of it is 
operationalised, so that it might usefully inform our empirical data. If this study were 
primarily focused on the relations between ‘state’ actors and ‘non-state’ actors then this 
approach would have certain attractions. This is because theories o f the state are, overall, a 
very useful device for conceptualising the relations between actors in the public and private
17 ibid, p.2J.
" Dunleavy, p. and O’Leary, B. Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy.
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987) break their analysis of state theories down into the following 
categories: State organisation, crises and methods and values, p.vii.
For example Althuser, L. ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in his Lenin and Philosophy. 
(London: New Left Books, 1971) argues that in capitalist societies the family is part of the state. Whilst 
Anderson, P. ‘The Anatomies of Antonio Gramsci’ New Left Review. 161, p.20-77, denies that this is 
the case, except under fascism. For an examination of rival definitions of the state see Hay, C.
Restating Social and Political Change. (Buckingham: OUP, 1996), ch.l and Mann, M. States. War and 
Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p.4.
47
spheres, irrespective of their other weaknesses.20 However, the current inquiry almost 
exclusively centres on relations between actors within the public sphere. Therefore, it is not 
essential to postulate a well worked out account o f the relations between ‘state’ and ‘non­
state’ actors. By abandoning the state, as the main unit o f  analysis, it is possible to seek out or 
devise a formalised account o f the relationship between the economic policymakers that is 
less macro, and more meso, and which more closely approximates empirical reality. As well 
as this, it is possible to make such a conceptualisation more neutrally grounded in terms o f  its 
assumptions about actors’ rationale for action. In the remainder o f this chapter, the focus will 
shift to the development o f  an account that can help us to answer the three questions that have 
previously been posited.
1. How are we to conceptualise the relations between the various actors that take 
part in the policy process we are investigating?
I f  the state is not to be used as the primary unit o f analysis, and the development o f a theory 
o f  it is to be abandoned, it becomes necessary to propose a more useful alternative. One 
possibility would be to narrow the focus from state to government, in the manner that 
pluralists tend to.21 However, within the popular psyche government is thought to refer to the 
hundred or so ministers that sit atop the Whitehall machine. Yet, it is clear that these ministers 
are not the only individuals that are involved in economic policymaking. Furthermore, the 
vast majority of those one hundred ministers are actually excluded.22 Therefore, if  focus were 
narrowly placed on government, a large number o f actors, that potentially had great impact of 
economic policy, would be excluded from our deliberations. The solution might be for us to
20 This is usefully characterised in terms o f ‘input politics’. See Dunleavy, P. and O’Leary, B. Theories 
of the State. p.U.
j2 Dyson, K. The State Tradition in Western Europe. (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p.4.
In the field of external economic policy in 1960s Britain less than ten ministers, and often fewer than 
five, played any part in decision making. See Castle, B. Diaries. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1984), p.462.
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widen our definition of government, so that it also included other actors that were involved in 
economic policymaking. However the price for such a conceptual slight of hand would be that 
our notion o f government would differ greatly from that employed by both scholars and 
policymakers; the concept would no longer be grounded in empirical reality and instead 
would become as vacuous as ‘the state’.
A more inclusive alternative framework that has been usefully employed in the past is the 
Westminster model™ At heart, it is an organising perspective that works on the assumption 
that parliament and not government should be treated as the principal actor.24 This is because 
government is drawn from parliament, its actions are scrutinised by it, and its legislation 
requires parliamentary approval. It is possible that by widening our focus to parliament, from 
the rather more narrow conception o f government, that many o f the important economic 
policymakers will be brought back into the analytic fold. The model also has the advantage of 
mirroring the popular perception of the policy process as reported in the media. However, the 
approach is lacking in terms o f its fit with empirical reality. Whilst it is clear that the Wilson 
government relied on its majority and the support o f its MPs in the House, in order to operate 
as a governing entity, there is little evidence that the legislature played any significant role in 
economic policymaking. None of the recently released archival documents in any way 
suggests that parliament was an important actor in this field. In fact, very few o f  the 
contingency plans produced would have required an act o f parliament in order to be 
implemented.23 This was because, in most cases, the prerequisite legislation was already on 
the statue books. This does not mean that a parliament centred approach would be useless for 
analysing other issues or policy areas; it simply means that there is no fit between such a 
perspective and the present data set.
23 Rhodes, R. Understanding Governance. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), p.5. 
See Mackintosh, J. The Politics and Governance of Britain. (London: Hutchinson, 1977). 
Interview with Anthony Glover.
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The available data, which has been collated from interviews and archival analysis, strongly 
suggests that the principal actors involved in the development o f economic planning in the 
mid to late 1960s were: the Treasury; the Bank of England; a small number government 
ministers, most notably the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, and very occasionally the 
entire Cabinet.26 This means that our organising perspective must attempt to unravel the 
relations and power dynamics between these institutions. O f the pre-packaged theories that 
are still available, the core executive would appear to offer the most analytic mileage.27 This 
is because
•  It is compatible with the assumption that political institutions are socially 
constructed entities. In other words, it does not become necessary to 
abandon the notion that bodies like the Treasury and the Bank o f  England 
are imagined entities which exist primarily within the minds o f their 
members;28 or that they evolve through the development o f shared 
meanings amongst their membership and that this results in the 
emergence o f an institutional identity. This means that it is possible to 
view many o f the structural enablers and disablers that affect policy 
outcomes as the product o f the mental conceptions that actors develop 
regarding what is acceptable policy and what is not. •
•  Furthermore, the core executive prism postulates that the policymaking 
process is best viewed in terms of the interaction between central political 
institutions such as the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Cabinet Committees and 
key co-ordinating departments such as the Treasury and the Foreign
"6 See the following PRO series: CAB 130 ‘Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees (GEN, MISC and REF 
Series), 1945-1970’; PREM 13 ‘Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1964-1979’ and 
T295 ‘Treasury: Finance Overseas and Co-ordination Division: (2F Series), 1954-1972’.
For a discussion of the core executive concept see Dunleavy, P. and Rhodes, R. ‘Core Executive 
Studies in Britain', Public Administration. 68. 1990, p.3-28.
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Office.29 However, it is arguable that in its choice o f departments to focus 
on, the theory is somewhat lacking. This is because in our policy area, the 
Foreign Office acts only at the periphery, whilst the Bank o f England, 
along with the other actors on the core executive list, assumes great 
importance.
•  Yet, the apparent weakness is in no way real. This is because the core 
executive perspective recognises that the policymaking process is 
dynamic and that the specific institutions and actors that are prevalent can 
alter both temporally and across sub-fields.30 In short, the approach does 
not attempt to overly simplify our understanding o f the policy process but 
instead it seeks to capture its true complexity.
Core executive theory, and this study, proceeds on the basis o f a number o f assumptions about 
the interaction o f institutional actors. The first is that it is impossible to locate an absolute and 
authoritative source o f power within the British political system. No one single actor or 
institution within the polity has accrued so many structural advantages that they are able to 
bend the will o f other actors to make it match their own. Instead, it is argued that the core 
executive has been constructed in such a manner as to ensure that power is dispersed through 
its branches.11 This is because actors within it are mutually dependent on one another, as no 
single institution or actor possesses all o f  the necessary resources for them to achieve the 
outcome that they desire. This means that the political process progresses in an environment in 
which actors must exchange resources with one another in order to bring about policy 
outcomes. It is through the process o f exchange that actors can influence the policy process. 
However, not all actors and institutions control an equal amount o f resources and those that *10
21 This builds upon Anderson's conception of the nation as an imagined entity. See Anderson, B. 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. (London: Verso, 1983).
Smith, M. The Core Executive in Britain. (London: Macmillan, 1999), p.2.
10 ibid
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they do control are liable to alter over time, depending on the context o f exchange and the 
tactics that they utilise in the deployment o f their resources.
Second, it is argued that because the core executive is both large and fragmented, it is 
impossible for it to manage British economic policy as a collective body. Instead, it breaks 
itself down into smaller overlapping units that develop expertise in particular sub-fields, 
including economic management.31 2 For example, during the 1960s, it is possible to distinguish 
between sub-divisions that focused on the management o f the domestic economy and those 
that centred on the external side. Even the sub-field o f  external economic management was 
further divided into smaller segments that dealt with exchange control, the sterling balances, 
Western European policy and contingency planning.33 Interested parties drawn from the 
Treasury, Bank, and ministerial circles staffed these sub-divisions.
In recent years, the concept ofpolicy networks has been used by scholars to make sense of and 
capture this process and it is a concept that I choose to employ.34 However I do not treat it as 
an independent variable that explains policy change and accord it the status o f a theory, but 
instead view it as a useful metaphor/organising perspective that aids in the development o f my 
second order interpretation.351 do however recognise that many o f the scholars that make use 
of the policy network approach tend to use it as a means o f  conceptualising the relations 
between the core executive and civil society.36 Yet, as I have already stated, this analysis 
focuses almost exclusively on the relations between actors within the core executive and it is 
possible that the idea o f a policy network is not particularly appropriate in our case. If the 
concept is to be retained for usage within this study then there are two possible rejoinders to
31 ibid, p. 11.
32 Dunleavy, P. and O’Leary, B. Theories of the State, p.172-3. See also Mosely, The Making of 
Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence from Britain and the US since 1945. (Brighton: Harvester,
1984).
33 See for example PRO T199/1239 ‘H.M. Treasury Organisational Chart, July 1968’.
34 Smith, M. The Core Executive in Britain, p.18.
Hay, C. ‘The Tangled Webs We Weave: The Discourse, Strategy and Practise of Networking’ in 
Marsh, D. (ed.) Comparing Policy Networks. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), p.34.
36 Marsh, D. ‘Development of the Policy Network Approach’ in his Comparing Policy Networks, p.8.
this. The first would be to argue that not all o f the actors involved in our brand o f  economic 
policymaking are drawn from the core executive and that some civil society members were 
included. It could be argued that the Bank of England should be treated as part o f civil society 
and that it is a peak organisation which represents the interests o f the City of London, the 
domestic banking system and the overseas sterling area.37 Furthermore, it would be argued that 
it has attained the status o f a peak insider group because o f  its role in controlling the EEA and 
because o f  the fact that it has expertise in financial management that the core executive can 
draw upon.
However, there are clear difficulties in defining the Bank as a civil society player. First, it is 
evident that when the Bank was nationalised in 1946 it became a public body and it is 
therefore more proper to view it as an executive agency.38 Second, even if it were possible, 
through some slight o f hand, to retain the notion of the Bank as a peak association, this 
account would now contain both core executive and civil society players. Whilst this would 
aid the quest to utilise the concept o f  policy networks, it would present further difficulties. Part 
o f the reason that it was possible to dispense so swiftly with the idea of developing a theory of 
the state was that such theories are generally used as an aid in mapping the relations between 
the core executive and civil society. If the Bank is to be treated as a civil society player, then 
there is the danger that a theory o f the state would have to be brought back into the fold.
The second rejoinder, and perhaps the more plausible, is to argue that policy networks are 
fluid and dynamic. That at times they can be composed o f both core executive and civil 
society players but at other times, and in our particular case, these networks can be made up 
solely o f core executive actors. Therefore a network must be conceived of as an alliance 
between two or more institutions, either from within our outside the core executive, that come 
together for the purpose of devising a solution to an issue that has been defined by them or by
” Grant, W. Economic Policy in Britain. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.201-203.
Fforde, J. The Bank of England and Public Policy: 1941-58. (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), p. 7&30.
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others as problematic.39 This definition therefore presupposes two things. Firstly, that 
networking is not a phenomenon that is engaged in solely by policymakers, it can also take 
place within the private sphere. O f course in our case, we are interested in networking within 
the core executive. However, it is also recognised that at times these networks can be trans­
national and that they can incorporate players from different nations, where those players also 
define an issue as problematic. Secondly, for a network to form there must be some sort of 
shared goal or outcome that the interested networking parties wish to work towards.40
Furthermore, networks will generally operate only were collective action is more likely to 
bring about the declared goal that singular institutional action. After all, if one o f the parties in 
the policy network were able to bring about their policy objectives without networking, then 
there would be no need to network.41 However, because power within the core executive is so 
widely dispersed its member institutions must network. In short, for a network to form, it is 
clear that there must be: (a) the belief amongst the potential network partners that there is a 
problem that needs tackling, or there would be nothing to network about; (b) shared 
overarching goals between the partners in terms o f  the resolution of that problem, or they 
would refuse to network; (c) a sense o f mutual dependency in terms of resources, expertise 
and authority, or there would be no need to network and (d) shared social constructions about 
the nature o f the political realm, or they would be unable to network.
However, networks will not develop spontaneously. For them to be established requires the 
existence o f a dominant partner that searches for other interested parties that can help it 
achieve its goals. Nonetheless, because o f the complex nature o f network relations, the party 
that dominates may change over time, depending on its resources, and different parties may 
dominate different sub-nodes o f the same overarching network.42 For example within the
39 Hay, C. ‘The Tangled Webs We Weave’, p.38.
40 ibid
41 ibid, p.39.
42 Smith, M. The Core Executive in Britain, p.17.
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broad umbrella o f the external economic policy network, it is clear that the Treasury acted as 
hegemon in the sub-sphere of contingency planning and that the Bank was dominant in the 
forging o f  a network to develop a workable sterling guarantee scheme.41
It is also clear that network membership also alters over time. Players will come and go 
depending on the resources they have to contribute and the degree to which their goals 
coincide with those o f  the wider network. For example, in the Treasury dominated 
contingency planning network representatives from Customs and the Board o f Trade were 
admitted briefly because they had expertise that was of use to the network core.44 They 
acquiesced in this arrangement because it gave them the opportunity to influence the shape of 
economic policy. However, when their expertise was no longer useful they were removed 
from the network, which reformed around Bank-Treasury-Ministerial lines. Furthermore, if a 
network is able to devise a successful solution to the problem it was designed to tackle, then 
that network will cease to exist.
As these networks are dynamic, fluid and overlapping it is impossible to capture them and 
map them once and for all, even within a single policy area over a relatively short period of 
time. However, core executive networks in the field o f external economic management do 
usually contain some sort o f ministerial presence.41 This is because it is elected politicians that 
hold the legal authority to make executive decisions. Yet, it is wrong to think o f these policy 
networks as committees comprising both ministers and civil servants. Instead it is more useful 
to view them as the composite o f two concentric circles; one made up of bureaucrats and the 
other o f  elected politicians. The vast majority o f individuals working within one circle will 
have little or no contact with the membership o f the other. Information exchange between the
See PRO T295/489 ‘Contingency Planning’, 15/3/68 and Bank OV44/159 McMahon ‘The Future of 
the Sterling Balances’, February 1968.
44 Interview with Lord Croham
For evidence of this see PRO CAB 130/499 ‘Minutes of MISC 205 (68) 1“ Meeting’, 17/3/68.
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two will generally occur via an individual or small group of individuals that act as an interface, 
for example the Cabinet Secretary, or through the written word.46
The central resource o f  the ministerial circle is its authority and its key function is to decide 
upon the course o f action to be taken to deal with the perceived problem.47 The bureaucratic 
element should not however be viewed as neutral implementers of policy. Its key resources are 
(1) the ability to define certain issues as problems and to ignore others and (2) its monopoly on 
knowledge and expertise. Through this monopoly, it is possible for it to define issues in 
certain ways and to highlight some policy options and to purposefully ignore others.48 In this 
manner, it is feasible for the bureaucratic circle to shape the environment in which the 
ministerial circle makes its choices. It is because of this, that it is best to view power as 
dispersed throughout the network. The fact that neither the political or bureaucratic circles are 
unified entities further adds to the complexity of the power dynamic. For example, within the 
bureaucratic external economic policy circle in the 1960s, the Bank and Treasury had 
developed very different institutional imperatives and agendas. The Treasury contingent 
tended to couch its position in terms of its desire to maintain the stability o f the international 
financial system, whilst the Bank was more concerned with protecting the City o f  London and 
its customers, the sterling balance holders.49 Where there was a single policy that would 
achieve the institutional aims of both bodies, then the bureaucratic element would be unified in 
its approach to the ministerial circle, but where there was not, they could not.50 Furthermore, it 
is also difficult to conceive of the ministerial circle in any given policy network as a unified 
entity. This is because ministers are likely to be members o f many different policy networks
*  Interview with Anthony Glover.
47 Smith, M. The Core Executive in Britain, p. 117-119.
„ Brittan, S. Iht Treasury Under the Tori«; 1951-1964, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1964), p.303-306.
J0 Interview with Sir Kit McMahon.
See for example Bank OV44/167 Morse to O’Brien, 9/7/68 and PRO T295/514 Figgures to Goldman 
‘Brandon and Androcles' 20/6/68 which suggest that whilst the Treasury were lobbying ministers to 
dismantle the sterling area the Bank of England were opposed to the idea.
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and are unlikely to have the time available to consult with their colleagues on a regular basis in 
order to develop an agreed line prior to the meeting of the network in question.51
It is clear then, that these networks provide the structural context in which strategic decisions 
are taken by actors that are mutually dependent on one another for the success of any given 
strategy. It is with the context o f  networks that problems are defined, solutions considered and 
through collective action, those solutions are employed. The actions of agents within a 
network in bringing about institutional change will however alter the contextual structure 
within which future decisions are taken.52 Furthermore, because the policymaking process 
does not operate within a vacuum, the actions taken will not only alter the structural terrain of 
the network within which it was taken. It is likely that they will also affect the choices and 
strategies of actors working within other networks both within and outside the policy field in 
question. In other words, there is a high degree o f  path dependency.53 Networks will also act 
as a site for policy learning. It is through the process o f networking that actors can evaluate the 
success or failure of previous strategies and hypothesise about the implications of future 
ones.54
2. What makes it necessary for our actors to act?
In the preceding section, the concepts o f the core executive and policy networks were 
elucidated as vehicles through which to make sense o f the context that our chosen actors 
operate within. However, it was also made clear that in order for networks to  form in any 
given policy area, there must be some issue which is defined by agents as problematic and as
51 Simon highlights this problem when he refers to bounded rationality. See Simon, H. Administrative 
Behaviour. (New York: Free Press, 1957), p.3.
See Sabatier, P and Jenkins-Smith, H. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework’ in Sabatier, P. Theories 
gf the Policy Process. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), p. 122.
Lowndes, V. ‘Institutionalism’, in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. Theory and Methods in Political 
Seisms, (2nd ed.), p.101.
Hay, C. ‘The Tangled Webs We Weave’, p.43.
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requiring a concerted attempt by them at collective resolution. In short, there must be 
something that makes it necessary for our actors to act.
This account assumes that the behaviour o f our actors must be viewed in terms of crisis 
management and crisis avoidance. In other words, our agents act in response to the possible or 
actual onset o f crisis conditions.55 However, a crisis cannot be understood from outside the 
perspective of those that define and experience it.56 It is through agent interaction that 
structures like the international economic system develop and through interaction that agents 
define the rules that constitute the normal operation o f  those economic structures. Therefore a 
crisis is the moment at which some group o f actors come to the realisation that the structures 
that they uphold and work within are: (a) no longer operating in what they regard to be normal 
tolerance: (b) that they have exhausted the available techniques of amelioration and (c) that if 
the structural framework broke down, this would be regarded by the actors, for whatever 
reason, as catastrophic.57 The mere fact that a structure has broken down is not enough to 
guarantee the event the status o f a crisis, for it to be a crisis proviso C must also hold.
It is assumed that the Bank-Treasury-Ministerial core executive network was united in its 
belief that the destabilisation o f  sterling and/or the international monetary system would be 
catastrophic (c). At this level, the network can be viewed as a unitary actor. Yet, the individual 
motives for agents holding position (c) might be different, and in fact might alter over time. 
Furthermore, the strategies for crisis resolution advocated by each o f the respective actors may 
also differ in light o f their conflicting motivations for holding (c) to be true. Therefore at this 
level, it is possible that the network is not a unitary actor.
35 - r i  . ,This section also proceeds inductively and the decision to use a crisis framework was made after I 
had analysed the official documents.
Habermas, J. Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976), p.l; Hay, C. Restating Social and 
Political Change, p.86-87 and Jackson, R. ‘Crisis Management and Policymaking: an Explanation of 
Theory and Research’ in Rose, R. (ed.) The Dynamic? of Public Policy: a Comparative Analysis. 
(London: Sage, 1976), p.209.
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However, the fact that these agents all agree on the definition of what constitutes a crisis is not 
enough for them to begin networking. There must also be the shared belief that the economic 
structures are no longer working within their normal tolerance levels (a), and that if some 
intervention is not embarked upon it will only be a matter o f time before it is too late and 
available mechanisms for crisis resolution are exhausted (b). Therefore, it is also postulated 
that proposition (a) also holds true and that the external economic system was not working 
within normal tolerance levels. This was because:
•  Firstly, there were insufficient foreign exchange reserves with which to maintain the 
stability o f sterling.58
•  Secondly, that Britain was in almost continual balance of payments deficit and this 
placed the meagre reserves under intolerable and constant strain.59
•  Thirdly, that because o f its role as banker to the sterling area, the UK held on 
deposit, in London, liabilities that far outstripped the reserves available to back those 
claims.60
•  Finally, these three weaknesses undermined confidence in the pound to such a degree 
that speculation against it was rife.6'
As our group o f institutional actors within the core executive believed that the collapse o f  the 
fixed exchange rate system was to be regarded as catastrophic (c) and because it was also clear 
that the economic system was not working within acceptable tolerances (a), they attempted to 
ensure that proposition (b) would be avoided and they entered into network relations in order
”  °ffe, C. Contradictions of the Welfare State. (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p.36-39.
PRO T318/188 ‘ Breakdown of Gold and Convertible Currency Reserves’, January 1968.
’ Financial Statistics. (CSO: No.93, Jan. 1970), p.95.
PRO T267/29 ‘THM: the Sterling Balances Since the War’, undated.
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to avert the onset o f a full scale crisis. Consequently, institutional actors formed themselves 
into two types o f overlapping networks in order to manage the currency. The first type of 
network predominantly searched for techniques to reduce the likelihood of crisis. The second 
type engaged in contingency planning. In other words, it considered the possibility o f alternate 
futures in which crises did occur because the techniques employed by agents in the first type 
o f network failed to stabilise the international economic structures.62 The main function of this 
type o f network was to dampen the effects o f  any external economic crisis that could not be 
avoided. However, both o f these network types operated within a context o f mutual path 
dependency. In other words, the success or failures o f the strategies employed by the first type 
o f network influenced the future choices o f the second type and vice versa.
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3. What is it that motivates them to choose one kind of response over another?
Thus far, I have explained how institutional actors within the core executive form themselves 
into policy networks in order to resolve issues that they or others have defined as problematic. 
However, I have not attempted to explain how the decision making process works within 
networks or what it is that motivates our institutional actors to agree on one possible means of
Hircsh, F. The Pound Sterling: a Polemic. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1965), p.24.
Rosenthal, U. and Kouzmin, A. ‘Globalizing an Agenda for Contingencies and Crisis Management: 
an editorial statement’ Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. Vol.l (1), 1993, p.l.
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problem resolution rather than another. In this section I w ill attempt to resolve this deficiency, 
because it is clear that there are many strategies that economic policymakers could have 
employed in order to ameliorate the problem o f sterling. In fact, it is evident that there were 
broadly four different approaches that could have been utilised. These were:61 *3
• First Order Change, which constitutes tinkering with the settings of the pre-existing 
instruments for economic control. This includes raising interest rates to attract foreign 
capital and increase the size of the reserves. Using credit controls and public 
expenditure caps to deflate the economy in order to  ensure that British goods will be 
redirected to the export market, to improve the balance o f payments. Borrowing 
money from foreign governments and central banks and lowering the exchange rate in 
order to reduce the propensity of speculative attacks and to make British exports more 
internationally competitive.
• Second Order Change refers to the development and deployment o f new instruments 
in order to uphold the fixed rate system. This would include the implementation of a 
system o f  import controls, in order to physically reduce the amount o f goods entering 
the UK, in an attempt to improve the balance o f  payments.64 The development of a 
sterling area guarantee scheme which would protect the sterling balances from a 
reduction in the exchange rate, thereby reducing the propensity o f holders to convert 
their holdings into foreign exchange.65 The extension o f exchange control to 
physically prevent the conversion o f the sterling balances66 and the mobilisation of 
UK citizen’s private portfolio holdings to bolster the official reserves.67
61 This Framework has been adapted from Hall, P. 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State:
the Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics. 1993, p.27J-296.
64 See PRO T312/2914 ‘Sterling Contingency Planning: UK Import Controls- Operation Orestes
(Quantitative import controls) January 1969-December 1971,
M s«  PRO T267/33 ‘THM on the 1968 Basle Agreement’, undated.
See PRO T295/514 ‘Operation Brandon (Exchange Control within the Sterling Area), 1968’.
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• Third Order Change, which amounts to institutional actors within our two types of 
policy networks abandoning the central policy that had hitherto been used as a 
mechanism for upholding the external economic structures and instead replacing it 
with something else. In other words, agents abandon the goal o f  maintaining a fixed 
rate o f  exchange as a means of upholding global capitalism and instead implement a 
system o f floating rates or a crawling peg.68 This type of change can occur for a 
number o f reasons, including (1) the failure o f  first or second order changes to 
stabilise the existing economic sub-system. (2) The belief that the first or second order 
change required to bring about stability involves more costs to the overarching 
economic system than implementing third order change. Alternatively, (3) because o f 
a wider change in the belief systems of actors, which may be wholly unrelated to the 
possibility o f crisis within the economic sub-system.
• Fourth Order Change, which in essence refers not only to a change of goals within 
the pre-existing economic system but the wholesale abandonment o f  that system.69 In 
other words, a fourth order change would refer not to a shift from fixed rates to 
floating rates but from capitalism to post-capitalism. However, I will not elaborate any 
further on this possible type of change because it is not relevant to an understanding of 
the events that this framework has been designed to render.
What then, is it that predisposes our institutional actors to advance one type of change over 
another? Firstly, it is postulated that institutional actors are satisfiers rather than maximisers. 
As they do not have the time or cognitive capacity to search out all possible remedies they will 
satisfice and choose a course that is good enough to meet their desires.70 In other words, they
67 See PRO T295/256 ‘Redeployment of Overseas Assets (Operation Bootstrap) 1965-1967’.
See PRO T312/2544 ‘Sterling Contingency Planning: Operation Hecuba 1968-1969’.
7o Hay, C. Restating Social and Political Change, p.95.
0 Mosely, P. The Making of Economic Policy, p.106.
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will make incremental change. Within our context agents’ [fourth order] goal is broadly to 
uphold a system o f international capitalism. Prior exchanges have determined that this goal 
was to be achieved within a [third order] framework of a fixed exchange rate. When that 
framework appears to be operating sub-optimally and there is the risk that it might unravel, 
agents will search for strategies that might enable them to stabilise it. As they are satisficers, 
they will engage in a limited search. Not all alternatives will be examined. Instead those 
alternatives which are most familiar to decision makers, which deviate least from the existing 
practices will be examined first, in order to cut down the information and transition costs 
associated with more radical change.71 In short, they will begin by implementing first order 
change and alter the settings o f  the existing instruments, in the hope that it will re-stabilise the 
third order framework and hence ensure the continued operation of the fourth order system.
Once first order change has been embarked upon, agents within the external economic policy 
networks will examine the impact that their intervention has had on the third order framework 
in order to determine whether any further intervention is required. Where further intervention 
is required agents must determine whether or not supplementary adjustment to the settings of 
existing instruments will be successful in bringing about stability and whether or not the costs 
associated with further setting changes outweigh the rewards. In other words, it will become 
clear to policymakers that there are only so many changes that can be made to the settings of 
the existing instruments before those changes begin to have dire consequences for other 
aspects o f economic management. For example, it would not be possible for policymakers to 
increase interest rates ad infinitum in order to attract foreign capital to the city o f London. 
There would quickly come a point when further rate changes became detrimental to the 
operation o f  the domestic economy, in terms of its effect upon the housing market and in terms 
of consumption.
71 Cyert, R. and March, J. A Behavioural Theory of the Firm. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.l 18.
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When institutional actors become aware o f the fact that either: (a) changes to the settings of 
the existing instruments are having no stabilising effect; or (b) that setting changes are having 
an effect but that there is no further scope to bring them about or that the effect is not being 
felt quickly enough, they will then more fully consider the possibility o f implementing second 
order change.72 As has already been outlined, this form o f change involves the crafting o f  new 
policy instruments that can be used to stabilise the third order framework. New instruments 
will however only be crafted when agents believe that there is sufficient time to develop them 
and when the costs involved in deploying them are considered to be less than the costs of 
altering the pre-existing third order framework. Where time is available and the costs are 
considered to be low, second order change will occur and the crafting o f new  policy 
instruments will allow a greater degree o f first order change because there will be more 
instrument settings to alter. However, where there is insufficient time or when the costs are 
deemed too great or where deployment occurs but fails to meet the desired objective of 
stability, institutional actors will instead consider the possibility of third order change. In 
short, they will prepare themselves for the prospect o f replacing the entire framework that they 
use to achieve their fourth order goal. In the context o f external economic policy, this means 
considering whether or not to move away from a system o f  fixed exchange rates towards 
something more flexible.
Nonetheless, whilst this framework enables us to render the context within which institutional 
actors incrementally adjust the strategies they use in order to achieve their goals, it fails to do 
three things. Firstly, it fails to tell us why our agents hold their particular fourth order goal in 
the first place. Secondly, it does not tell us why institutional actors often disagree on the first, 
second and third order mechanisms that should be used in order to achieve that fourth order 
goal. Thirdly, it also fails to tell us how agents arbitrate between their differing proposed first, 
second and third order strategies. These omissions point to a serious deficiency within the
72
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theoretical framework but one that is difficult counter once and for all. However, in the 
remainder o f  this chapter I will outline a number o f plausible hypotheses and provide a 
preliminary indication as to which is/are most beneficial to our interpretation.
Hypothesis 1- a passive core executive
This interpretation would view the core executive as a passive mechanism that is controlled 
entirely from the outside by agents w ithin wider society.73 In other words, our institutional 
actors would have no goals or motives o f  their own but would instead pursue the goals of 
other interested parties. This would mean that the external economic policy network adopted 
its particular fourth order objective because this is in the interest o f the external actors that 
control the core executive. Where actors within our policy network advocate different first, 
second or third order responses, this is because each potential mechanism o f  control has either 
a favourable or adverse impact on a certain societal interest that attempts to exert control. 
Various core executive institutions would be viewed as colonised by different interests and 
institutional actors would be seen as pawns in a game o f pushpin, where the most dominant 
interest would see its preferred first, second or third order response implemented.74
Yet, in order to advance such a hypothesis it is necessary for us to be explicit about what sort 
of groups are supposedly exerting this kind o f control. Three possible sub-hypotheses could be 
developed. Namely, (1) that it is the electorate, parties and interest groups that lobby the core 
executive;75 (2) that it is a socially76 and/or economically dominant elite77 or (3) some 
combination o f  the two. Nonetheless, the clear problem with this hypothesis is that none o f  the 
data gathered from either archives or interviews suggests that any such lobbying took place. 
The external economic policy network w as completely closed. It contained no members from
75 MacPherson, C. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval. (Oxford: OUP, 1973), p. 188.
74 Dahl, R. Modern Political Analysis. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.50.
Birch, A. Representative and Responsible Government, (London: Allen Unwin, 1964), p.236.
Edelman, M. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 19.
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outside the core executive, its deliberations were considered top secret, were covered by the 
Official Secrets Act, members were positively vetted by the security service, and it is 
extremely unlikely that they discussed these issues with any outside group.7 8 Therefore this 
possible interpretation must be considered the most unlikely, although it cannot be completely 
dismissed. This is because it is possible that outside consultations did take place and that these 
were not recorded within the official documents.
Hypothesis 2- a partisan core executive
Under this interpretation agents within the external economic policy networks would be 
viewed as motivated by their own self interest and personal welfare and as working on their 
own behalf.79 The fact that they shared the same fourth order goal would not be explained in 
terms o f it being posited upon them by outside actors but instead would be seen as emanating 
from the collective realisation that it was in their shared interest. In this case, their common 
goal was to maintain the stability o f the currency. It would be argued that they pursued this 
because if they did not the domestic economy would become destabilised with disastrous 
consequences for institutional actors in terms of their own financial well being.
Where institutional actors could not agree on the first, second or third order mechanisms that 
were to be utilised, this again would be explained in terms of self-interest. In other words, 
different institutional actors would opt for different delivery mechanisms based on what they 
thought would be in their own interest. The deadlock between actors would be resolved 
through bargaining and coalition building.8' The agents that were able to muster the most 
institutional resources would be able to successfully lobby for their chosen delivery
77 See Kautsky, K. The Class Struggle. (New York: Norton, 1971).
^  Interview with Sir William Ryrie.
”  Dunleavy, p. and O’Leary, B. Theories of the State, p.331-334.
Brittan states that the families of Treasury officials ‘would tend to have small private incomes 
invested in government stock or other fixed private securities, and would thus be ultra sensitive to any 
threat of inflation or currency debasement'. See Brittan, S. The Treasury Under the Tories, p.22.
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mechanism. However, the clear problem with this interpretation is that it is impossible to 
falsify. Where agents couched their motives in terms of defending the public interest, a 
supporter o f this interpretation w ould simply dismiss this as a charade perpetuated by self 
interested officials who wished to  hide the degree to which they manipulated the core 
executive towards their own vested interests.82 Where outcomes actually benefited the public 
interest, this would be deemed coincidence.
Hypothesis 3- attenuated self-interest
This interpretation is a more sophisticated version o f  the previous one. Under it, it is assumed 
that core executive agents act in their own self interest and that they primarily desire to ensure 
that their institutional positions become as entrenched as possible. However, they recognise 
that entrenchment can only take place when they are seen to be acting in the interests o f key 
societal groups from which they derive support and therefore it is in their interest to do so or to 
be seen to be doing so.83
Institutional actors hold the [fourth order] goal o f maintaining the existing economic structures 
because this is in the interests o f the core executive as a whole. More specifically, it would be 
possible that both the tax revenues and the perceived legitimacy o f  the core executive would 
be diminished to such a degree that its continued existence would be brought into question, if 
the economic system were operating sub-optimally. Therefore institutional actors recognise 
that because they operate within a capitalist framework, they are dependent on the success of 
capitalism if  they are going to be able to pursue their own interests in terms o f sustaining 
themselves in office. This means that whilst they work in their own interests, they recognise
Sabatier, P and Jenkins-Smith, H. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, p.122.
This is a problem of unfalsifability. See Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. (London:
Routledge, 1969), p.J3.
Block, F. ‘The Ruling Class does not Rule: notes on the Marxist Theory of the State’ in his Revising 
State Theory; Essays in Politics and Post-Industrialisation. (Temple University Press, 1987), p.62-63.
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that these are best achieved by pursuing the interests o f capital, although not necessarily its 
optimal interests.84
Disagreements within the core executive relating the first, second and third order delivery 
mechanisms would be explained in terms o f the fact that different institutional actors derive 
their support from different societal interests and that they must be seen to be taking their 
interests into account. For example, elected officials draw their support from their electoral 
and party base. Therefore, they recognise that it is in their interest, because they wish to 
remain in power, to consider what the likely implementation implications of the different 
delivery mechanisms are on their core base o f support and to opt for the mechanism that does 
the least harm to this group. O f course, because no public consultation takes place, elected 
officials must rely on their own perceptions of what would be in the best or least worst 
interests o f their support groups and therefore in their own best interests.
Where non-elected officials posit different delivery mechanisms to their elected counterparts, 
this would be explained in terms o f the fact that they derive institutional support from a 
different source, more specifically from organised interests that they are dependant on for 
information and advice. As it is in their interest to court these groups, non-elected officials will 
consider the impact o f various delivery mechanisms upon them and/or on their own 
institution’s prestige. Where different non-elected officials propose different delivery 
mechanisms this would be explained in terms of the fact that different bureaucratic institutions 
derive support from different sources. Yet, because the various core executive institutions 
have to operate within networks, they need to secure collective agreement before they can 
proceed. This means that different institutions will, through self-interest, end up defending 
different aspects o f the public good related to its client groups and/or its institutional interests.
ibid
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As in hypothesis two, the deadlock between the different factions of the policy network would 
be resolved through bargaining and coalition building.
Although this interpretation of interests suffers from many o f  the defects o f the previous one, 
it is more sophisticated and strikes a balance between hypothesis one and two. This is because 
it recognises that whilst outside actors within society do not have a direct influence on the 
closed external economic policy network, they do have an attenuated one. For self interested 
policymakers must be mindful o f the impact o f their chosen policy on key societal groups if 
they are to maintain their power base. Consequently, it is the interpretation that will be 
advanced throughout this study.
Summary
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework that is used to make sense o f our object of 
investigation. It began with the premise that the political and economic spheres are socially 
constructed entities and that empirical investigation should proceed on the basis o f attempting 
the reconstruct the constructions o f  those that it observes. From such a perspective, the role of 
theory is to provide a vocabulary that allows the observer to  make sense o f the object of 
study. Within the bounds of the present investigation, it was recognised that there were three 
central issues that the theoretical framework needed to respond to. Firstly, how are we to 
conceptualise the relations between the various actors that take part in the policy process we 
are investigating? Secondly, what makes it necessary for our actors to act? Finally, what is it 
that motivates them to choose one kind of response over another? In response to these 
questions, it has been argued that the most useful way o f  conceptualising the relationship 
between actors in the policymaking process is to utilise o f combination o f core executive and 
policy network theory. Furthermore, the propensity towards action by members of networks 
must be understood in terms of a shared perception about the actual or potential onset o f crisis
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conditions. The policy response chosen by actors, in order to deal with a crisis, will be 
conditioned by their attenuated self interest.
Figure 2.2 Overview of Theoretical Framework*’
” Adapted from Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, p. 122.
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Chapter 3 Sterling Contingency Planning: Pre-Devaluation
As I made clear in the introduction, this thesis is primarily concerned with external economic 
policymaking in the aftermath o f the 1967 devaluation. One o f the principal arguments is that 
the existing scholarly accounts are too devaluation centred; they are overly focused on the 
build-up to the event but pay scant attention to the aftermath. Furthermore, I regard this to be 
a great deficiency, because the devaluation itself represented only first order change. This is 
because it amounted to nothing more than an alteration to the settings of existing economic 
instruments. There was no move to create either new second order policy mechanisms or to 
alter the third order fixed rates paradigm towards something more flexible. Yet, in the 
aftermath this was no longer the case. The Treasury-Bank-Ministerial networks crafted new 
second order instruments during 1968 and also gave serious thought to the mechanisms, 
tactics and consequences o f abandoning a fixed rate o f exchange for sterling. This does not 
mean to say that the devaluation was an irrelevance. Merely that its significance has been 
overplayed. The shift in parity and the build-up to it is however o f some importance, because 
it provided the context in which economic policymakers operated during its aftermath. For 
this reason, any analysis o f external economic policy post-1967 must pay some attention to it. 
In the discussion that follows, I intend to outline the state o f thinking within the minds o f  
ministers and officials in the build up to devaluation. In so doing, a useful base point is 
established, from which to assess the change in attitudes and modus operandi post­
devaluation.
The Road to 1968
When Harold Wilson took over the office of Prime Minister on 15 October 1964, he made a 
conscious decision that the devaluation of the pound was out o f the question. This decision 
was ratified two days later by his Chancellor o f the Exchequer, James Callaghan and by
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George Brown, who was First Secretary and head of the DEA.1 *At the time, the decision was 
not out o f  line with thinking in official circles in Whitehall. Indeed, Sir William Armstrong 
(Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury), S ir Burke Trend (Cabinet Secretary) and Sir Eric 
Roll (the Permanent Under-Secretary at the DEA) had all come to similar conclusions. Only 
Sir Donald MacDougall, the Director General at the DEA, argued in favour o f  a change in 
parity.
The decision to rule out devaluation was taken not because the assorted ministers and officials 
believed that the position o f sterling was relatively strong, but because they believed it was 
weak and that the economic and political situation would be made worse by a change in 
parity. For even though the balance o f payments deficit inherited from the Conservative 
government was thought to be in the region o f £800 million, Wilson was not prepared to 
devalue the moment he took office and blame his predecessors.3 This was because he felt that
‘The financial world at home and abroad was aware that the postwar decision 
to devalue in 1949 had been taken by a Labour Government. There would have 
been many who would conclude that a Labour Government facing difficulties 
always took the easy way out by devaluing the pound. Speculation would be 
aroused every time that Britain ran into minor economic difficulties....’4
Callaghan’s support o f Wilson’s decision is attributable to the fact that before taking office, 
Nuffield College had arranged for his introduction to the US financial community. In May 
1963 he met a number o f American financial leaders including the Chairman o f the Federal 
Reserve and the Secretary o f  the Treasury and had pledged that Labour would not voluntarily
1 Bale, T. “Dynamics of a Non-Decision: the ‘Failure’ to Devalue the Pound, 1964-67”, Twentieth
Century British History. Vol.10, No.2, 1999, p.198.
3 Burke, K. “1967 Devaluation Symposium”, Contemporary Record. Vol.l, No.4, 1987. p.46.
! Wilson, H. The Labour Government 1964-1970: a personal record. (London: Weidenfield, 1971),p.6.
4 ibid.
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devalue if it were the next party in government.5 Brown too acquiesced, for although his 
knowledge of economics was at best limited, he believed that devaluation would hurt the 
working class.6
Whilst the majority o f officials in the Treasury and Bank o f England were loath to see a 
reduction in the parity the perception was that it was still possible that it could occur. 
Especially if the government did not have the stomach for the deflationary measures 
necessary to improve both confidence and the balance of payments.7 Sir William Armstrong, 
in particular, did not believe that it was desirable to ‘get caught with..[his]..trousers down’.8 
At the beginning o f December 1964, he authorised the initiation o f small-scale contingency 
planning into the possibility o f  a  forced devaluation. Initially only Robert Neild (Economic 
Advisor to the Treasury), Alec Caimcross (Head o f the Economic Section) and Donald 
^MacDougall were involved in the operation.9 The three advisors, in complete secrecy, 
undertook to examine as a matter o f urgency, a number o f  issues relating to the possible 
forced devaluation of sterling.10 In particular this embryonic planning group considered the 
amount by which the rate should be adjusted, whether the move should be to a fixed or 
floating rate and the question o f  offering either compensation or guarantees to sterling holders 
in the aftermath, in order to reduce diversification. The advisors also considered whether the
Bruce-Gardyne, J. and Lawson, N. The Power Game: An Examination of Decision-making in 
Government. (London: Macmillan, 1976), p.126.
6 Burke, K. ‘1967 Devaluation Symposium’, Contemporary Record. Vol.l, No.4, 1987. P.45, 
i The reluctance of officials to advocate devaluation as a deliberate act of policy can be attributed to a 
¡number of factors. Firstly, as sterling was a reserve currency the devaluation of it might trigger a chain 
reaction amongst other currencies including the dollar, perhaps even precipitating the destruction of the 
fixed rate system. Secondly, it would reduce confidence amongst OSA official holders, potentially 
leading to a problem of direct diversification. See PRO T312/1399 ‘ International Monetary 
, Implications’, 13/7/65 and T312/1636 ‘Paper by Bank of England “Guarantees’” , 21/9/66. One also 
suspects that the pound held symbolic value to some of the officials and that a reduction in its parity 
| would to them represent a national defeat.
1 Robert Neild speaking at the devaluation symposium, Burke, K. ‘1967 Devaluation Symposium’, 
Contemporary Record. Vol.l, No.4, 1987. p.52.
|(PRO T312/1635 Walker to Armstrong ‘Contingency Planning’, 5/5/66.
10 Caimcross, A., Managing the British economy in the 1960s: a Treasury perspective. (London: 
Macmillan, 1996), p.24.
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UK might use the act o f  devaluation to promote wider changes to the international monetary 
system."
In the end, three papers were prepared and between them they covered these issues in a very 
preliminary way. At this stage, however, only the advisors themselves discussed the papers 
and although Sir William Armstrong saw copies, he did not comment upon them. Indeed the 
documents, and all discussions pertaining to them, were effectively put into cold storage 
' between January and March 1965, because confidence in the currency had increased. 
Nonetheless, by the end o f March, speculation against sterling intensified and sizeable losses 
were incurred. Armstrong came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take contingency 
planning out o f the deep freeze and placed David Hubback, Under-Secretary at the Treasury, 
with John Portsmore, from the Bank, at the apex o f  the planning group.1 2
Armstrong also set up a contingency planning committee, which initially comprised Sir Denis 
Rickett, Second Secretary at the Treasury, Alec Caimcross, his deputy Fred Atkinson, and 
.Robert Neild, amongst others.13 The exercise itself was labelled F.U.14 and main thrust of 
planning took place between March and November 1965, amidst great secrecy. The papers 
produced were abridged and placed into a devaluation war book, which was updated by 
officials in the light o f  changing circumstances.15 The Chancellor was aware that the planning 
was being conducted expressly against the wishes of the Prime Minister, yet ‘reluctantly 
accepted that this was necessary but...expressed neither interest in nor enthusiasm for it’.16 
This meant that during the pre-devaluation contingency planning, ministerial involvement 
was made conspicuous by its absence. This was in direct contrast with the planning that
11 PRO T312/1635 Walker to Armstrong ‘Contingency Planning’, 5/5/66.
11 ibid.
13 PRO T312/1401 ‘F.U. (65) 7* Meeting’, 16/6/65.
14 ‘"FU" on the basis that it might be thought of as entailing [F]ollow-[U]p action after the budget’,
PRO T312/1635 Walker to Armstrong ‘Contingency Planning’, 5/5/66. Although, according to Sir Kit 
McMahon, it came to have a more colourful meaning.
13 PRO T312/1398 David Walker ‘Procedure’, 21/9/65.
16 ibid.
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occurred after the devaluation, where ministers welcomed the initiatives and took a more 
hands on approach.
In broad-brush terms, the F.U. group considered the following issues:17
(
(1) Were there any policies, apart from the usual deflationary ones, that could be 
deployed at short notice to avert the need for devaluation? The possible alternatives 
included
•  Offering guarantees to balance holders to reduce the chances of 
conversion.
•  Blocking the sterling balances.
(2) I f  devaluation proved to be unavoidable what were the main decisions that had to be 
taken? These included
•  Deciding the threshold at which officials would advise ministers that 
there was no alternative to devaluation.
•  The choice between moving to a fixed or a floating rate.
•  If a fixed rate was decided upon then it was necessary to determine 
what that rate should be.
In the discussion that follows, I intend to examine each o f the issues listed above in the order 
that they are laid out, so that we might have some degree of comparison between Treasury 
and Bank thinking pre and post-devaluation.
It was recognised by the FU contingency planning group that one way o f potentially avoiding 
the possibility o f  devaluation, over and above attempting to improve the balance of payments,
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was to offer guarantees to sterling holders." Under such a system, the sterling balances would 
have been guaranteed against a reduction in value should the pound be devalued. The purpose 
would have been either to deter the liquidation o f  holdings that might trigger devaluation, or 
to check diversification that might occur after devaluation, so that the maintenance o f  the new 
rate would be more sustainable.17 *9 If guarantees were presented in a form that was attractive to 
sterling holders, their effectiveness would have been dependant on whether or not they were 
perceived as credible. If  they were interpreted as a sign o f weakness, it was thought that they 
would actually speed up, rather than reduce the conversion process.
\  If the proposal were ever to be implemented, it was recognised by both the Treasury and the 
I Bank, that it would be wisest to offer a dollar value.20 Under such a system, should the pound 
have been devalued by say 10% against the dollar, the sterling balances would have been 
written up by a corresponding amount, to maintain their dollar purchasing power. However, 
/the  majority o f officials in both the Bank and the Treasury were loath to advocate such a 
system o f guarantees.21 The balance holders had, after all, received generous rates o f  interest 
on their holdings and had they chosen to hold dollars they would have received lower rates 
and nothing if they have moved into gold. It was arguable that the high interest rates could be 
\  regarded as compensation for the risk of devaluation.22 Furthermore, the reserves o f the 
sterling area were held in part to cover their borrowing in sterling and it was felt that there 
was no reason why a bonus through guarantees should be payable on this element o f  their 
sterling reserves. Equally, if  the UK authorities were to implement a system o f full guarantees 
they may have been forced to honour them because of action that was outside their control.
17 Drawn from PRO T312/1399 ‘Summary of Papers (F.U. Series)’, 27/7/1965.
"  PRO T312/1636 ‘Guarantees’, 2/9/66.
19 PRO T312/1398 ‘Guarantees and Compensation’, 12/7/65.
20 A guarantee in terms of gold would have been risky, as there was constant speculation that the price 
of gold would be substantially increased. If the price of gold were say doubled it would have obliged 
the UK authorities to double the value of the guarantee and the purchasing power of the sterling 
balances would also have doubled.
21 PRO T312/2734 ‘Guarantees and Compensation’, 11/9/67.
22 PRO T312/1398 ‘Guarantees and Compensation’, 12/7/65.
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For example, in the unlikely event that the dollar was re-valued, the UK would have to have 
written up the sterling balances by a corresponding amount.23
It was also believed that if guarantees were extended with the aim of averting devaluation, 
they would in all probability have been offered when the UK was in a position of absolute 
fragility. The risk was that this would have been interpreted as an act o f weakness and that 
speculative outflows would actually have increased. It would also have been impossible to 
extend guarantees to all holders without reducing the credibility o f  the system. Those holders 
that were not guaranteed would have had less incentive to hold the currency and it was 
possible that they would convert their balances. Furthermore, if  the system was put into 
practise, it was felt likely that pressure would also come to bear on the US to offer something 
similar. It was believed that the Americans would be extremely unlikely to entertain the idea 
and in all probability would have been very unhappy with the UK for putting them in such an 
awkward position.24 Thus, all o f the Treasury and Bank officials concluded that it would be 
unwise and probably harmful to guarantee sterling holdings.25
Whilst everyone was agreed that guarantees before devaluation should not be actively 
considered, not everyone was quite so convinced about the case against compensation in the 
aftermath. Robert Neild, in particular, believed that if a devaluation occurred, the sterling area 
holders would not remain loyal but would instead embark on a process o f direct 
diversification. Consequently, he argued that it would have been far better, under such 
circumstances, to offer compensation at the start ‘than to be driven to it by the beginning o f a 
wave of conversion, or threats thereo f\26 However, his was the minority view. The majority, 
including Rickett, argued that after a devaluation where compensation was offered, the
23 ibid
24 PRO T312/1636 ‘Guarantees’, 2/9/66.
25 PRO T312/1637 ‘F.U. (66) 1” Meeting’, 11/11/66.
26 PRO T312/1398 Robert Nield ‘Annex A: Compensation', 20/7/63.
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holders would be more likely to liquidate their windfall and run than to stay loyal.27 Although 
compensation might have reduced the grievances of sterling holders, for it to actually 
diminish their propensity to convert they would have to have believed that it would be offered 
again if there were another devaluation. In other words, by offering compensation it was felt 
likely that demands for formal guarantees would come soon afterwards and with them all the 
problems relating to confidence in the currency that had led officials to reject them pre­
devaluation.28
With hindsight, it is clear that Neild was correct. The shock o f devaluation was to greatly 
: undermine the loyalty o f the OSA official holders and bring with it a bout o f direct 
diversification. If a system of guarantees or compensation had been administered as part of 
the devaluation package, it is arguable that much of the instability that occurred during 1968 
could have been avoided. The irony is that by May 1968, the Bank’s prior scepticism had 
been greatly reduced. Furthermore, by September 1968, the Bank in collaboration with the 
Treasury had successfully negotiated a sterling guarantee for OSA holders. Contrary to the 
view that guarantees would undermine confidence, rather than improve it, the system that was 
put in place greatly increased the stability o f sterling. The assumption that the US would not 
welcome the scheme also proved to be faulty. In fact, it became the largest financial 
contributors to the operation. If the guarantee proposal had been negotiated the in 1965 rather 
than 1968, it is arguable that the pressure on sterling would have been greatly reduced. 
Therefore, the decision to avoid this form o f second order change was perhaps the biggest 
mistake o f both the contingency planning and crisis avoidance networks pre-devaluation.
27 PRO T312/1401 ‘F.U. (65) 6* Meeting’, 19/5/65.
28 PRO T312/1398 ‘Guarantees and Compensation', 12/7/65. However PRO T312/1637 ‘F.U. (66) 1“ 
Meeting’, 11/11/66 does suggest that there was some softening amongst officials on the issue of 
compensation. Of course, when devaluation did finally occur, none was given.
78
A second possible means of avoiding a forced devaluation was also considered, albeit briefly, 
by the FU group. That possibility was the blocking o f the sterling balances. It was recognised 
that a
‘a sufficiently draconian system of controls and restrictions regardless o f the 
consequences, accompanied by a total repudiation o f international obligations, 
could theoretically prevent., [devaluation].’29
''.Blocking the sterling balances during a time of absolute crisis would have protected the 
¡1 reserves in the EEA from the demands of conversion because free convertibility would have 
I been suspended. O f course under such a regime, sterling holders would have been able to use 
their currency for the purchase of British imports and to avoid this it would have been 
necessary, in addition to the suspension of convertibility, to completely freeze the sterling 
balances.30 However, the possibility of blocking was considered only momentarily by the FU 
group. The consequences of embarking on this course were regarded as potentially worse than 
the devaluation it would be intended to avoid. This was because blocking would have been 
the equivalent o f the Bank suspending cash payments to its customers. A large part o f the 
\reserves of the OSA would immediately have been made illiquid and London would be shut 
down as a source of borrowing for the finance of short-term trade. Officials believed that the 
international liquidity problem and the financial banking problem that would be created 
would completely undermine the existing international monetary arrangements and that 
British assets held overseas would undoubtedly have been frozen in retaliation. Whilst it was 
recognised that intense exchange control had been accepted by sterling holders during the 
war, it was felt that they would not be so obliging during peacetime. If exchange control 
restrictions had to be implemented in the post-war era, officials regarded it as tantamount to
29 PRO T312/1398 ‘Blocking’, 12/4/65.
30 PRO T295/489 William Hughes ‘Trade Effects of Brutus’, 19/3/68.
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declaring bankruptcy. Consequently, ‘the position o f  sterling as a trading, investment and 
reserve currency would have been destroyed overnight’.31
(
Both Bank and Treasury were unanimous in their conclusion that blocking could never be 
preferable to devaluation. However in the post-devaluation era, this unanimity was to be 
eroded. In fact, the Treasury, much to the displeasure of the Bank, instead concluded that 
blocking would actually be preferable to another devaluation. Furthermore, it is arguable that 
it was the Treasury’s preference for blocking that led the Bank to reconsider its objections to 
sterling guarantees. To the Bank, guaranteeing sterling was a lesser evil than defaulting on its 
customers.
Having rejected all but the usual first order deflationary strategies as a means o f  avoiding 
devaluation, the FU group had to consider the threshold at which they would advise ministers 
that the defence o f  the present parity was futile. However, agreement between the Bank and 
the Treasury on the minimum level o f reserves required to maintain the parity was hard to
I
 come by. For Robert Neild the figure was £800-£ 1000m.32 Although he doubted that 
ministers would be prepared to devalue at this level, he felt that ‘it would be foolish to let the 
reserves run so low that we had inadequate means with which to intervene in the exchange 
market after devaluation’.33 O f course, throughout much o f the 1960s, the reserves were never 
far from the £ 1000m benchmark. Even so, it is arguable that it is impossible to set a figure 
below which devaluation is automatically advocated. Whether the level of reserves are 
dangerously low or not cannot be deduced simply by toting them up; instead it is important to 
understand the situation at the time, the level o f  confidence and the degree to which 
conversion represents a real risk of their exhaustion. The Bank took such a line arguing
31 PRO T312/1398 ‘Blocking’, 12/4/6J.
12 PRO T312/1399 Neild to Armstrong ‘The Trigger’, 15/7/65.
33 ibid
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‘We cannot say that even £500 million of reserves is the minimum 
where, if  HMG were willing and able to enforce unquestionably 
effective measures, we could hold a new position. We can say that if 
HMG are not so willing and able, five times that figure would not be 
enough.’ 4
It is arguable, therefore, that the attempt to come to a core figure, beyond which devaluation 
was unavoidable, was a futile endeavour. It would only be during the midst of a crisis, that 
those concerned could come to a decision. The fact that neither the Treasury nor the Bank 
papers were actually discussed at the FU meetings suggests that this was a view shared by its 
chair, Sir William Armstrong. Far more important was whether, once devaluation came, it 
should be to a fixed or floating rate.
The argument was not about whether a general system o f flexible rates was to be preferred to 
ithe pre-existing Bretton Woods system. Instead, the emphasis was on whether it would be 
better to allow the rate to be determined by the market than to re-peg it at a lower parity, in 
conditions where the UK could no longer maintain the present parity. Kaldor, the 
Chancellor’s special advisor, and Neild, were attracted to the idea o f letting the pound float. 
I Kaldor advocated it as a temporary expedient that would allow the UK authorities to devalue 
I by the correct amount before re-pegging.3! Whilst Neild hoped that a decision to float would 
result in the (third order) reform o f the international monetary system and push it towards 
multilateral flexible rates.34 56
The general argument in favour o f  a move to floating rates was, according to Neild, that a 
fixed rate easily gets out o f  line with the competitive position of the economy.37 He felt that it
34 PRO T312/1399 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Trigger’, 26/7/65.
35 PRO T312/1399 Kaldor ‘Fixed or Flexible Rates', 23/7/65. ')
36 PRO T312/1399 Neild ‘Fixed or Flexible Rates’, 23/7/65. 1
37 PRO T312/1398 Neild ‘Fixed or Flexible Rates’, 26/4/65.
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ought to be possible to avoid this, by adjusting the rate to keep it in line with competitive 
positions. However under the existing system o f fixed rates, politicians had become reluctant 
to alter the rate and the maintenance o f the parity had become a matter o f national prestige. 
Furthermore, if a fixed rate devaluation were initiated, any move would have to  have been 
large in order to convince the world that it would be stable. The process o f  adjustment 
required to take advantage of this kind of change would be painful. It would involve a huge
(
package of deflation, as home demand would have to be cut back severely in order to 
encourage export volume to increase.38 It was thought possible that these changes could be 
nade more efficiently, if the adjustment could be made more incrementally through recourse 
o flexible rates. It was also possible that by adopting a floating rate the potential to over- 
levalue would be avoided, and that ministers and officials would not have the worry of 
leciding what the new rate should be.
However, the vast majority o f Bank and Treasury officials were not swayed by the Neild- 
Kaldor creed. Caimcross, in particular, felt that a move to floating rates would be disastrous.39 
"ll: was clear to him that the shock to the international system, if a key currency such as sterling 
t /as to flout IMF rules by moving to a floating rate, would be great. It was probable that the 
IK would have been disbarred from her IMF drawing rights if she had floated. Without such 
redits, any chance of managing the floating rate would have been reduced to nil. There was 
also a severe danger that the reactions of other countries, to a move by Britain, could have 
been very damaging. Foreign powers might have decided to devalue or float themselves, in 
order to deny the UK her competitive advantage, or at the very least, they could have been 
expected to introduce tariffs, import quotas, and export subsidies.40
There was also the danger that floating presented to the reserve currency function o f sterling. 
If sterling moved to a new fixed parity, it was possible that balance holders would feel that
31 PRO T312/1636 Ryrie ‘Fixed or Flexible Rates’, 22/9/66.
” PRO T312/1398 Caimcross ‘Floating Rates', 2/4/65.---- -------
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nothing was to be gained from diversifying. However, the majority o f  the FU group 
recognised that a move to flexible rates would probably ‘precipitate an enormous withdrawal 
o f sterling balances’.4' It was likely that the amount of sterling that would be disposed o f in 
the market would be so great that ‘the rate could be depressed so far as to bear no relation 
whatever to the competitive strength of the economy’.40 *2 The group could only conclude that 
the risk that the rate might fall too far, coupled with the difficulties associated with Britain’s 
IMF obligations and sterling’s role as a reserve currency, precluded the possibility of 
adopting flexible rates.43
O f course, this was to become another area were Bank and Treasury disagreed after 
devaluation. Whilst the vast majority o f Treasury officials were to reject the possibility of 
floating in the early part o f 1968 the Bank could see the attractions of it, especially when the 
Treasury’s alternative to it was blocking. However with the conclusion o f  the sterling area 
guarantee system in September o f  1968 the argument against floating, because it would 
|  trigger a bout o f OSA diversification, lost much o f its force. Consequently, the Treasury was 
to become a late convert to the floating camp. O f course, they would never advocate it as a 
deliberate act of policy, but they w ere prepared to recommend it under crisis conditions.
However in the pre-devaluation era, floating was never to be seriously considered. Indeed, the 
officials involved in FU were horrified when at the end of July 1965 Armstrong reported to 
them that ‘the Prime Minister was understood to have a firm preference for floating if  the 
need for devaluation arose’.44 To make matters worse, it also appeared that the Chancellor 
shared similar sentiments, although he at least was not completely committed to them. The 
Bank was especially worried by W ilson’s enthusiasm. Maurice Parsons, the deputy governor,
40 PRO T312/1827 ‘Fixed or Floating Rates', undated.
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thought that it was essential that officials should have adequate time to discourage ministers, 
in the wake of a crisis, before a decision to float was taken.45 In the meantime, all that could 
be done was to ensure that the papers that formed the war book ridiculed floating to the 
maximum. One of Neild’s earlier papers suited that task well. For
‘though it finally rejected them the paper started from a position 
fundamentally in favour of flexible rates; given the views of Ministers, as 
they are understood, this would clearly be a most useful document in the 
situation envisaged. But it was felt necessary to add to the dossier an 
“official” and “impersonal” document which would provide a more direct 
argument coming to the same conclusion.’46
Therefore, it was hoped that v ia a combination o f papers and oral advice it would be possible 
to shape the context within which ministers made their decisions and prevent them from 
doing the unthinkable. However, even if the Bank and Treasury were successful in their aim, 
an important question remained. Namely, if a fixed rate devaluation was forced upon sterling, 
at what level should they peg the new rate?
Calculations by the Economic Section estimated that a 10% devaluation, with appropriate 
accompanying measures should be sufficient to improve the balance of payments, during 
1967, by between £600-£800m. This would have meant lowering the exchange rate from 
$2.80 to the pound to $2.52.47 *O f  course, the J-curve effect would ensure that it would only be 
I after a significant period of tim e that the improvement was noticed and in the short-term, the 
balance of payments would actually worsen.4“ This is because, in the interim, even though
45 ibid
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demand for imports would lessen in the aftermath o f devaluation, the cost would remain static 
or possibly rise, because those goods that entered would cost more. It was felt likely that it 
would take, at the very minimum, several months before British exporters managed to take 
advantage o f their increased competitiveness by carving out a share of new markets, thereby 
improving the visible account. Therefore, Treasury planners believed that a margin of safety 
was required, because ‘in a position in which our resources to support the new rate were very 
limited, it would be important to choose a rate which was virtually certain to do the trick ...’.49 
Equally, it would also be important to establish confidence in the UK’s ability to hold the new 
rate but not to go so far down as to provoke retaliation by other countries.50 The former 
requirement meant that devaluation would have to be by at least 10%, whilst the latter ruled 
out a move beyond 15%.51 However, it was clear that a judgement about the precise degree o f 
devaluation required could not be made in advance. It was only possible to come to some 
provisional conclusions but above all else, it was essential that there should be no 
retaliation.52 Yet by the end o f 1967, the events that the FU had planned for, but hoped would 
not occur, seemed more likely than ever.
The Devaluation
During the first half o f 1967, confidence in sterling seemed to have increased. This was 
mainly due to the fact that in the last quarter o f 1966, there had been a visible trade surplus 
and ‘calculations made by the Treasury during the summer o f 1967 showed that [the] 
overseas payments had actually been in surplus for the first half o f the year and forecast a 
small surplus for the year as a whole’.53 By the end of March 1967, nearly all central bank 
assistance had been repaid.54 However, this tranquil state o f affairs was not destined to last for
49 PRO T312/2764 ‘The Choice of a New Rate’, undated.
PRO T312/1399 ‘The Choice of Rate and International Acceptability’, 26/7/65.
PRO T312/1398 Note by the Economic Section ‘Choice of a New Fixed Rate’, 2/4/65.
55 PRO T312/2764 ‘The Choice of a New Rate', undated.
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long. Three factors were set to undermine confidence in the currency, and it is fair to say that 
two o f them were outside the control of the administration. The first was the government’s 
decision, at the beginning o f May, to announce that the UK would formally apply to join the 
¡Common Market. It was widely known that the cost of entry to the balance o f payments 
would be substantial, and in view o f this, sterling balance holders suspected that entry into the 
EEC might be accompanied by devaluation.55 The position was not helped by the French, who 
were highlighting the difficulties that sterling w as likely to encounter.56 Therefore, the 
announcement triggered a bout o f speculation. Secondly, at the beginning o f June, came the 
six-day Arab-Israeli War, an oil embargo, and the closure o f the Suez Canal.57 This 
development was most harmful to Britain. It meant that exports destined for the 
Commonwealth had to traverse the Cape, and consequently took longer to arrive. This greatly 
increased the costs o f shipping, as did the rise in the price of oil.58 Thirdly, by mid-September 
a series o f dock strikes, within the UK, ensured that goods destined to make the long journey 
around the Cape instead lay idly on the docks. Although the goods had left the factories and 
were destined for overseas, they could not be recorded as exports until they had actually been 
loaded onto ships.59 From the balance of payments perspective, this was a rather unfortunate 
anomaly. Consequently, the small surplus was to turn into a substantial deficit and the effects 
on confidence were disastrous.
It was from these events that the seeds of devaluation were sown. The orthodox view is that 
the balance o f payments deficit and the speculation that it provoked so drained the reserves 
that devaluation became unavoidable.60 The truth o f  the matter is that just sixteen days before 
devaluation took place Callaghan was not easily persuaded that it was either necessary or
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inevitable.61 Instead, he wanted to wait until the spring, as did Wilson. It was only when 
Caimcross, a recent convert to the devaluation camp, told Callaghan that he thought it was 
both necessary and inevitable that the Chancellor reconsidered.62 Caimcross had come to that 
conclusion as far back as September.63 If the Crossman diaries are to be believed, it would 
seem tha t Wilson too could not make up his mind. For on 3 November, the day after 
Caim cross’s discussion with the Chancellor, Wilson reported to Crossman that he was now in 
favour o f  devaluation, adding that 'I ’m for the floating pound but the fixed pound is what the 
other side want’.64 Yet by 8 November it seemed that the Prime Minister had recanted and 
had sw ung back in favour of attempting to maintain the existing parity.65 It also appeared that 
Callaghan had again reassessed the situation, and he reported to the S.G.P. that he was now 
against devaluation and that ‘we must solider on’.66
It is difficult then, to properly assess ministerial thinking in the build up to the event. 
Although during a press conference after the event, Callaghan was to state that the decision 
was taken two weeks before its implementation, this is not strictly true.67 It would seem that 
neither the Prime Minister nor the Chancellor could make up their minds, and both appeared 
to prevaricate. O f course, the vast majority o f the Cabinet was in favour o f  a shift in parity. 
This was because they mistakenly believed it was a magic wand that would reduce the need 
for deflationary policies.68 However most o f them were not members o f  the SEP and 
consequently did not know that any discussions relating to the parity o f the pound were taking 
place until, they ratified the decision two days before it was implemented.69
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The key discussion on devaluation by the SEP took place on 8 November 1967. No minutes 
o f the meeting were taken; consequently, it is necessary to rely on ministerial memoirs in 
order to get a flavour o f it. According to Crossman, Wilson, Callaghan, Crossman, Crosland, 
Stewart, and Gunter were present.™ The Chancellor made it clear that he was both against 
devaluation and the floating o f  the pound and that he was not prepared to reconsider the issue 
for several months. Wilson however started the meeting provisionally in the pro camp and 
was prepared to keep his options open. He stated ‘I am politically open on the subject. I am 
prepared to think that there could be some merit in a free decision...’.71 However, by the end 
of the meeting it appeared that he too had lost his nerve. Instead, he advocated looking into 
the possibility o f rallying support from foreign creditors.72 This was something that 
particularly riled Crossman, because he feared that neither Wilson nor Callaghan had any 
intention of devaluing and that instead they would accept foreign credit no matter what sort of 
strings were attached.73
Although contingency planning was brought to a state o f  readiness in the Treasury, both 
Wilson and Callaghan attempted to employ the international support package gambit to avoid 
a shift in parity. There does however seem to have been a tacit understanding between them 
that if  devaluation was to be avoided the funding would have to be large, in the region of 
$3billion, and for a long duration, not less than a year.74 It is likely that both men felt a sense 
of defeat after working so hard to bring about a balance o f  payments surplus, only to have the 
rug pulled from under them.75It would seem therefore that they concluded that credit would 
have to be sought to, ‘give some real security to sterling for a long period ahead’76 and if it 
could not, only then would they opt for devaluation.
™ Crossman, D. The Crossman Diaries 1964-1970. p.357.
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Two different strategies were adopted in the quest o f gain additional funding, one by Wilson 
himself and the other by officials in the Treasury and Bank o f England. Both projects were 
initiated the day after the SEP meeting on 9 November 1967. Wilson believed that the best 
possible method for securing the credits was for him to make a direct and personal plea to the 
American President.77 For maximum effect, he felt that it would be better to see the President 
in person rather than to communicate via telegram. Of course, because the pressure on the 
pound appeared to be mounting, time could not be wasted and therefore he attempted to 
organise an impromptu visit to the White House.78 Clearly, it would have been impossible for 
the Prime Minister to make the trip without attracting publicity, and Wilson was worried that 
speculators would guess that the pound was on the brink. Thus it was necessary to concoct an 
excuse that was wholly unrelated to ‘economic and financial sphere’ to which the meeting 
would have really related.79 It appeared to Wilson that a possible rouse would be to declare 
that he was visiting the President to discuss policy relating to the war in Vietnam. O f course, 
the war was going badly for the Americans and it was not a cover story that the President was 
happy for Wilson to use.80 In any case, it emerged that Johnson w as fully occupied and it 
would have been difficult for him to make time to see the Prime Minister. However Wilson 
was by this stage desperate and was prepared to ‘come for two hours...to any place you 
name'.81 Furthermore, when he recognised that the Vietnam pretext w as proving difficult for 
the President, he even considered using the excuse of a visit to his son Robin, who was 
studying for a degree at MIT, as a means o f avoiding press interest.82 However as Wilson 
himself states ‘after preliminary soundings, we dropped the idea’.83
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In the event, only the second strategy was fully enacted. On 10 November 1967, Dennis 
Rickett, from the Treasury, and Jeremy Morse from the Bank, made their way to the United 
States to begin the rigours o f negotiation. The discussions began at the US Treasury on the 
morning o f 11 November. The Americans, who recognised the serious consequences of a 
sterling devaluation for the dollar, believed that the figure of $3billion was not out of the 
question. However, as their balance of payments was in dire straights it would require a joint 
operation between themselves, the Europeans, and the IMF. Fowler, the Secretary to the US 
Treasury, proposed the following package:
United States $500m
Germany $250m
Italy $250m
Others $300m
IM F $ 1400m
Banks $300m(
The US recognised that it might take some time to negotiate these arrangements but suggested 
that in the meantime the UK could use its Federal Reserve swap drawing rights. It was also 
clear that the negotiations for a long-term package would not be problematic from a 
congressional perspective, and that only presidential approval would be required.85 If this 
were granted, US Treasury officials agreed that they would discuss the arrangements with the 
Europeans.
The same afternoon, Rickett and Morse visited Schweitzer, the Managing Director o f the 
IMF, in order to determine whether there was any chance o f  the Fund lending the $1400m 
that Fowler had suggested. Although Schweitzer was happy to put the matter before his
“ PRO PREM 13/1854 ‘Tel. No. 3535’, 11/11/67. 
5 ibid
90
board, he stated that he would need the support of all his major shareholders and in particular 
he did not know what the view of the French government would be.86 It was clear that all 
members would have to agree if the Fund was to act. Although Schweitzer was only luke 
warm, the Americans seemed supportive, mainly because they feared the consequences for 
the dollar o f a sterling devaluation. Much however would rest on how the Europeans reacted 
to the scheme.
Leslie O’Brien, governor o f the Bank o f England, negotiated that aspect o f the exercise, at the 
BIS governor’s monthly meeting in Basle on 12 November. However, the Europeans were not 
even luke warm. They refused to advance any credit and instead suggested that the IMF 
should finance the whole operation.87 Schweitzer took this news calmly and discussed at 
length the problems involved. For if the proposal was accepted, the standby offered to the UK 
would be greater than any extended in the whole of the Fund’s history. Consequently it could 
only be provided with strings attached and these would have included further deflation, a 
reduction in public expenditure, the introduction o f  incomes policy and assurances that 
exchange control would not be extended without the agreement o f the Fund.88 Callaghan, in 
his memoirs, states that it was the conditions attached ‘which were not such as I could 
recommend to Cabinet’ that led him to reject the offer.89 However, this was simply not true.90 
The government did not reject the IMF loan; instead Schweitzer reconsidered and concluded 
that it was not a feasible proposition.91 His reasons were that a stand-by going so far above 
200% of the UK’s quota, would be too great a departure from the policy and practise o f the 
Fund. Furthermore, he felt that it would be wrong for the IMF to take on such an operation
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alone. If the Europeans had been prepared to involve themselves, it would have been a wholly 
different matter.92
With this news, the Americans now recognised that a change in the rate was unavoidable. 
Yet, they half-heartedly proposed that the UK should ‘have another go in Paris...on the lines 
of the Fowler package’.93 However, Schweitzer confirmed that this would be futile because 
the Europeans had a ‘complete lack o f  interest in direct central bank support’.94 Without the 
possibility o f  additional funding, the British politicians had almost made up their mind that 
they would devalue. At the Treasury, planning for the devaluation was stepped up a gear, but 
the politicians did not quite accept that ‘twelve o ’clock has struck’.95 Negotiations were to 
continue just in case they bore fruit.96 However, the only possible source of funding by this 
stage, seemed to be an IMF loan of $1.4 billion, which Fowler urged the British to apply for.97 
Although it was recognised in London that such a loan would not provide enough resources to 
protect sterling in the long-term. Besides this, the IMF seemed to have moved into a position 
of actually favouring a reduction in the parity o f the pound. One is led to this conclusion 
because it raised all sorts o f objections to  the possibility o f providing the $1.4 billion to help 
prevent devaluation, but seemed more than happy to provide it in the aftermath to preserve 
the new rate.98
With this news, Wilson met with his Chancellor at 11.15pm on 13 November. Also present 
were Armstrong and Trend. The meeting must been seen as a key turning point in the 
deliberations over devaluation. This is because with the knowledge that an international 
support operation of adequate size was out of the question, the Prime Minster and Chancellor 
had to finally concede that midnight had struck. The ‘decision subject to ratification by our
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Cabinet colleagues, was to devalue’.99 It appears, however that the technicalities o f the issue 
were left untouched at that gathering. It was not until Wilson called together a group of 
ministers the next day that these issues were decided upon. The meeting, according to Wilson, 
came to be known as the ‘Tuesday Club’, because it met at 4.30pm on Tuesday 14 November. 
100 It comprised the Prime Minister, Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary, 
President o f the Board of Trade, Defence Secretary, and the First Secretary. Although 
Wilson’s memoirs do not record what was discussed and no official record seems to exist, 
from the briefing memo prepared by Trend for Wilson’s chairmanship o f the session, it is 
possible to get some idea of the agenda.101 In particular, it seems that the ministers discussed 
whether the new rate would be fixed or floating; the degree o f devaluation; whether 
guarantees or compensation would be offered and the domestic accompanying measures.102 
The fact that the devaluation, when it took place, followed the recommendations of the FU 
group to the letter, would suggest that Bank and Treasury officials were successful in 
quashing any ministerial hankering for a floating rate. Furthermore, it is likely that it was at 
that very meeting that both floating and compensation were rejected.
The formal ratification of the decision to devalue did not take place until 16 November, just 
two days before the event itself.103 Cabinet minutes are often unreliable as an accurate and 
verbatim record of events.104 However, the documentation for this particular discussion is 
worse than most. This was because Burke Trend recognised that the Cabinet Minutes, which 
would be circulated around Whitehall, could contain no reference to the impending 
devaluation, as a leak to the press would undermine the whole operation. Instead, he 
suggested that all that should be recorded was that ‘the Cabinet then discussed the political
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situation’.105 Therefore, it is again necessary to rely on the accounts o f the diarists within the 
Cabinet. It appears that at the very least, Barbara Castle did not suspect that the Cabinet 
meeting was to be used to ratify the decisions of the Tuesday club. Although, it is likely that 
all of those who were not a part o f the meeting three days prior were in the same boat. 
However Castle records that soon into the meeting Callaghan announced ‘I have decided that 
the pound must be devalued...This is the unhappiest day of my life’.106 He then explained to 
his colleagues that the pressure on the currency in the previous weeks had been great and that 
the thought facing a battle similar to that o f 1966 was sickening. Consequently, both he and 
Wilson had decided to recommend a devaluation of 14.3%, reducing the parity with the dollar 
from $2.80 to $2.40.107 Apparently some of the Cabinet questioned whether 14.3% was 
enough and Castle herself advocated a floating rate. However, the decisions had already been 
taken at the Tuesday club, and all that was intended was for the Cabinet to rubber stamp them. 
Keeping information away from the full Cabinet for so long before their consent was required 
was a useful tactic, both for reducing the chance o f leaks and for ensuring that colleagues in 
favour of a more radical course would not have the time to put a proper case together. The 
whole exercise was presented to the Cabinet almost as afait accompli.
However, whilst the meeting was taking place it became clear that Robert Sheldon, a Labour 
backbencher, had tabled a ministerial question to ask whether it was true that a $1 billion loan 
was being negotiated with foreign bankers.108 The Cabinet discussed whether they should try 
to get him to withdraw it. Consequently, the Chief Whip went to Parliament in an attempt to 
persuade Horace King, the Speaker o f the House, that the question should not be allowed 
because it was against the national interest. However, the Speaker would have none of it. 
Callaghan, whose job it was to reply, was put in a very difficult situation. From his
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perspective there were only three alternatives open to him, first, to make no statement. Second 
to say that the rumour was correct, or third to state that the government was to devalue on 
Saturday. Each of these strategies was, to his mind, equally flawed. To have failed to make a 
statement would have been just as damaging to confidence as if  he actually admitted that 
devaluation was to take place.109 Equally, he could not very well have commented on the 
negotiations in Europe because no further credits were likely to emerge. Consequently, 
Callaghan replied ‘I did not start the rumours and I do not propose to comment on them’.110 
Callaghan’s dodging o f  the issue was, overall, damaging. It did not put the markets at rest; in
(
fact, it did quite the opposite. It signalled that sterling was on the brink and on Friday 17 
November, £4 15m was lost from the EEA.1"  The loss was greater than during the whole of 
the crisis filled month o f  July 1966.
On Saturday 18 November, the devaluation took place. The existing accounts tend to assume 
that the move was forced upon the Wilson administration because it was impossible to hold 
out any longer.112 Yet, this is not strictly true. Although confidence in the currency had been 
greatly eroded by the events o f the summer and autumn, the reserves at the beginning of 
November stood in the region o f £1915m.m  O f course, when Britain’s short and medium- 
term liabilities to the IMF and central banks are factored in, this figure falls to  £903m.114 Yet, 
even by 16 November, in spite o f the speculative pressure, the till was still far from empty. 
The remaining resources comprised an IMF standby o f  £420m, central bank facilities totalling 
£280m, market swaps o f  £36m and a BIS credit o f  £90m. 115 Furthermore, the Bank had 
managed to raise an additional £175m by liquidating a portion o f  the government’s dollar
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portfolio. In short, total assets amounted to £ 1,001m. Given that £194m would be required to 
service debts at the end of November, £805m remained. This meant that the reserves were 
only £226m lower than at the end o f August 1965 and that they were actually £190m higher 
than during the March 1968 gold crisis."6 Thus, it is possible that sterling could have 
weathered the storm. This does not mean, however, that devaluation per se was avoidable. It 
simply means that in November 1967 Wilson and his Chancellor had a choice and that they 
decided to jump before they were pushed. If the Wilson government had decided to hold out, 
it would have been necessary to implement a massive deflationary package in order to 
improve both the balance of payments and confidence in the currency. Although such 
package was implemented in the aftermath of the rate change, it may have been politically 
difficult for the Chancellor to gain support for it within the Cabinet, amongst ministers who 
understood little o f economic affairs, without the backdrop o f the devaluation crisis to send 
the message home.117
However, up until 16 November, Wilson and Callaghan could have recanted and instead 
opted for either inaction or the deflationary route. Although, the former would have been 
extremely unwise and the latter risky, without adequate financial underpinning."8 In any case, 
Callaghan’s performance in the House of Commons, in response to Robert Sheldon’s 
question, finally closed off both these options and made a November devaluation 
unavoidable. Indeed, 'heavy pressure against sterling developed...following the Chancellor’s 
statement’." 9 In the wake of this, the reserves totalled a meagre £390m.120 If plans had not 
already been put in motion to devalue the currency the next day, the government would have 
been forced to develop them rapidly. Given this, it is tempting to argue that devaluation was 
unavoidable in November 1967 and that the Labour government would have been forced off
116 PRO T312/1827 ‘The Financial Position: Quick Assets and Liabilities', October 1967 and PRO 
T318/189 ‘Reserve Position at close of Business on 14lh March’.
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parity even if it had been decided to hold the rate. However, it is clear that Callaghan’s 
response to Sheldon’s question was conditioned by the fact that the decision to devalue had 
already been taken. If it had been decided to soldier on, then it is likely that Callaghan would 
have taken a different tone.
What is more interesting, is that when the decision was taken, Wilson and Callaghan opted for 
a fixed rate move. Had they opted to float, the events o f 18 November 1967 would have 
represented a more significant policy departure: because the second order fixed but adjustable 
mechanism would have been abandoned and with it, the third order goal o f fixed exchange 
rates. The devaluation, by contrast, was only significant in so much as it altered the structural 
context within which policymakers operated. Its importance lay in its legacy. However, it 
seems odd that Callaghan and his Prime Minister decided upon a first order fixed rate move, 
when both had previously declared a preference for floating rates.'21 It is unlikely that the 
decision to avoid floating stemmed from Cabinet opposition, because influential ministers 
like Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman were also known to favour them.122 Instead, it is 
far more likely that officials from both the Bank and Treasury had done their utmost to 
dissuade the P.M. and his Chancellor from taking any action that would undermine either 
Bretton Woods or sterling’s reserve currency role.123 Although devaluation was seen as less 
damaging to the IMS than floating, Wilson himself recognised that it ‘would not be the end of 
the affair but the beginning o f a long and dangerous process which could lead us not upwards 
but still further downwards’.124 The danger was that the prognosis for sterling would be no 
better in 1968 and that it might actually be made worse because of the devaluation. This was 
because the balance o f payments would worsen, as imports became more expensive.125 It was
9 7
also likely that the sterling balance holders would search for a more stable reserve asset and 
that this would exacerbate the drain on the reserves.
Sum m ary
This chapter has examined the role, remit and outcome of the planning undertaken by the 
sterling contingency planning network. The aim has been to provide a base point for 
comparison. It has been argued that although the Bank and Treasury were prepared to 
examine the feasibility o f  blocking the sterling balances, extending guarantees to sterling 
balance holders and floating the pound, they were not prepared to implement any of these 
crisis avoidance mechanisms because o f the huge political and economic costs that they 
would have entailed. Instead, officials devised a plan for the devaluation o f sterling. However, 
it would be wrong to suggest that when the decision to devalue was taken, in November 1967, 
it was forced upon the administration. Given the level o f the foreign exchange reserves, it 
would have been possible, although not necessarily desirable, to maintain the existing rate o f 
exchange at least into the early months of 1968. Furthermore, the importance o f the 
devaluation has been overplayed. It only amounted to a (first order) setting change to the 
existing (second order) economic instruments. No attempt was made to devise a new second 
order instrument (blocking or guarantees) or to reshape the third order policy paradigm 
(floating). The devaluation's importance rests in its legacy and in the way in which it altered 
the structural context o f the management o f sterling. However, its legacy remains one o f the 
greatest silences within the existing literature.
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Chapter 4- The March Gold Crisis
This chapter examines the management o f sterling in the period immediately after the 
devaluation. Primarily it focuses on the origins and consequences of the gold crisis that 
erupted in March 1968 and which had the potential to have more far-reaching implications for 
sterling than the devaluation itself. Although the crisis was resolved without recourse to 
drastic action, a successful resolution was not a forgone conclusion. Failure would have 
undoubtedly resulted in either second order (blocking) or third order (floating) change. In this 
sense, the crisis is o f counterfactual significance. The chapter is broadly divided into four 
parts. The first begins by examining the state of economic policy in the aftermath of 
devaluation. Section two charts the gold crisis and its implications for sterling, whilst sections 
three and four examine the responses made by officials and politicians to the crisis.
Beyond the devaluation
The devaluation o f sterling led to the resignation of Callaghan as Chancellor.1 However, it is 
patent that Wilson, ever fearful o f plots against his leadership, wished that Callaghan would 
stay in his post.2 For if  the Chancellor returned to the backbenches, he would no longer be 
bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility and there was the possibility that he might 
speak out against the premier. Yet Callaghan could not be dissuaded, he had come to view 
devaluation as a moral issue and believed that because he had been unable to prevent the shift 
in parity, his position was now untenable.3 Consequently, Roy Jenkins was to replace him as 
Chancellor. Jenkins was not, however, the most logical choice. Although he held a first in 
PPE from Oxford and was certainly more economically literate than Callaghan, there were 
others in the government, most notably the academic Anthony Crosland, who would have
| Callaghan, J. Time and Chance. (Glasgow: Collins, 1987), p.222.
Dunne, A. ‘The Pound in Your Pocket’: A Study of the Economic Policy of the Wilson Government 
And the Devaluation of Sterling 1964-1970. (University College Dublin: Unpublished MLitt thesis,
2000), p. 131.
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been more obvious contenders. However, it is clear that Jenkins was selected because Wilson 
wanted to keep Callaghan in the government and the move would allow  a straight swap 
between the two ministers, with Callaghan moving to the Home Office. Had Wilson decided 
to transfer Crossland to the Treasury, a much larger and more far reaching reshuffle would 
have been required, if Callaghan were still to hold a senior position.4
Jenkins was something o f a cool operator5 and his appointment was to  ruffle the feathers of 
Treasury officials. This was because of his tendency to exclude his Treasury knights from 
policy deliberations and instead surround himself with his own hand picked team. In 
particular he relied for support on David Dowler, who was brought in from the Home Office 
and acted as Principal Private Secretary.6 However, the new Chancellor was to hit the ground 
crawling rather than running. It is arguable that Jenkins should have used the devaluation 
crisis as a justification to quickly push through a host o f deflationary policies that would 
ensure that domestic consumption was reduced and that production was diverted to the export 
market.7 This would have ensured that the competitive advantage that the devaluation 
provided was best capitalised on and that the balance of payments w ould quickly improve. It 
would also have sent a signal to the sterling balance holders that the U K  was prepared to put 
its economic house in order and it is possible that the spate o f direct diversification, into gold 
and dollars, would have been arrested. However, Jenkins took very few positive steps in this 
direction during his first two months in office.
Jenkins himself recognised this deficiency. However, he argued that the blame rested not with 
him but with Treasury officials who did not properly advise h im .8 With Christmas
4 ibid.
5 Interview with Sir William Ryrie
Interview with Sir Jeremy Morse; The fact that Dowler was brought in from outside, proved to be the 
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earmarked for potential high fliers. The fact that someone from outside the Treasury filled it meant that 
internal promotion prospects had been reduced. Interview with Anthony Glover.
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approaching, the Treasury argued that it would be politically difficult to check demand at a 
time at which it would have caused the ‘maximum of inconvenience’.9 It was not until 
January 1968 that the government was to consider the shape that economic policy should take 
post-devaluation. During a series o f meetings held between Thursday 4 January and Monday 
15 January, Jenkins was finally to present his economic agenda to the Cabinet.10 *He made it 
clear that his prime objective was to bring about a turnaround in the balance of payments. 
This would of course be accomplished by reducing home demand. However, the Chancellor 
rejected the possibility o f  raising taxation as a means of achieving this." His reason for this 
dismissal was that it was highly probable that increased taxation would have an inflationary 
effect on wages and prices, thereby negating the competitive advantage that the devaluation 
afforded. Instead, he argued that the solution was to enact sizeable cuts to the government’s 
public expenditure programme, at home and overseas. Although he was rather late off the 
mark, his choice of action was sensible. As I have argued in the introduction, deficits in the 
balance o f payments, during the 1960s, were not caused by the tendency to over import. 
Instead, where they existed, it was because government overseas expenditure was spiralling 
out of control.
The Chancellor argued that the government should accelerate its planned military evacuation 
from its bases east o f Suez by 1971 and that the order for fifty F-l 11 fighter aircraft, which 
had been placed with the Americans, should be cancelled. On the domestic front, he 
suggested that savings could be made if NHS prescription charges were restored and if  the 
planned increase in the school leaving age were postponed for four years.12 O f course, all o f 
these proposals were to result in the traditional battle between the exchequer and the spending 
ministries, which resented having to make cuts. The Ministers for Social Security, Health,
’^ Caimcross, A. Managing, p. 199.
Wilson, H. The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record. (London: Weidnefield and 
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Defence and Education all raised objections to the cuts to their respective departments.13 
However Wilson acted as an important counterweight to these protestations and the 
Chancellor’s measures were eventually accepted and announced in Parliament on 16 January. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that if  the Treasury and the Chancellor had been quicker o ff the 
mark it would have been possible to hold these ministerial discussions in December and to 
implement them in January. Instead, the Budget, which would herald the initiation, was 
shelved until 19 March. From mid-January, the preparations for the Budget were to become 
the prime occupation of the Chancellor and his Treasury team and by Wednesday 13 March, 
they were *in nearly final shape’.14 However from this date forward, the proposals were 
relegated to the back burner, because an exchange crisis o f monumental proportions erupted, 
which threatened to undermine the notion that £1=$2.40. Whilst the crisis primarily centred 
on the relationship between gold and the dollar the currency speculation that it provoked was 
extremely damaging to sterling.
The M arch Gold Crisis
Jon Davis has described the gold rush o f March 1968 as ‘the gravest economic crisis to affect 
Britain for twenty years’.15 He asserts is that its significance was greater than that o f the 
previous year’s devaluation or for that matter any sterling debacle since the 1949 devaluation. 
He does however slightly overstate the case. The gold rush was potentially the most severe 
sterling crisis o f  the post-war era. Although the new $2.40 rate was maintained, the 
consequences o f failure would have been horrific. Whilst the gold crisis is usually viewed in 
terms of its threat to the Bretton Woods accord and as paving the way for the forced floatation 
of the dollar,16 its impact on sterling was grave to say the least. As Roy Jenkins, the 
incumbent Chancellor remarked ‘As was invariably the case in the 1960s, whatever currency
!’ PRO CAB128/43 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting’, 4/1/68.
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the gale was directed against the side-winds were devastating for sterling’17 and this was 
especially true o f the gold crisis.
Its importance for Britain was threefold. Firstly, its ‘side-winds’ virtually wiped out Britain’s 
foreign reserves, prompting the possibility o f a second devaluation four months after the 
previous one. Second, in response to the prospect o f a further devaluation the British 
government seriously considered suspending the convertibility o f sterling from the 18 March 
1968 onwards.18 Finally, even after the US government loaned London a significant sum of 
money to avert a shift in parity Harold Wilson’s government authorised for the first time, full- 
scale sterling contingency planning.19 In short, it was from this debacle that the seeds o f 
Brutus were sown.
The origins o f the gold crisis can perhaps be traced as far back as 1934, when President 
Roosevelt declared that the United States was prepared to sell gold to other central banks at 
the price o f $35 per ounce, a decision that became the lynch-pin of the post-war Bretton 
Woods agreement20. Whilst this pledge was invaluable in the early post-war years, once 
Western Europe had recovered from the war and the United States had become embroiled in 
various Asian conflicts, the pledge came under continual attack. Much of the concern centred 
on the US financing o f the Vietnam War and of the large scale capital exports which led to 
high and almost continuous balances of payments deficits for the US throughout the 1960s.21 
The worry was that these strains would only serve to weaken the US gold stock and ensure 
that there was not enough gold to back the dollar in its entirety. Therefore, the problem that 
beset the dollar was very similar to that that plagued the pound. In the case of sterling, one o f
PRO T267/21 ‘Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 20: The March Gold Crisis 1968’, undated.
8 Jenkins, R. A Life at the Centre, p.234.
18 PRO PREM 13/2051 Note by the Treasury ‘Contingency Planning’, undated but probably authored
between 14 and 17 March 1968.
Of course, this does not mean that this was the first time that the Treasury engaged in contingency 
planning under the Wilson government. Merely that it was the first time that it was done with the 
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the difficulties was that Britain’s dollar holdings were insufficient to meet the requirements o f 
overseas sterling balances. For the US, the problem was its dwindling stocks of bullion and 
the fact that it was widely believed that the dollar should be devalued in relation to gold.
In order to stabilise the dollar-gold parity the gold pool arrangement was instituted in 1961. 
Under this agreement, the Bank o f England acted as controller o f an international reserve 
stock o f gold fed by the central banks o f  the US, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Britain, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands.21 2 The function of this reserve fund was to stabilise the price 
of gold in the London market. However, by  1966 the ability of the gold pool mechanism to 
steady the price of gold receded.23 Two problems thwarted its management. The first was 
speculation on the part o f private investors. The second was an increasing demand for gold 
for commercial and industrial purposes.24 By July 1966 demand for gold increased rapidly, 
just when new supplies were drying up.25 F or the first time since 1952, the USSR did not find 
it necessary to sell gold in the world market. This coincided with the fact that Western 
production also stopped rising, and for the first time since 1945, all newly mined gold went 
into private hands. Thus the Western central banks were not able to add to their official gold 
reserves, and in fact had to feed the gold pool with $95m in gold to keep the prices down.26 
The following year was worse than the previous. The price in the London market came 
dangerously near the upper limit o f $35.20 per ounce and by the middle of 1967 rarely 
dropped below that figure. During 1967 as a  whole, the countries operating the gold pool had 
to feed the market with $2,000m in gold, to  keep the price down.27 Between November and 
December 1967 alone, the US Federal reserve sold $ 1,600m from its gold reserves in a bid to
21 Roy, R. ‘The Battle for Bretton Woods: America, Britain and the International Financial Crisis of 
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maintain the gold-dollar parity.28 Whilst the rush into gold slowed during January and much 
of February 1968 pressure resumed by March. Much o f this was precipitated by the release of 
the US balance of payments figures for 1967, which revealed a glaring deficit o f $3.6 
billion.29 This coupled with the fact that yet more troops were to be sent to Vietnam, triggered 
off a new bout of speculation in the gold market.
For Britain, the knock on effect of this crisis was terrible. The sterling balance holders, stung 
by the effects o f the devaluation, had already concluded that diversification was a sensible and 
desirable policy. The gold crisis added further fuel to the fire, because holders had come to 
believe that a revaluation o f the metal was inevitable and that gold would provide them with a 
speculative gain. Therefore, they sought to convert their holdings into dollars in order to buy 
gold. On Friday 23 February 1968, sterling took a sudden plunge. The rate fell by half a cent 
bringing it dangerously close to the $2.38 level that would trigger an automatic devaluation.30 
This occurred in spite o f  operations by the Bank o f  England to support the pound, which 
involved the use of over £100m of the foreign reserves. A week later the ‘Friday pressure’ 
repeated itself and on Friday the 8 March, a further £250m was lost from the reserves.31 The 
US unfortunately added to the crisis atmosphere when it was announced that William 
McChesney Martin, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, would attend at the central bank 
governor’s meeting in Basle on Sunday 10 March.32 This was a very unusual happening. 
However, nothing of significance came from it. During the first two weeks o f March, there 
had been devastating losses for the Bank o f England. Calculations made by the Treasury 
estimated the total spot loss on regular transactions to be in the region o f £500m.33 By far the 
greatest loss occurred on 14 March, when over £100m was converted into dollars. Apart from 
the fact that speculators anticipated a rise in the price o f  gold, the Treasury believed that some
21 Bank OVJ3/56 Kessler ‘The Cold Problem’, 4/3/68.
”  PRO T267/21 ‘T.H.M: March Gold Crisis 1968’, undated.
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o f the losses were directly attributable to the impending budget speech and the fear of ‘wide 
exchange controls’.3 4
On paper, the reserves stood at £935m on 14 March.35 This comprised £367m in gold, £112m 
in foreign exchange, a £167m Federal Reserve swap, an £8m Bank o f France credit and the 
remaining £281m of the IMF’s devaluation support package. However, because of the 
immediate requirement to cover £84m o f  market forwards, £34m o f central bank orders and to 
contribute £202m in gold to the gold pool, the real reserves totalled no more than £615m. 
Although, even this figure is optimistic as the Bank calculated that the EEA would have to 
honour a further £982m in market forwards at the end o f March. In strict accounting terms, the 
reserves were -£367m, although, as these debts had not matured the real figure was only a 
technicality. The Bank could still have used the remaining assets and it may have been 
possible to defer payment on the outstanding debts. Yet, in spite o f  all this the reserves were at 
a dangerously low level. When one recognises that the total resources available on the eve of 
the 1967 devaluation was £190m higher than those available by 14 March 1968, that fact 
becomes glaringly clear.36 It was quite possible that if the pressure did not subside, all of the 
remaining foreign exchange would be exhausted by Monday 18 March, the day before the 
budget.
Contingency Planning
However, it seems that the Treasury was unprepared for the crisis, with no contingency plans 
on the shelf. This apparent lapse was serious and it worried Thomas Balogh, the Prime 
Minister’s Economic Advisor.37 In January 1968, he had made inquires and had discovered
33 PRO T318/189 Copeman to Goldman ‘Reasons for Outflow from Reserves’, 27/3/68.
34 ibid
35 PRO T312/189 ‘Reserve Position’, 14/3/68.
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that ‘little in the way of contingency planning has been initiated’.38 He informed the Prime 
Minister that he regarded it as essential that a committee o f  economic advisors should be 
established immediately so plans might be prepared. Consequently, Wilson sent a memo to 
the Treasury asking them to update him on their current state of readiness.39 The reply was 
that ‘much thought is indeed being given to these questions’ and a short paper on Treasury 
contingency planning, relating to the blocking o f the sterling balances, was enclosed for 
Wilson’s inspection.40 Whilst this seemed to satisfy the Prime Minister, there is little evidence 
within the Treasury files that suggests any planning was occurring. Thus, it is tempting to 
conclude that the memo was designed to stop Wilson and th e  irksome Balogh intruding into 
Treasury affairs any further. In fact, the paper on blocking sent to Wilson was virtually 
identical to an undeveloped piece produced by the Treasury in 1965.4' Another possibility is 
that the Treasury did in fact engage in systematic planning bu t that the documents pertaining 
to it were not preserved. Although given that when Sir Douglas Allen took over as Permanent 
Secretary in the aftermath o f the gold crisis he set up a specialised planning division, it would 
suggest that he was unhappy with the arrangements that existed before.42 As would the fact 
that in the aftermath of the crisis, Treasury officials working in the new division spent over 
four months honing the proposals devised during the crisis.43
In a recent interview Michael Posner, who took over from Robert Neild as Economic Advisor 
to the Treasury at the beginning of 1968, accepted that the Treasury could be criticised for its 
lack of planning.44 However, he suggested that there were tw o  reasons for the omission. The 
first is that in the aftermath o f devaluation it was believed, even in spite of the J-curve effect, 31
31 ibid
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40 ibid Dyer to Dawe, 19/1/68.
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that the balance o f  payments would improve much more rapidly than it actually did.45 In other 
words, the Treasury was still optimistic about the future prospects o f  sterling and operated on 
the assumption that the currency’s recovery would not be undermined. Secondly, officials had 
become preoccupied with the preparations for the budget and this meant that contingency 
planning was to be relegated to the peripheries.
Therefore, it w as not until 14 March, during the very midst o f the gold crisis, that any 
preparations w ere made. The committee of economic advisors that Balogh had long argued 
for was finally brought into existence. Its Treasury contingent was made up o f William 
Armstrong (Permanent Secretary), Samuel Goldman (Second Secretary: Overseas), Alec 
Caimcross (Head of the Economic Section), Nicky Kaldor (Special Advisor) and Anthony 
Rawlinson (Assistant Secretary: Exchange Control).46 Maurice Parsons (Deputy Governor) 
and Kit McMahon (advisor to the governors) represented the Bank. This was however a very 
ad hoc gathering and when the Treasury continued the planning exercise in the aftermath of 
the gold crisis, membership altered greatly.
During the discussions of this hastily convened group, the only course of action that was not 
advocated by anyone, was a second fixed rate devaluation. In fact, the option was not even 
discussed and it would seem that there was a tacit understanding that it was to be avoided.47 In 
a recent interview with Kit McMahon, it emerged that there were three reasons for this.48 
Firstly, because the reserves were at such a low level, if the sterling exchange rate were further 
reduced, it would have been very unlikely that any new rate could actually be maintained.49 
Secondly, the previous devaluation had taken place only four months prior. To shift the rate 
again so soon w ould have been little different from moving to a floating rate. Thirdly, from the
45 ibid
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Treasury’s point o f view, the 1967 devaluation had been a great blow to their morale and a 
second devaluation would have been doubly so.* 50
The group agreed that the preferred course of action was to attempt to extract further credits 
from the US and the Europeans so that the rate could be supported.51 It was clear that if 
additional support was not provided the results would be disastrous. Whilst the Bank was 
initially against further borrowing, because £201 lm in aid had already been drawn upon, 
without it the collapse of the currency would be inevitable and it would be the end for sterling 
as a major reserve currency.52 It would ensure that the sterling area holders would dump their 
holdings en-mass and the rate could not be held.53
However, when the group turned its attention to the options that should be pursued if the US 
and the Europeans could not be counted upon to provide further assistance, it became clear 
that the Bank and the Treasury had gone through ‘much the same analysis’ on the possible 
courses ‘but ended up rather differently.’54 Whilst both institutions were able to agree 
internally on course they preferred, agreement between Bank and Treasury could not be 
reached. Treasury officials advocated devising a method that would remove the capacity of 
sterling holders to convert their balances into dollars. Therefore, they had come to favour the 
wholesale blocking o f  the sterling balances. This would prevent the drain from the reserves 
and in their view, do the least damage to the international monetary system. The net sterling 
balances stood at £3,893m and it was believed possible that up to £2,000m could be lost if  the 
balances were not blocked.55 By blocking, it might have been possible to conserve the
”  This is supported by PRO T312/189 ‘Reserve Position’, 14/3/68.
50 Interview with Kit McMahon; PRO T295/489 Goldman to Principle Private Secretary ‘Contingency 
Planning' 15/3/68.
51 Interview with Jeremy Morse; PRO T318/189 ‘Credits utilised and remaining facilities-end-March 
1968’; Bank OV53/38 Morse to Governors, 14/3/68.
’’ Bank G3/287 O’Brien to Armstrong, 21/3/68. The governor recognised that in accepting credit the 
Bank would be putting itself into a situation where ‘it might not be able to meet its repayment 
obligations on the due date’.
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remainder of the reserves and to maintain parity with the dollar. To the majority o f  the 
Treasury team, this seemed like an acceptable price to pay if it reduced the chance that the 
whole fixed rate system would collapse.56
However, the Bank was utterly opposed to the suggestion.57 For unlike the Treasury, it had a 
number of client groups that would be directly affected by the policy. Firstly, it would be the 
accounts o f its customers that would be blocked.58 In a recent interview, Kit McMahon stated 
that Maurice Parsons, the deputy governor viewed blocking as a very delicate moral issue and 
he felt that the Bank could not be seen to be defaulting on its client’s balances.59 Secondly, 
blocking would undermine the position of the Bank’s second client group, the city of 
London.60 It would thwart the inflow of foreign capital to London, and undermine the 
sustainability o f her investment banks.61 There was also the possibility that it would affect the 
operation of the Euro-Dollar market, which was operated by Banks, who accepted short-term 
deposits in dollars and then re-lent them for short periods. The British Euro-Dollar market was 
valued at around $17.3 billion, during the first quarter of 1968.62 It was possible that the 
blocking of the sterling balances would arouse suspicion that foreign currency balances would 
also be blocked, culminating in the withdrawal of the Euro-Dollar balances from the UK.63 
This would have been problematic for the British banks that operated the market, as they 
tended to lend out funds for longer periods than they had access to them, in the belief that new 
deposits would cover the shortfall. If new deposits did not materialise, British banks may have 
had to default in order to prevent their demise. Furthermore, in blocking, the Bank of England
56 PRO T295/489 Goldman to Dowler ‘Contingency Planning’, 15/3/68.
57 Bank OV53/38 Morse to Governors, 14/3/68
Interview with Jeremy Morse
Interview with Kit McMahon
60 PRO PREM 13/2051 Balogh to Wilson ‘For the Record’, 16/3/68.
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would still have to honour its commitments to the sterling balance holders in the future and its 
officials wondered where the Treasury planned to conjure up the foreign exchange from.64
Instead, the Bank argued that the solution was to float the pound.65 By moving to a flexible 
exchange rate, the Bank argued that neither it nor the Treasury would have to worry about the 
level o f the reserves any longer. The Bank would no longer face the prospect o f having to run 
roughshod over the interests o f its domestic and international clients and the Treasury would 
not have to worry about how future drawings on the sterling balances would be funded. It 
would be the rate and not the reserves that would take the strain. O f course, floating would still 
have done a considerable amount o f damage to the stability o f the City o f London.66 However, 
it is arguable that from the point o f view o f the Bank blocking would have been far more 
hazardous to the City, because financial activity would all but cease.67 Under floating rates, the 
City of London would continue to operate albeit at a greatly reduced level.68 However, the 
Treasury did not agree with the Bank. Goldman in particular argued that by floating, there 
would be an ‘immediate sharp fall in the rate due to diversification- possibly to $1.50’.69 This 
would make it very difficult to manage the domestic economy, as there would be a severe 
inflationary effect due to the increased price of imports. Furthermore, it was obvious that the 
movement to a flexible rate would have a profound effect on the world monetary system. It 
was highly probable that pressure on the dollar would intensify, that it too would collapse, and 
that this would destroy Bretton Woods. It was obvious to Goldman that there was ‘no doubt 
that we [the Treasury] shall get the blame’.70 It was also evident to the Treasury that the UK 
would be in breach o f its IMF articles, that it would be debarred from drawing on its IMF
64 PRO PREM 13/2051 ‘Blocking’, 17/3/68. For the proposed solution see PRO T295/580 Rawlinson 
‘Brutus: Mobilising Private Overseas Portfolios', 13/6/68.
65 Interview with Kit McMahon; Bank OV53/38 Morse to the Governors, 14/3/68; ibid. ‘Note for the 
Record’, 18/3/68
66 PRO T295/489, ‘Contingency Planning’, 15/3/68.
67 Bank OV53/38 Morse to Governors, 14/3/68. Morse states that ‘it [floating] would be unlikely to 
leave the same long-run scars as a blocking operation'.
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standby credits, and would therefore probably have to consider blocking anyway.71 To the vast 
majority o f Treasury officials, floating was simply out of the question.
Although the Bank was unanimously opposed to blocking, it appears that it did not have 
access to enough strategic resources to make the Treasury bend to its will. Recognising that 
it had in effect been overruled, it argued that if  the Treasury were to have their way then only 
the official sterling area balances should be blocked and that a conference should be quickly 
convened ‘to negotiate the partial liquidation o f  the sterling area’.72 It is arguable that the 
Bank pushed for this because it believed that it would do less damage to its overseas clients 
than a more draconian regime. However, the Treasury was not keen to compromise, because 
it believed that a partial block would not be effective and that the reserves would continue to 
diminish.73 Therefore, the Treasury pushed ahead. Three schemes for blocking were devised 
and these were named Brutus One, Two, and Three by Anthony Rawlinson,74 in honour of 
the Ides o f March.™ The outline that follows may seem somewhat scant but this is 
symptomatic o f  the fact that the initial Brutus schemes were drafted at breakneck speed and 
were thin on detail.
Brutus
The first proposal, Brutus I, cannot be properly described as a full blocking scheme in sense 
that assets are frozen or balances defaulted on. Instead, it must be seen simply as the return to 
sterling balance inconvertibility. Under it, the sterling balances o f overseas holders would 
have been distributed into different types of holding accounts.76 The first type o f account, the 
Number 1 account, would have contained all the existing sterling assets o f  persons resident
^ ibid and T29S/502 ‘Cranmer: Relations with the IMF and OECD’, 20/6/68.
2 T295/489 Goldman to Principal Private Secretary ‘Contingency Planning’, 15/3/68.
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outside the United Kingdom. These accounts would only be usable to make payment inside 
the UK for British products and services either for export or consumption within Britain. It 
would have been quite impossible to present Number 1 account sterling to the Bank of 
England for conversion into a foreign currency. The second type o f account would have been 
referred to as the Number 2 account and all future accruals of sterling, which were earned after 
the suspension of convertibility, would be deposited here. These accounts would however 
have been convertible. This would have stopped the diversification o f the existing sterling 
balances but would have allowed the conversion o f  newly acquired balances. After all, if 
future sterling transactions were not convertible those who exported to the UK but did not re­
import goodsfrom the UK would have no use for sterling and would not accept it as payment. 
Instead they would demand dollars and add to the drain on the foreign reserves. Of course 
those who acquired Number 2 account sterling under the new regime, would still be able to 
convert their holdings and diminish the reserves but the fact that they would have had to go 
through the process o f conversion might have slowed the practice down.
However, had Brutus I ever been implemented it would have provided an incomplete and short 
lived shield for the currency, a fact well known by Treasury planners.77 The proposal did not 
involve the abolition o f the Sterling Area and it could only block the transactions of overseas 
sterling holders. British investors would still have been free to move their assets out into the 
sterling area, thus exacerbating the drain to the reserves. Furthermore, it would have been 
likely that a market in cheap sterling would have developed. Those individuals who held 
Number 1 account sterling that were keen to dispose o f their assets would be able to sell them 
on at a discount to foreign importers who wished to buy goods from the UK at reduced prices.
It is also likely that the UK would have found it difficult to stop the drain on the foreign 
reserves. It would have been unlikely that overseas sterling holders would have done nothing 
with their inconvertible sterling and far more likely that they ‘would try to turn it into [British]
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goods as quickly as they could....they would do this until their balances were exhausted’.78 As 
a result, Britain would have gained no new foreign currency for its exports but would have had 
to pay for its imports with convertible sterling, most o f which would be converted, leading to a 
reduction in the reserves. Therefore rather than protecting the reserves and the parity, Brutus I 
would have merely prolonged the inevitable and slowed the exodus. It would, however, have 
given officials the time to work out a more encompassing scheme that could have been built 
around the move to inconvertibility.
For this reason contingency planning continued and a second variation of the scheme was 
devised.79 Under this version, only Number 1 accounts would have existed and they would 
have been completely blocked. In other words, instead of merely being able to use Number 1 
account sterling to pay for UK goods, the funds held in these accounts would have been 
completely frozen and inaccessible. Still, if  implemented this scheme would have faired little 
better than the previous one. Whilst the complete freeze would have removed both the 
problem o f the cheap sterling market and would ensure that exporters would have had to pay 
for British goods in foreign exchange, there would have been no incentive for foreign 
exporters to deliver goods to Britain. After all, if they were to be paid in frozen Number 1 
account sterling, they would have in effect been robbed. Therefore, Britain would either have 
to cancel the majority o f imports or pay for them in scarce dollars. It may well have transpired 
after a time that the UK earned enough foreign exchange from exports to cover the cost of 
imports but nothing would be left to pay for the rundown o f the sterling balances and these 
would have to have been left frozen indefinitely. Furthermore, under this variation o f the plan, 
sterling holdings in the hands o f British citizens would still have been freely convertible with 
potentially disastrous consequences. This coupled with the fact that the process o f freezing the 
accounts o f foreign holders would have been an administrative nightmare that could have 
potentially taken several weeks to enact by the banks, made the scheme look rather slapdash.
77ibiT
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Planning therefore continued and a third variation of the proposal was developed.79 80 The 
problem o f UK residents transferring their funds to the OSA was considered in some detail 
and it was decided that the only way to stop this would be to abolish the sterling area and re­
designate the scheduled territories as Britain and the Republic o f Ireland solely. However, talk 
o f dismantling the sterling area was not a new phenomenon that occurred simply because of 
the drastic situation during that Bank Holiday weekend. It had been considered as a standalone 
operation in its own right from as early as 1965 under the code name Brandon and in the 
context o f Brutus it was merely cut and pasted in.81
Under this third scheme two accounts returned. The Number 1 accounts would have been 
blocked completely as would have been the case in Brutus II. However, funds in these 
accounts would have been usable to purchase goods that had already been dispatched by UK 
exporters. This was because it was felt that if concessions were not made here, once the goods 
arrived at their foreign destinations, they would not be paid for at all. Freezing the Number 1 
accounts in this manner would stop holders running down their balances by purchasing/i/rf/ier 
UK exports and would also help to stop a cheap sterling market developing. However Number 
1 accounts would have been usable for the purchase of UK securities, the profits o f which 
would be transferable to Number 2 accounts.
The Number 2 accounts would have been convertible and would have received all post-zero 
payments. However, it w ould not have been possible for balance holders to transfer their funds 
from Number 1 to Number 2 accounts. Although the blocking of these accounts was 
considered for a short time, it was thought necessary that they remained convertible; for if they 
were not, no one would contemplate accepting sterling as payment for goods.
79 PRO T295/489 ‘Operation Brutus’, 14/3/68.
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Figure 4.1 Brutus 1,2 and 3
Brutus 1
Number 1 account
■ All pre-existing OSA and NSA balances placed here
■ Cannot be converted into foreign exchange
■ Can be used to make payments to the UK for trade purposes
• Funds can be transferred from here to other number 1 accounts but not to 
number 2 accounts.
Number 2 account
■ All future accruals o f sterling to be placed here
■ Fully convertible
Brutus 2
Number 1 account
■ Inconvertible and frozen- this means that funds held in these accounts cannot be 
for any purpose
■ All pre-existing and future accruals o f sterling would be placed here as no 
number 2 accounts operate under this proposal
Brutus 3
Extension o f exchange control to OSA under operation Brandon. Note that this 
alteration applies to all subsequent Brutus proposals and is designed to stop capital 
outflow.
Number 1 account:
• Inconvertible and frozen.
• Usable only to (a) pay for goods that have been ordered by foreign importers 
pre-zero and (b) to buy British securities, the profits from which will be 
transferred to the number 2 account.
Number 2 account:
■ Receives all post-zero payments.
■ Completely convertible.
■ However, funds cannot be transferred from No.l to No,2 accounts.___________
This was about as far as the Treasury advisors took the initial exercise. Although they had 
considered some o f the potential pitfalls involved in the implementation of Brutus 1 and 2, 
they did not have time, at this stage, to develop a full critique o f  the third plan. Although the 
planning was far from complete, the constraints o f time demanded an agreed line from both 
the Bank and the Treasury. It was clear that o f the non-Bank representatives, Caimcross ‘opted
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very reluctantly for blocking’.82 Nevertheless, he preferred wait and to see how the markets 
operated on the following Monday and Tuesday before a decision was taken. Thomas Balogh 
seemed to be in favour as did Anthony Rawlinson, who thought that Brutus I could be called 
off after a short time.83 However, it was decided that
‘If forced to choose between a floating rate for sterling and the blocking o f the 
sterling balances, on balance the second should be favoured. Some of us are 
doubtful about this conclusion and consider the main lesson of the paper is 
that it is vital at all costs to avoid either o f these alternatives’.84
Thus, it was reluctantly agreed that Ministers should be advised that if no further funding was 
forthcoming, Brutus should be implemented. However, because o f  the obvious flaws with the 
plans the Treasury were ‘backing Brutus I, the only version sufficiently advanced to be 
feasible’.85 The hope was that if this terrible step had to be taken, planning could continue 
post-Brutus and the blocking effect tightened. Accordingly the official advice was that if  
Brutus had to be implemented it should be ‘done so on Sunday night [17th March] no later that 
9pm or in the course o f the budget on Tuesday...as we would have 2 days experience o f the 
markets in order to determine whether Brutus was necessary’.86
Ministerial Involvement
It was in the atmosphere o f impending crisis that on 1S March the Chancellor, who had been 
briefed by Goldman on the outcome of the discussions, went the House of Commons to warn
„  Caimcross, A. Wilson Years, p.287.
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the Prime Minister o f  how close to the edge sterling really was.87 He also informed Wilson 
that he had heard that the US planned to hold an international conference in Washington over 
the weekend, at which they hoped to deal with the problem of gold. The meeting between 
Chancellor and Prime Minister took place at 6.00pm. By half past, Michael Halls the Prime 
Minister’s principal private secretary formed an emergency office and alerted the appropriate 
Treasury officials.88 At 9.00pm, Wilson met with his Chancellor again. Although no new 
information was available on the plight o f sterling or the impending discussions in 
Washington both men were both optimistic and at the same time anxious. They were 
optimistic because they hoped that the UK could use the conference as a means to extract the 
desperately needed funding package from the Americans. Yet they were anxious because it 
was possible that the US might use the conference to announce far reaching changes to the 
nature o f the relationship between the dollar and gold, and that such alterations would 
negatively impact on the already perilous sterling.89
To Wilson and Jenkins, it seemed that the United States had four options, each with their 
own potential reverberations on sterling.90 The first was to suspend the convertibility o f gold 
into dollars.91 In the short-term, this option would have been favourable for Britain. It would 
have stopped the run on the pound that was principally caused by the flight into gold. After 
all, if dollars could no longer be converted into gold, speculators would see no incentive in 
cashing in their sterling holdings to purchase dollars. However in the medium to long term, 
the suspension o f dollar-gold convertibility would be damaging to the Bretton Woods accord 
and would serve to undermine the regime o f  fixed currency rates which was backed by
87 Jenkins, R. A Life at the Centre, p.235; Jenkins, Life, p.235. Crossman states that the ‘Bank of 
England utterly betrayed the government by leaving [it] in the dark to the very last minute and not 
foreseeing and warning them of the catastrophe.' MRC MSS. 154/8/120,21/3/68. However, Kit 
McMahon and Jeremy Morse both denied this in recent interviews. Their version of events is supported 
by the fact that daily EH A reports were supplied to the Treasury between February and March 1968.
See PRO T318/184 ‘Daily Reports to the Chancellor on Sterling and the Foreign Exchange Market’, 
6/2/68-17/S/68.
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gold.92 It was for this reason that officials within both the Bank and the Treasury thought that 
this option would be unpalatable to the US.
The second alternative would be to give in to the speculators and re-value gold.93 For Britain, 
this would be a mixed blessing. It would greatly delight the speculators, who had sought this 
end and thus the flight into gold would cease. It would also lead to the upward valuation of 
Britain’s gold holdings, which could only be welcomed at a time when the reserves were 
almost exhausted and it was for this reason that the Bank favoured it.94 Although Caimcross, 
the head o f the economic section, also preferred this option,95 other problems would emerge 
if  it were pursued. The IMF had loaned Britain sizeable sums of money to bolster her foreign 
reserves, most o f which had been used, and rather unfortunately the agreement pressed for 
repayment in dollars at gold value. Thus if gold were re-valued, the UK would find itself 
owing considerably more dollars to the IMF and this would greatly offset the rise in value of 
Britain’s own gold holdings.96
However, no one within the Treasury or the Bank believed that revaluation would be the 
chosen policy stance of the United States. It would in effect be the devaluation o f the dollar 
and would dent US prestige. Furthermore, every private buyer of gold in the market would 
reap an unearned reward and one that would undermine the authority o f every central bank 
that took part in the gold pool. Gold producing states like South Africa and the USSR, which 
were not on friendly terms with the US, would also benefit from a revaluation.97 Moreover, 
increasing the gold price would most likely be ill received by those in closest association 
with the US, who had helpfully agreed to hold dollars and not convert them into gold. They 
would find that their commitment to the US had left them much less well o ff in terms of the
92 ibid
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purchasing power of their reserves when compared to countries with heavy gold reserves 
such as France.98
The third possibility was that the US would implement the Carli plan,99 which would create a 
two-tier gold market.100 The first tier would be operated by central banks that would trade 
gold with each other at the official price within a closed market and would not sell gold to 
private traders. The second tier would be the private market o f gold buyers and sellers and 
this market would be allowed to reach its own level. The hope was that this second tier 
would provide a useful safety valve that would take the pressure off both the pound and the 
dollar as privately held gold would be allowed to increase in value without any impact on the 
currency markets. Treasury officials were convinced that this would be the policy proposal 
that the Americans advanced. However, the scheme would only work if European central 
bankers agreed to accumulate further large amounts o f dollars. The suspicion was that they 
would not be prepared to go very far in this direction. It would have been likely that this 
view would have been shared by speculators who would have believed that the scheme 
would not endure and thus it was possible that speculation against both the pound and the 
dollar would resume after a time. Indeed, Wilson feared that the two tiered system ‘could not 
survive the strains for long, perhaps not even for more than a day or so’.101
Whilst each o f  these three options would be potentially damaging to Britain in the short-term 
they would reduce the pressure on sterling and hopefully avert the impending crisis for a 
time. The fourth and most terrifying possibility was that the US might do nothing at all. This 
would signal the end o f $2.40=£1. Speculation would continue unabated and the pound 
would be pushed over the edge. Thus, the greatest fear, among both officials and politicians
"ibid
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in London, was that nothing new would emerge from Washington.102 The hope in Whitehall 
was that, because the US gold reserves were reaching the S1 Obillion mark, action would 
have to be taken. This was because this figure was widely regarded in the US as dangerously 
low; any lower was thought to be inconsistent with national security.103
In any case, at 10.40pm Henry Fowler, the US Treasury Secretary, telephoned Jenkins. The 
line was less than clear and Fowler seemed in some state o f  distress. All that Jenkins could 
understand was that Fowler had asked if the London gold market could be prevented from 
opening the following day.104 It emerged that the US planned to use the Washington 
conference as a means to push through the two-tier gold market proposal. If the gold market 
stayed open after the conference had been officially announced, it was likely that speculation 
would intensify, as fund managers might believe that the conference would be used to 
announce an upward valuation o f gold. For Jenkins, this was positive news for two reasons. 
Firstly, it signalled that the US was not prepared to let the drain continue but more 
importantly it presented the administration with a ‘smokescreen’ under which the foreign 
exchange markets could also be shut down.105
Indeed, one method of slowing a currency’s demise is simply to close the foreign exchange 
markets in which it is traded, as this stops the possibility o f spot market speculation. 
However, it sends signals to the international market that the currency is weak. Thus, if and 
when the markets are re-opened speculation will resume with a vengeance. However, if it 
can be made to look as though the markets have been closed because o f  the request o f a third 
party then speculators will not suspect that there is anything amiss. The pressure on the home 
currency will be alleviated for the duration of the closure and valuable planning and
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bargaining time can be gained before the markets are reopened.106 Jenkins seized this 
opportunity.107
Wilson readily agreed to the plan, which was ‘an absolute sort o f lifebelt to a drowning 
man’.108 However, after consultation with officials it became clear that in order to close both 
the gold pool and the foreign exchange markets a bank holiday would be necessary. This in 
turn required an Order o f the Council and a Privy Council that night in the presence of the 
Queen.109 Thus the Prime Minister and the Chancellor were joined by Peter Shore, the 
Secretary of State for the DEA, and they made their way to Buckingham Palace in order to 
present the proposal.
George Brown and the Reformation of the Core Executive
However, a great political storm blew up. George Brown the Deputy Leader and 
unquestionably number two in the Cabinet had not been consulted and thus accused Wilson 
of
‘introducing a “presidential” system into the running of the government 
that is wholly alien to the British constitutional system...but was so 
operating it that decisions were being taken over the heads and without 
the knowledge of Ministers, and far too often outsiders in his entourage 
seemed to be almost the only effective “Cabinet”’.110
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However it is more likely that Brown was not concerned about decisions being taken without 
the approval of the whole Cabinet, but the fact that he felt he was no longer a part o f Wilson’s 
inner clique and that his influence was waning. Wilson had unquestionably attempted to 
contact Brown; the issue was how much effort he had put into it ."1 Wilson claimed that he had 
sanctioned several attempts to find Brown but that he seemed unobtainable, whilst Brown 
claimed that Wilson’s attempts to locate him were half-hearted and that Wilson wanted to 
keep him out o f the loop."2 When the Brown was finally informed of the decision, he called 
Number 10 and expressed his deep displeasure. After gathering together all the available 
Cabinet Ministers in the House of Commons he descended onto Downing Street and launched 
into one of his famous tirades, which eventually resulted in his resignation from 
government."3
Whether or not Brown’s exclusion from the decision making process on the night o f the 14 
March was a calculated move on the part o f Wilson is difficult to discern. It is clear that both 
Wilson and Jenkins were operating under crisis conditions and that the closure o f both the 
gold and foreign exchange markets seemed to be the only viable solution. Especially as it 
could be presented as a benevolent act on the part o f the British government in response to an 
American financial crisis. One can only conclude that the decision taken by Wilson and 
Jenkins was the correct one but that Wilson’s method o f  running the Cabinet was one that 
caused a great deal o f agitation to its members. As Richard Crossman records in his diary
‘If I was ever to resign it would be precisely because I can’t stand the 
way Cabinet is run. It’s because of Harold’s inability to create a firm 
inner group with whom to work consistently and his determination to 
keep bilateral relationships with each one o f us and arbitrarily to leave us *
Davis, J. ‘Staring over the Precipice and Into the Abyss’: An Anatomy and an Analysis of 
‘Operation Brutus’ November 1967-Julv 1968. (University of London: unpublished MA thesis, 1999), 
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out of absolutely vital conversations just because we don’t happen to be 
in No. 10 or because we’re out of favour that afternoon.
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There was no earthly reason why on Thursday evening [14th March 1968]
Harold shouldn’t have quietly permitted Burke Trend [Cabinet Secretary] 
to organise a meeting o f all available members o f S.E.P or o f Cabinet, 
including the deputy leader’.13 14
It is arguable though that Wilson’s ‘inability’ to form an inner Cabinet was actually a 
calculated and central part o f his leadership style. Bilateralism allowed him to play his 
ministers o ff  one another and ensure that it was never possible for any o f  them to become 
powerful enough to threaten his leadership. In one sense, Brown’s departure was a blessing. 
As Caimcross recalls, ‘Fortunately attention was diverted from the gold market by other 
events: the resignation of George Brown, the appalling [anti-Vietnam war] riot in Grosvenor 
Square’.115 However, in another sense it was damaging. It meant that Wilson had to be seen to 
be more inclusive and democratic in his leadership style. These changes began almost 
immediately.
The following day Wilson called a Cabinet meeting and everyone attended, except of course 
George Brown. The Chancellor explained the chronology of the previous night’s events in an 
attempt to justify the lack of consultation. Barbara Castle, Minster of Transport, testified that it 
was the first occasion in the Wilson administration that such matters had been discussed 
before the full Cabinet. She felt ‘absolutely fascinated, feeling I had been let into political 
adulthood for the first time’.116 During the meeting, Anthony Crosland stated that whilst he 
agreed with the decision, during his three years as a Cabinet Minister the subject of sterling 
had always been something that the Cabinet were not allowed to discuss collectively. In fact, it
113 PRO CAB 128/46 ‘Note of a Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street,’ 17/3/68.
||4 Crossman, R. The Crossman Diaries, p.410.
Caimcross, A. Managing, p.210.
116 Castle, B. Diaries, p.402.
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was clear that all the important economic decisions took place merely between the Prime 
Minister and Chancellor. He went on to say that ‘the rest o f us were merely faced with the 
results when a crisis came and when the choice o f action was invariably limited’.117 He felt 
that the Prime Minister should establish an inner group o f Ministers that could discuss these 
issues.
Whilst Wilson was not keen to do this because o f the fear o f leaks it seems that he conceded 
the point. Indeed, ‘Douglas [Allen, Permanent Secretary at the DEA] explained that after the 
George Brown episode P.M. will have to summon five Ministers to discuss the situation 
tomorrow [Sunday].’" 8 Wilson himself confirms this version o f events ‘To forestall criticism 
from certain o f our colleagues, I had formed a small committee of the six ministers directly 
affected...’" 9, although Wilson seems to have his numbers muddled. In any case, this was a 
concession that the Prime Minister had to make because with Brown gone, there was a chance 
the government might collapse. Indeed, Tony Benn was extra vigilant in completing his diary 
entries during this episode because ‘if the Labour Government falls, as I now think quite 
possible, then at any rate I shall have documented the circumstances’.120 O f course, whilst 
Wilson’s resignation was not beyond the realms o f possibility the collapse of the government 
was unlikely. Irrespective o f how the crisis was resolved, the Labour Party would retain its 
parliamentary majority.
MISC 205
The group that Wilson called together comprised himself; the Chancellor; Secretary o f State 
for Economic Affairs; the President o f the Board of Trade and George Brown’s successor at 
the Foreign Office, Michael Stewart. It became ad hoc Cabinet committee MISC 205 which
" 7ibid, p.400.
111 Caimcross, A. Wilson Years, p.288.
119 Wilson, H. The Labour Government, p.513.
120 Benn, A. Office Without Power: Diaries 1968-72. (London: Hutchinson, 1988), p.47.
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was later described by Barbara Castle as ‘this most secret and powerful o f  Cabinet groups’.121 
At that first meeting of MISC 205 at 3.30pm on Sunday 17 March, it became obvious that 
there were two over-riding and interconnected issues.122 Firstly, the outcome of the 
Washington conference. If it were unsuccessful in halting speculation in the gold market, the 
pound would sink. Second, the fact that the reserves were either already exhausted or near that 
point. This issue was crucial. After all, had the reserves been larger during 1968, then the 
pound would have weathered better against speculation on the gold market. Furthermore, 
because the reserves were now so low, even if the Washington conference was successful and 
stopped much o f the speculation, a minor flight from sterling would still be enough to trigger 
the meltdown o f the currency.
Thus it was obviously imperative that whatever decision was taken by the Americans at the 
Washington conference, in terms o f the relationship between gold and the dollar, that the 
outcome was able to restore calm to the world’s currency markets. If  confidence was not 
restored, the side winds o f the crisis would continue to plague sterling. Furthermore, if  calm 
was not re-established then it would be essential for the UK to gain more funds from the 
Americans and the G10 to plug the gap in the reserves, just as the Bank and Treasury had 
advocated.123 In fact, even if the pressure did die down, the available resources in the EEA had 
become so inadequate that it would be difficult to maintain sterling’s parity with the dollar, 
even under non-crisis conditions. However, the Chancellor was not confident that the 
Americans would provide the essential line of credit. During his previous conversations with 
Fowler, Jenkins had requested a large stand-by credit. Yet, ‘He [Fowler] was non-committal, 
even unforthcoming’.124 William Armstrong, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, who had 
been dispatched to Washington, shared this lack of confidence in the chances o f US rescue
Castle, B. Diaries, p.462.
122 PRO CAB 130/497 ‘MISC 205 (68): First Meeting’, 17/3/68.
123 ibid
124 Jenkins, R. A Life at the Centre, p.235.
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package.125 He informed Jenkins, via telephone, that it was most uncertain that Britain would 
get the financial support from the US that would allow smooth running when the markets re­
opened and suggested that Monday and Tuesday should be proclaimed Bank Holidays too.126
This greatly worried W ilson’s M1SC 205 and it considered the Treasury’s contingency plans 
very carefully. Wilson him self thought that ‘information on the progress o f the Washington 
conference was not yet sufficient to form the basis for firm decisions’127 *but that it was 
essential to become acquainted with the alternatives. However, it was obvious to the 
assembled Ministers that there were clear problems with blocking. The UK would accept a 
major catastrophe and risk being branded as a pariah state in order to avoid chaos. There was 
the very real possibility that other countries would retaliate and that Britain’s overseas 
investments would be frozen in return. Furthermore, the plan’s potential to destroy the sterling 
area was both unthinkable but at the same time strangely appealing. Yet, it was clear that if 
Brutus were implemented, international economic disorder would ensue. However, Wilson 
recognised that the scheme could potentially lead to some favourable outcomes.
Indeed the Prime Minister, who was still reeling from de G aulle’s second veto on Britain’s 
membership o f the European Economic Community, believed that the damage to the 
international trading community that would result from Brutus might cause further tension 
between the six members o f  the EEC.121 To his mind, it was possible that the wedge created, 
could potentially grease the way for a third, and this time successful, British bid to join the 
community. However, this was an unlikely outcome. It was far more likely that the six would 
gang up on Britain, the cause of their misery, than each other.
125 Interview with Sir Samuel Goldman.
126 Bank OV53/38 Armstrong to Jenkins, 17/3/68.
127 PRO CAB 130/497 ‘Minutes of Misc 205(68) 1“ Meeting’, 17/3/68
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Obviously, the main advantage with the scheme, as far as ministers were concerned, was that 
it was designed to shield the reserves. It would protect Britain against a further run on the 
pound and put pressure on the US to develop a long-term solution to international monetary 
problems. As well as this, it would make the problem of the sterling balances an immediate 
priority for the international community and it might have been possible that some collective 
means o f funding them would be found. I am bound to agree with this analysis, at least in part. 
It is undeniable that in blocking, Britain would have provided the long-overdue impetus for 
interested parties to reform the international system but it is unlikely that the ill conceived 
Brutus I would have provided an efficient shield to the reserves.'29
However, the Ministers were still clear that their favoured option was be for the US to provide 
a funding package. This would ensure that international chaos could be avoided, at least for 
the near future. O f course, whether or not the US would agree to this was another matter. If 
they did not, Wilson believed that it might be possible to use Brutus as a mechanism to force 
them to make a U-tum. Not through implementation but as a threat that would make the US 
authorities recognise what the dangers to the international monetary system would be, if  they 
failed to prevent sterling’s demise. Wilson explained to his colleagues, that if the Americans 
were not forthcoming, then it would be necessary to
‘...use the arguments adduced about the consequences which would follow if we 
were driven to block the sterling balances in order to ensure adequate support for 
sterling... the President would be likely to be more responsive in this respect if it 
was made clear that the blocking o f sterling balances would mean a serious threat 
to the dollar’.129 30
129 Readers might like to examine PRO T29J/493 ‘Measures to deal with severe outflows including
blocking of sterling accounts: Master plan (operation Cranmer)', 1968. This file contains the master 
plan to the blocking exercise and is far more complicated and rigorous than the early Brutus schemes. 
150 PRO CAB 130/497 ‘Minutes of Misc 205(68) 1“ Meeting’, 17/3/68.
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In fact, Wilson had already begun the ‘blackmail’.131 He had made contact with President 
Johnson three days prior and stated ‘if we [the UK] had to protect ourselves, we should be 
forced to take action which could have a grave effect on other currencies’.132 One wonders 
then, why he felt the need to seek agreement from his colleagues, for a course of action that he 
had already embarked upon. One can only conclude that post-Brown, Wilson was ever 
mindful of the vulnerability o f his position and any attempt on his part at paying lip service to 
the idea of collective decision making would aid his cause. However, before the weekend 
Wilson’s threat to Johnson had been a hollow one. Now that some progress had been made on 
Brutus planning, the threat was credible.
Although it is ironic that at the Washington conference, Leslie O’Brien (Governor of the Bank 
o f England) reported that ‘various forms of partial blocking o f sterling are being suggested to 
us but we are resisting these and stressing that blocking would have to be complete and would 
necessarily cause damage to others as well as ourselves’.133 It is possible that O’Brien’s 
rejection of blocking and his elucidation of its horrors at the conference made Wilson’s ploy 
more effective. For the Americans and Europeans finally concluded that if sterling was not 
assisted then the consequences for both the dollar and the IMS would be grave.134 *
Consequently, the two-tier gold market was adopted and Britain got its much-needed standby 
credit. The final sum that was acquired was $3975m.13! It was not however quite the amount 
that was requested, nor quite the sum that was publicised, but the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor deemed that ‘this was not sufficient grounds to justify immediate action to block,
131 ibid
132 FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XII ‘Telegram from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson', 
18/3/68, p.617. This telegram refers to a copy of Wilson's March 14th message in which he sends this 
passage.
133 Bank OV53/38 ‘Telegram No.925’ 16/3/68
134 Interview with Sir Samuel Goldman; FRUS, Vol.12 ‘Paper Prepared in the Department of State’, 
undated; Bank OV53/38 Armstrong to Jenkins, 17/3/68.
133 Bank OV53/38 Morse ‘New Arrangements for Sterling’, 18/3/68. This comprised existing standbys 
totalling $2,833m, plus an additional $1,100. Of the additional credits $700m came from the US, $50m 
each from Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, $130m from Germany and $100m from the BIS.
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which would lead to the complete dismantling o f  the sterling area’.136 However, when the 
market reopened on Monday 18 March there was, rather thankfully, a highly uneventful day’s 
trading. Attention therefore reverted to the preparations for the next day’s Budget speech.
Summary
This chapter has analysed the origins and implications of the March gold crisis. It has been 
argued that the episode is important for the following reasons. Firstly, because it occurred 
during a time when the Treasury, which was pre-occupied with preparations for the budget, 
had put its contingency planning operation to bed. This meant that officials had not given as 
much thought as they could have to the various policy alternatives. Consequently, they had to 
develop proposals from scratch, under conditions o f crisis. The result was that both the Bank 
and the Treasury were prepared to consider courses o f action that they had rejected before the 
devaluation, under the auspices o f  the ‘FU war book’.137
Secondly, the episode also marks a rift between the two organisations, with each coming to 
favour one o f the two previously rejected policy options, namely blocking and floating. This 
rift did not occur because the Bank and Treasury had different ideas about the best means to 
achieve the public good but because of the particular vested interests that each organisation 
held. The Treasury opted for blocking because it feared that its prestige would be dented if the 
pound floated, although with hindsight it is arguable that its prestige would have been just as 
damaged by blocking.138 Whilst the Bank, in choosing its preferred course, was conscious of 
the need to protect the interests o f  its client group, namely its overseas customers and the City 
of London. That the Treasury was successful in subjugating the Bank and foisting its own 
preferences on the Labour government suggests that the Bank was the junior partner in the
l36PRO CAB 130/497 ‘Minutes of Misc 205(68) Second Meeting’, 17/3/68. The amount requested was 
$5,000m and the publicised figure was $4050m.
|37 PRO T312/1636 Ryrie ‘Fixed or Flexible Rates’, 22/9/66; PRO T312/1398 ‘Blocking’, 12/4/65.
‘ Interview with Samuel Goldman
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relationship. Kit McMahon, an ex-deputy governor o f the Bank, also supports this 
interpretation.119 However, it is important to stress that the Bank was not totally subservient to 
the Treasury and that it still retained a great deal o f autonomy, most notably in its internal 
management and in its relations with other central bankers and the sterling area.* 140
Thirdly, because the early Brutus scheme was so rudimentary, it is very unlikely that it would 
have provided an effective block.141 If the additional credits had not been provided and 
ministers were forced to implement the plan, it would only have been effective for a matter of 
weeks at the most. Although the Treasury would most likely have attempted to improve the 
block, if they had been unable to do so quickly enough, they would have been forced to float 
the pound.
The episode also marks a transition in the way that Wilson organised his executive in terms of 
economic policy making. No longer were the Prime Minister and the Chancellor to conduct 
economic policy behind closed doors and then bump it through Cabinet. MISC 205 became a 
serious inner group of economic policy makers. Wilson may not have intended this to be so 
but after the Brown debacle there was little else he could do. The committee was also to take 
a serious interest in the Treasury’s future contingency planning activities. This too was in 
marked contrast to the conduct o f  planning pre-devaluation. However, because the Treasury 
controlled the flow of papers to the committee, it is arguable that officials were still able to 
shape the context within which ministers operated. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
during 1969 MISC 205 met only five times.142 This suggests that the scars resulting from 
Brown’s departure had healed and that Wilson could return to bilateralism. It also suggests 
that power relations within the core executive are fluid and dynamic, rather than static.
Interview with Kit McMahon
140 Bank OV44/160 ‘Extending the Basle Arrangements' 10/4/68; Bank OV44/164 ‘The Sterling Area 
and the Basle Negotiations’, 19/6/68; PREM13/1402 Balogh to Wilson ‘Bank of England’, 20/5/66.
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131
Finally, the crisis also had wider significance in terms o f its impact on the IMS. The 
American decision to split the gold market in two, with one part controlled by the central 
banks who continued to trade gold at $35 per ounce, and the other part operated by the 
markets where gold was allowed to find its own level, marks the beginning o f the end for 
Bretton-Woods.* 143 The Bretton-Woods agreement had been established on the principle that 
the US would agree to buy or sell gold from anyone, irrespective o f their status, at a fixed 
price o f $35 per ounce. With the implementation of the two-tier system, this pledge was only 
to hold good for monetary authorities. The step also represented the partial devaluation of the 
dollar. This was because the currency would have two different values, depending on whether 
it was being used in official or non-official transactions. Furthermore, as the price of gold in 
the private market was constantly fluctuating, this meant that the dollar had in effect floated 
in that market.144
PRO CAB 130/497 ‘MISC20J (69)’, undated.
143 PRO T267/21 ‘T.H.M.: The March Gold Crisis 1968’, undated.
144 ibid; Bank OV53/38 ‘Telegram No. 2603’, 14/3/68.
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Chapter 5 Operation Brutus
This chapter provides an in-depth account o f the continued activities o f the sterling 
contingency planning network. For although the immediate crisis had receded planning did 
not. It is arguable that the one lesson that officials and politicians, alike, learned from the 
debacle was just how unprepared they were.' Whilst the additional funding secured from the 
United States and the G10 would reduce the likelihood o f a further flight from sterling in the 
coming weeks it clearly could not protect the pound indefinitely. The worry was that pressure 
on the free gold market would resume by the summer with disastrous consequences. If 
another crisis erupted during the US presidential election campaign or coincided with the fall 
o f the Italian or German coalitions it would be possible that the Americans and the Europeans 
would be so obsessed with their domestic politik that they would not come to the aid of 
sterling.1 2 Therefore, between March and July 1968, the contingency planning network 
continued to hone the Brutus scheme. Eight distinct versions of the operation were devised 
during this five-month period, with an ever-increasing degree of complexity. Broadly, the aim 
o f this chapter is to reconstruct the deliberations of the contingency planning network. The 
first half o f the chapter examines the development o f the basic macro Brutus regime and the 
movement from Brutus 1 to Brutus 8. The second half o f the chapter focuses on the micro 
planning conducted by the network, after it had agreed upon the more general Brutus regime. 
It will be argued that once officials embarked upon the more micro aspects o f planning, they 
quickly came to realise that the full Brutus system would require import controls, rationing at 
home, a ban on foreign travel and the requisitioning o f citizens’ equity holdings in foreign 
corporations. Once the implications o f implementing the Brutus scheme hit home, officials 
within the contingency planning network quickly concluded that this form o f second order 
change should be avoided at all costs.
1 Interview with Sir Kit McMahon
2 PRO T29J/490 Michael Posner to Douglas Allen ‘Brutus’, 6/5/68.
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The Continuation of Brutus
Sir Samuel Goldman recognised that, even with the fresh borrowing rights that had been 
accrued during the gold crisis, there would be the risk o f  a renewed crisis o f sterling if the 
balance o f payments did not improve and sterling balance holders continued to diversify. 
Therefore, he informed the Chancellor on 20 March
‘that it is necessary to probe more in depth into the consequences for trade and the 
international banking system of blocking and to examine alternative courses of 
action such as borrowing or floating the pound’.1
Sir Douglas Allen, who was in the process o f taking over as Permanent Secretary from Sir 
William Armstrong, agreed and urged Jenkins to put the matter before Wilson’s M1SC 205, 
which was meeting later that day.3 4 Although there is no surviving record o f the M1SC 
meeting, it would appear that it was a request that the politicians conceded to or perhaps even 
welcomed. For as Allen later reported to his officials:
‘The remit is to continue over the next few weeks to study the policy 
questions involved in Brutus with the aim o f resolving them but not to make 
any physical preparation in terms o f training staff and allotting 
accommodation’.5
Ministers were worried that if a large number of staff were taken off their regular duties and 
trained in the exchange control regime, it would only be a matter o f  time before a leak 
occurred. This would potentially undermine confidence in sterling, precipitating the need to
3 PRO T295/489 Goldman to Dowler ‘Contingency planning: Operation Brutus Trade Effects'.
4 PRO T29S/490 Allen to Halls ‘Contingency Planning: Operation Brutus’ 20/3/68.
134
introduce Brutus. Consequently, Sir Burke Trend (the Cabinet Secretary) imposed severe 
security restrictions on the individuals involved in Brutus planning. Firstly only those who had 
been positively vetted by the security service were to be involved in the scheme and secondly 
only two copies o f the plan were to ever be in circulation, one at the Treasury and one at the 
Bank.” To that end Anthony Glover, a Principal in General Finance, who was on secondment 
from Customs and Excise, set about destroying all but one of the eight copies o f the first 
Brutus scheme ‘in accordance with instructions relating to the disposal o f top secret waste’.5 67
Douglas Allen decided that he would supervise the development o f the project but put 
Anthony Rawlinson in charge o f its day to day development.8 Rawlinson was the Assistant 
Secretary heading the exchange control division and was in many ways the natural choice to 
lead the project. He had a wide-ranging knowledge of the issues related to Brutus, which 
essentially centred on exchange control. Furthermore, Rawlinson with the assistance Anthony 
Glover had devised the 1966 scheme to block the balances o f the Rhodesians, which was 
something o f a mini-Brutus.9
Therefore Rawlinson must be seen as the central figure in the world of blocking schemes or as 
Sir Kit McMahon so eloquently put it, he ‘was the arch-commissar o f Brutus’.10 Rawlinson 
was the son o f a Church o f England Bishop, a devout Christian, and an Oxford graduate with a 
first in classics.11 It was perhaps his love of the ancients that led him to christen the scheme 
Brutus, in honour of the Ides o f  March. He was also suited to his new role because he 
recognised the importance o f this kind o f planning. As Anthony Glover recalls:
5 PRO T295/492 Rawlinson to Goldman ‘Brutus etc’, 1/4/68.
6 Interview with Sir William Ryrie and PRO T29J/489 Goldman to Rawlinson ‘Brutus’ 21/3/68.
7 PRO T29S/489 ‘Note for the Record’, 20/3/68
'  PRO T29J/489 Hay to Hawtin 20/3/68
9 Interview with Anthony Glover
10 Interview with Sir Kit McMahon
11 Interview with Sir William Ryrie
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‘Rawlinson thought that plans were useless but that planning was essential. He 
meant that it was never likely that a contingency plan produced so far ahead of 
events would have much bearing on the situation as it unfolded. But by going 
through the process of planning we would be much more familiar with the various 
techniques available to us to control the situation than we would have been if no 
planning took place’.12
As the production o f a workable Brutus scheme was likely to be very complicated and time 
consuming, Douglas Allen took Rawlinson off his normal duties and created a new division 
for him to head that focused solely on contingency planning. This new division was called 
Finance: Planning and for all intensive purposes Rawlinson was its only full-time member. In 
his previous post as chief of the Exchange Control division, Rawlinson had reported to David 
Hubback, the head o f the General Finance Group. Although in his new role he had not been 
promoted and was still ostensibly a part o f  Hubback’s group, he no longer reported to him and 
nor was Hubback kept up to date on the development o f Brutus. Instead, Rawlinson officially 
reported directly to the Third Secretary heading the Home and General Finance Groups, who 
was at that time Goldman, but unofficially he reported straight to Douglas Allen.13 This type 
of arrangement had been something Allen had authorised before when he was at the DEA but 
it was a novel organisational change for the Treasury.14
However, it would have been impossible for Rawlinson to complete the Brutus plan alone. 
Therefore, Allen assigned Michael Posner, the Economic Advisor to the Treasury, to work 
along side him.15 Posner, like Nicky Kaldor and Tommy Balogh had been brought in as an 
outside advisor by the Wilson Government and was therefore one o f the Treasury irregulars. 
He headed no division of his own and nor was he a part o f any. Although between March and
12 Interview with Anthony Glover
15 Interview with Lord Croham and T199/1239 ‘H.M. Treasury Organisation Chart’, January 1968;
May 1968 and July 1968.
14 Interview with Lord Croham
136
June 1968, he was to spend a considerable amount o f his time working on the project in 
collaboration with Rawlinson.15 6
With the consent o f Douglas Allen, Rawlinson also enlisted the help o f a number of part-time 
collaborators. These included Robert Armitage, from the Treasury Solicitors Department, who 
dealt with the legal aspects o f imposing exchange control; William Ryrie and Geoffrey Littler, 
both Assistant Secretaries from the General Finance group; Sir Samuel Goldman, Rawlinson’s 
immediate superior; William Hughes from the Board o f Trade; Dorothy Johnston, a 
Commissioner at Customs and Jeremy Morse, Kit McMahon and Jasper Hollom from the 
Bank.17 However with so many people involved, Douglas Allen also found it useful to 
establish a forum in which the various officials could meet to co-ordinate the distribution of 
work and discuss papers that had been produced. The forum was rather aptly named the Allen 
Group and Douglas Allen himself chaired it.18 As planning progressed it was to meet on an 
almost weekly basis.
Brutus 1-3 Reviewed
By this stage, three different versions of the Brutus plan had been developed. The first scheme, 
Brutus 1, operated a system o f partial blocking through the return to inconvertibility. Under it, 
all the existing holdings of both the sterling and non-sterling area would have been placed in 
Number 1 accounts which would have been completely inconvertible. However, those that 
held this form of sterling would still have been able to use it for the purchase of British goods 
and securities. The only sterling that would have been convertible under this system would be 
new accruals that were acquired post-zero. This scheme would not have entailed the abolition
15 ibid
16 Interview with Michael Posner
17 Interviews with Anthony Glover, Sir William Ryrie, Sir Samuel Goldman, Sir Kit McMahon, Sir 
Jeremy Morse and Lord Croham confirm this version of events.
* Interview with Lord Croham
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o f the sterling area and UK residents would still have been free to move funds out of Britain 
and into sterling area countries.
The second version o f the plan, Brutus 2, attempted to deal with the problem of sterling 
holders running down their balances through the purchase of UK goods with sterling rather 
than foreign exchange by implementing a regime that allowed only one type of account, the 
number one account. All o f  the overseas sterling balances would have been placed into this 
account and not only would it have been inconvertible but also completely frozen. Exchange 
control would also have been extended to the sterling area to prevent UK residents from 
moving their assets offshore and exacerbating both the balance o f payments deficit and the 
drain in foreign exchange.
At the time Rawlinson took charge of the Brutus project, somewhere between 20 and 23 
March, Brutus 3 was in a very early stage o f development. The formula for the operation of 
the numbered accounts had not yet been properly worked out and Brutus 3 existed in name 
only.19 The only paper produced before the fully elaborated April version of Brutus 3 was 
devised, was put together on 19 March. In it, it was suggested that Number 1 accounts should 
be blocked but that Number 2 accounts should be fully convertible.20 However, by this stage it 
was not clear what sterling holdings would be placed into the respective accounts or whether 
they would be made inconvertible or completely frozen. Nor is it clear what exceptions would 
be made to the general rules in the cases of hardship and the fulfilment o f pre-Brutus export 
contracts.
However, William Hughes recognised the danger o f  simply making the Number one account 
sterling inconvertible. It was clear to him that the holders o f such sterling would try to turn it
19 The first fully elaborated version of Brutus 3 is not found on file until sometime in April 1968. See 
PRO T295/490 Rawlinson ‘A Plan for Operation Brutus [3]’, undated. Although Rawlinson’s paper is 
undated, the file that it is held in was not commissioned until 17 April 1968.
20 PRO T295/489 ‘Contingency Planning: Operation Brutus’, 19/3/68.
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into British goods as quickly as possible and export those overseas.21 2 In his opinion, they 
would do this until their balances were exhausted. Where they were balance holders that did 
not want to buy into the UK export market, it would be possible for them to sell their sterling, 
probably at discount, to foreign importers who would make use o f it. Therefore, the UK would 
have earned no new foreign exchange until the Number 1 account balances had been 
completely wiped out.
Figure 5.1
Breakdown of the Sterling Balances: December 1967____________________ £m_
OSA Sterling Balances NSA Sterling Balances
Official Holdings 1,747 267
Private Holdings 1,222 657
Total 2,969 924
Source: PRO T295/489 ‘Contingency Planning: Operation Brutus’, 19/3/68
As the above table illustrates, the sterling balances of overseas holders were sizeable. When 
one combines the sterling and non-sterling area balances it becomes clear that if those 
balances were simply made inconvertible, overseas holders would have had somewhere in the 
region o f £3,893m to dispose o f in the purchase of British exports. As well as this, the 
convertible sterling paid into number two accounts in exchange for UK imports would most 
likely have been converted immediately because holders would have feared that it would only 
have been a matter o f time before this sterling was also made inconvertible. Therefore the UK 
would make no new foreign exchange from its exports to bolster the EEA and at the same time 
number two account sterling would be gushing from it. Hughes recognised that this would be 
highly undesirable. After all, the principal aim o f Brutus was to negate the need to float. If, 
however, Brutus could not ensure that British exports were paid for with dollars, sterling 
would be pushed to a floating rate very quickly. Hughes concluded that ‘This could not be 
allowed to happen...we would have to restrict the uses of Nol accounts’.2
21 PRO T295/489 William Hughes, ‘Trade Effects of Brutus Plans’, 19/3/68.
22 Ibid
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On March 28 Douglas Allen’s group met for the first time. As no new papers had been 
produced, little in the way of substantive discussion took place.23 However, the group 
concluded that any Brutus operation would have to be accompanied by some sort o f  import 
restrictions. After all, if the foreign exchange in the EEA was to be conserved, it could not be 
frittered away on inessential imports. Especially if  it was likely that the UK would make little 
in the way of additional foreign exchange, as Hughes had suggested, once Brutus had been 
implemented. Even so, it was clear that any import-licensing scheme that was to be set up 
could neither be planned nor implemented secretly, because o f the need to train customs 
officials in its operation. This posed a great problem, because it might mean that Brutus would 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy and at this stage, the group could find no way to square that 
circle.
The group also considered whether it would also be prudent to block number two accounts 
under Brutus 3. After all, money deposited here would be freely convertible and in all 
likelihood would be converted. However no conclusions were reached. The only thing that the 
assorted officials could agree upon was that they were a long way away from devising 
anything that could be administered at short notice. Without papers to discuss, it was difficult 
for them to make any headway. Consequently, Allen asked Rawlinson to go some way to 
developing a fully elaborated version of Brutus 3 for their next meeting and he requested a 
paper on the practicalities o f limiting British banks involvement in the Euro-dollar market.24
Brutus 3 Formulated
During the first two weeks of April 1968 Rawlinson set to work. He believed that in theory it 
would be possible to begin with a complete block o f non-resident sterling and to relax it in 
stages. However, it was likely that such a block would present major difficulties to other
at
MPRO T29J/490 Rawlinson to Goldman ‘Brutus etc', 1/4/68.ibid
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countries, especially those that held their foreign exchange in sterling, as these balances would 
also be blocked. Unless some arrangement was made, several o f the OSA countries would 
have no means of making payments to other countries until they had earned some foreign 
exchange.25 Although the development o f  such arrangement was outside his current remit, it 
was clear to Rawlinson that a paper would have to be commissioned by the Allen group on the 
subject at a later date.
Figure 5.2
Brutus 3
Extension o f exchange control to OSA under operation Brandon. Note that this alteration 
applies to all subsequent Brutus proposals.
Number 1 account:
• Inconvertible and frozen.
■ Usable only to (a) pay for goods that have been ordered by foreign importers pre­
zero and (b) to buy British securities, the profits from which will be transferred to 
the number 2 account.
Number 2 account:
■ Receives all post-zero payments.
• Completely convertible.
■ However funds cannot be transferred from No.l to No.2 accounts.
Rawlinson’s regime for Brutus 3 was as follows: Firstly, that number one accounts would be 
blocked completely. He accepted Hughes point, that inconvertibility would not be sufficient. 
However, Rawlinson felt that the balances in number one accounts should be useable to meet 
pre-zero commitments.26 In other words, before the Brutus system was to be imposed, British 
exporters would have shipped a large number o f goods for which they had received no 
payment. At the point at which Brutus was implemented, foreign importers’ sterling holdings
25 PRO T295/490 Rawlinson, ‘A Plan for Operation Brutus [3]’, undated.
26 ibid
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would be blocked and they would have no means to pay for the goods. Rather than these 
importers fulfilling their contractual obligations by paying for the goods in dollars, it would be 
more likely that they would simply default, arguing that the funds to pay for them were 
available in their blocked number one accounts.27
Therefore, to Rawlinson it was obvious that an exception had to be made in respect o f the pre- 
Brutus contracts or British exporters would be left out o f pocket. He believed that such an 
action would not preclude the possibility o f the UK earning new foreign exchange in the way 
that making number one accounts inconvertible would.28 After all, when the backlog of pre- 
Brutus contracts had been met from number one accounts, all subsequent British exports 
would have to be paid for in dollars. Rawlinson also felt that in order to placate the disgruntled 
number one account holders, the Treasury should allow them to invest their balances in British 
securities with the profits being credited to their number two accounts.29
Under the scheme, number two accounts would have been completely unfrozen and fully 
convertible. These accounts would receive all post-zero payments for UK imports. It was 
obvious that if the accounts had been either fully or partially blocked that no foreign exporter 
would accept sterling as payment for goods and would instead demand dollars.30 O f course, 
once foreign exporters had received their number 2 account sterling, it would have been likely 
that they would convert it in any case. However, some respite to the British reserves might 
have been gained if (a) the conversion process took a few days or (b) if they decided not to 
convert at all.
However, Posner was not at all convinced that Rawlinson’s Brutus 3 would work.31 Firstly, he 
was doubtful whether it would be possible to allow sterling holders to use their number one
27 ibid
21 ibid
29 ibid
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accounts to pay for pre-zero imports, as Rawlinson had suggested. This was because at any 
one time, the UK had dispatched around £3,000m worth of exports that had yet to be paid 
for.* 32 British exporters extended very favourable credit facilities to foreign importers and 
generally allowed them up to three months to pay for the goods. However, foreign exporters 
seldom offered such generous credit facilities to British importers. Therefore, if  the Treasury 
allowed number one accounts to be used to pay for these pre-zero British exports, the EEA 
would potentially be robbed of a very large amount o f foreign exchange. Furthermore, if 
Britain continued to offer credit to foreign importers post-Brutus the Treasury would have to 
wait several months before any new foreign exchange was earned. Whilst if the credit were 
denied, the foreign importers might move out o f the British export market altogether.
Secondly, whilst Britain floundered in its attempt to gain new foreign exchange she would 
face bills from foreign exporters for immediate payment for imports to Britain. It would 
therefore only be a matter o f time before the foreign reserves were exhausted.33 Consequently, 
the Treasury would certainly have had to greatly reduce the amount of imports entering the 
country during the period in which foreign traders used their number one account sterling to 
pay for their imports. Yet, it had already been acknowledged that it would be difficult to 
prepare for this without months of open planning. To Posner it seemed that ‘the pressure on 
foreign reserves may be so extreme that it will be difficult to hold the rate unless we allow a 
queue in exchange to develop’.34 He was suggesting that instead of number two account 
sterling being immediately convertible there should be some sort o f time delay whereby 
holders had to wait their turn before they were allowed to convert, thus reducing the drain on 
the reserves. Such a system would be far more complicated to plan and administer than the 
existing scheme but it was quite clear that the current scheme would not work.
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Rawlinson’s initial solution to the problems raised by Posner was to insist that all UK exports 
were paid for in dollars and to prevent pre-zero balances being used to pay for exports that 
were already dispatched. Even if this meant that British exporters were left out o f  pocket. 
However, he quickly recognised that where pre-zero exports had been invoiced in sterling it 
would be neither practical nor legal to insist on payment in dollars. Consequently, the 
Treasury might be forced to accept that exports that had already been dispatched would have 
to be paid for in sterling or not at all. He concluded that ‘Brutus could only be implemented if 
the UK had a large amount o f foreign exchange...but with such foreign exchange there would 
be no need for Brutus’.35 Therefore, he was forced to agree that his Brutus 3 was not viable 
and on 25 April he reported as much Sir Samuel Goldman.36
However, at this stage it is clear that the Treasury mindset was still firmly against floating, in 
the midst of another crisis. Instead, officials favoured a solution that would bring about the 
minimum of disruption to the international monetary system and one that would maintain the 
parity o f the pound.37 O f course, blocking would cause chaos within the international markets, 
especially for those countries that held their reserves in sterling but it was a more favourable 
outcome than floating, which could potentially drag the dollar down too and precipitate the 
destruction of the global fix-rate system.
Brutus 4 and 5 Developed
Consequently, Rawlinson’s work on Brutus did not end at this juncture and he strove to amend 
the plan to take account o f these difficulties. He began work on Brutus 4 and 5 simultaneously, 
and completed them on 29 April. According to Rawlinson the new plans elaborated on ideas 
that were aired at a meeting o f the Allen group, presumably some time in late April.38
35 PRO T295/490 Rawlinson to Goldman ‘Brutus: Sterling Debts on Imports and Exports’, 25/4/68.
3‘ ibid
37 Interview with Sir Kit McMahon
51 PRO T295/490 Rawlinson, ‘Brums’, 29/4/68.
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However no record of that meeting exists and so it is impossible to know what was discussed. 
In any case, the two new plans produced by Rawlinson were rushed and somewhat scrappy, 
being compiled in less than four days.
Figure 5.3
B rutus 4
Number 1 accounts:
•  Inconvertible and Frozen
•  M ay be used only for minor personal post-zero payments
•  M ay not be used for pre-zero export contracts
•  Transferable between holders
•  N ot usable for purchase o f UK securities
Number 3 accounts:
•  All post-zero credit placed here
•  Transferable between residents o f the same country
•  Both frozen and inconvertible- releases to be made only in accordance with bilateral 
clearing arrangements established with each country.
Brutus 5
Number 1 accounts:
•  Inconvertible and frozen
•  M ay not be used for pre-zero contract payments
•  M ay be used for hardship
•  In the long-term, the balances in these accounts will be financed by HMG’s 
compulsory acquisition o f  UK citizen’s private portfolio holdings under the 
codename Bootstrap.
Number 2 accounts:
•  W ill receive all post-zero payments and this sterling will be fully convertible.
Under the Brutus 4 regime, Rawlinson dispensed with the number two accounts and instead 
suggested the operation of number one and three accounts. Quite why he chose to call the 
account, in which post-zero sterling was placed, the number three account and not the number 
two account is unclear and needlessly complicates the hastily produced scheme. In any case, 
the plan would have operated in the following way.
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Number one accounts would be both inconvertible and frozen. The only exception to this 
general rule would have been for minor personal payments in the case o f hardship post-zero. 
The accounts would not be usable to meet payments for pre-zero contracts.39 In other words, 
foreign importers would have been forced either to pay for their goods in dollars or to default. 
One supposes that Rawlinson’s assumption was that even if only 10% of the goods were paid 
for, that payment would be in dollars and would bolster the reserves. As well as this, UK 
importers would not have been permitted to make payments for goods in any other currency 
than sterling. This too would have gone some way to limit the drain from the reserves. 
Rawlinson also revoked the entitlement o f number one account holders to invest their frozen 
sterling in UK securities. He realised that once the Treasury had allowed that sterling to be 
invested, it would be possible for one holder to transfer the assets to another, at dollar 
discount, in order to get out of sterling.40
All post-zero credit would have been placed in number three accounts. These accounts, unlike 
the number two accounts in Brutus 3 would not have been convertible. They would have been 
transferable between residents o f the same country but releases from them would only have 
been made in accordance o f bilateral clearing arrangements established with every country.41 
Quite what those arrangements would have been is unclear but it is certain that they would 
have taken weeks, if  not months to negotiate and in the meantime this sterling would have 
been frozen.
Whilst no critique o f the plan exists on the files it is certain that it would have succeeded in 
stopping the drain from the reserves and maintaining the parity o f the pound but only at very 
grave cost. It would have turned Britain into a siege economy in which the majority o f pre- 
zero exports would have been defaulted on, potentially leading to the bankruptcy o f Britain's 
exporters. Imports into the UK would almost certainly have ceased from the moment o f
”  ibid
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inception as no foreign exporter in their right mind would have accepted number three account 
sterling as payment for goods. The sterling would have been completely unusable in the short­
term and the foreign exporter would be taking a great gamble that the regime would unwind at 
a later stage and that they would eventually be able to convert their holdings.
It is perhaps because of these difficulties that Rawlinson simultaneously developed Brutus 5.42 
Under it, the number two accounts returned and would have received all post-zero payments in 
the same manner as Brutus 3. In other words, all new accruals o f sterling would have been 
fully convertible. The number one accounts would have been unusable for post-zero contract 
payments, although it is not clear whether the same would have been the case for pre-zero. 
However number one account sterling would have been convertible in unofficial markets 
abroad, should anyone wish to purchase it. As well as this, Rawlinson suggested that the 
government should carry out the compulsory acquisition of UK citizen’s private portfolio 
holdings in foreign securities.43 It should then either sell them for dollars to  fund the rundown 
of the number one accounts or offer to pass on the securities unsold to the number one account 
holders in lieu of payment.
However, this scheme was in no way an advancement on Brutus 4. It w as little more than a 
reworked version of Brutus 3 that offered a way to run down the number one account balances 
in a controlled manner via the use o f  private portfolio holdings, thereby offering the hope that 
Brutus could be revoked at a later stage. The problem of the foreign exchange drain remained, 
because all new British imports would have been paid for in convertible sterling. It is likely 
that Brutus 5 would quickly have degenerated into a regime o f floating rates. The generous 
credit that British exporters offered their customers would mean new foreign exchange would 
only appear sporadically and could not hope to offset the drain in reserves that occurred from 
imports.
41
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The Posner Plan
Posner, recognising the difficulties with Brutus 4 and 5, set to work on Brutus 6, which he 
completed on 6 May.44 Although the Posner plan did not provide a wholesale solution to the 
problem of draining reserves, it must be seen as a turning point in the world of Brutus 
planning. This was because the finalised blocking scheme, developed over the summer of 
1968, was based very much on it but in a more detailed and elaborated form.
Figure 5.4
Brutus 6
Number 1 accounts:
Restrictions
■ Frozen and inconvertible except for:-
■ Minor personal payments to UK
■ Hardship payments to anybody
■ Pre-zero contract agreements
Uses
■ Transferable between holders and
■ in long-term balances will be financed via mobilisation of UK’s private portfolio 
holdings.
Number 2 fAlphal accounts:
■ These holdings are unconditionally convertible 
Number 3 fBetal accounts:
Restrictions
■ Inconvertible but not frozen 
Continued
■ Holders must queue in order to attain convertibility rights. Once those rights have been 
attained the sterling is transferred to the No.2 account.
Uses
• Purchase o f UK goods and services
■ Transferable between holders
Number 4 TGammal accounts:
43 ibid
44 PRO T29J/490 Posner to Allen, “Brutus”, 6/5/68.
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■ Both inconvertible and frozen.
• Transferable between residents o f the same country
British Imports
■ Importers no longer to pay for goods in foreign exchange.
■ Instead they will be issued with either an Alpha, Beta or Gamma import license 
depending on whether the import is essential or not.
■ Essential imports- Alpha license with importer being directed to deposit funds in the 
foreign exporter’s convertible No.2 account.
■ Desirable imports- Beta license with importer being directed to deposit funds into the 
foreign exporter’s No.3 queuing account.
■ Luxury goods- Gamma license with importer being directed to deposit funds into the
_______ foreign exporter’s frozen No.4 account.__________________________________________
Under Posner’s Brutus 6, exchange control would be extended to all countries, in much the
same way as would have occurred in all Brutus schemes from version 2 onwards. The
proposal was far more complicated than any o f its predecessors and envisaged the operation of
four numbered accounts. The first, the number one account, would not be usable for post-zero
payments but could be drawn upon for contracts agreed upon pre-zero.45 As well as this, the
account would be useable for minor personal payments to the UK and for hardship payments
overseas. It is likely that Posner suggested such a weak block on the number one account as an
attempt to appease holders. He also built Rawlinson’s Brutus 5 suggestion into the account’s
operation. Namely that private portfolio holdings would be requisitioned and used in the
medium to long term to fund the windup o f the blocked accounts.
Whilst Posner recognised that his colleagues might have found his number one account 
scheme too liberal, in the sense that he would have allowed the use o f blocked accounts for 
settling pre-zero contracts expressed in sterling, he believed that it was a necessary step.46 Like 
Hughes, he felt that if holders were not allowed to use their number one accounts in London to 
pay for pre-zero British exports, they would not be paid for at all. He also felt that it was 
necessary to allow for the transferability o f these accounts in order to reduce the level o f
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international uproar. O f course, that transferability came at a price: it would have led to the 
development of a cheap sterling market.
Under the proposal, number two [Alpha] account sterling would have been completely 
convertible but payments into this type of account would have been very small. The number 
three [Beta] accounts would have been freely transferable and convertible at the official rate 
but a queuing system would have operated.47 In other words, those that held this form o f  
sterling would have to have waited until they reached the front o f the foreign exchange queue 
before they could have converted their holdings. This queuing system was a rather a novel 
innovation. For whilst Posner was prepared to concede the use of number one accounts for 
pre-zero contracts, the problem of the reserve drain that would have occurred from this 
concession under Rawlinson’s schemes no longer applied. This was because foreign exporters 
would have to have waited until the UK had earned some dollars from post-zero exports 
before they would be paid for British imports.
In effect, the overseas exporters would have been coerced into extending credit to the UK in 
much the same way that British exporters extended credit to their customers. Once the holder 
of a number three account sterling reached the front o f the queue for unconditional 
convertibility, the part o f their balance in question would have been shifted to their number 2 
accounts. However, the time taken for them to reach the front o f the queue would be 
completely governed by the UK’s liquidity position. It is perhaps best to use the analogy o f  a 
tap and cistern to describe the advance that Posner had made. When the cistern contained a 
reasonable amount o f  water, the tap would be turned on allowing some to be used, but when 
the supply was diminished the tap would be shut off. Thus, the number three account system 
would have provided a means to regulate the movement o f reserves out of the EEA by simply 
switching off the supply.
150
In order to induce foreign exporters to accept number three account sterling as payment, 
Posner also suggested that it might be necessary to allow free transferability between holders 
and to make the holdings inconvertible but not frozen.48 In other words, these funds would be 
usable for the purchase o f British goods and services. This would mean that if number three 
account holders were not prepared to wait their turn for conversion rights, they would either 
use their sterling to purchase British goods or sell their holdings, probably at discount, to those 
who did want to buy UK exports. Whilst this would make foreigners more likely to accept 
sterling as payment it would also have meant that the UK would have to have tolerated a 
floating market in transferable sterling. To Posner this was a price that had to be paid if one 
wanted a workable scheme.
The plan also outlined the use of a fourth type of account, the number four [Gamma] 
account.49 Although Posner accepted that it might not be desirable or necessary to use this 
category, he wrote it into the scheme in any case. This kind o f  account would have been 
completely blocked and would only have been transferable between residents o f the same 
country. Releases from it would have been made in accordance with bilateral clearing 
arrangements that would have been established post-zero.
Three o f  the four types of account were also prefixed Alpha, Beta and Gamma. These 
corresponded to an import-licensing scheme that Posner planned to implement as part o f the 
Brutus plan. British importers would have been prohibited from making payments for goods in 
foreign exchange. Instead, they would have been forced to deposit funds in either the foreign 
exporter’s number two, three or four accounts.50 Alpha, Beta and Gamma licenses would have 
been issued to British importers. Those who held Alpha licences would pay the foreign 
exporter sterling into their number two account. This would have been as good as paying them
47
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in dollars, as this form of sterling could have been converted immediately. Those importers 
with Beta licenses would have to pay the value o f  the imported goods into the foreign 
exporter’s number three account and the exporter would have to queue for the right to convert. 
Finally, Gamma licences could also have been issued which would have paid foreign exporters 
into their number four accounts. However, it would have been extremely unlikely that they 
would have accepted completely blocked sterling as payment.
To Posner, the licensing system provided the means to totally regulate imports entering the 
UK. Indeed the best way to reduce the number o f imports and conserve foreign exchange 
would have been to grant Gamma licences for luxury goods that were not essential to the 
smooth running of the British economy. As foreign exporters would refuse number four 
account payment, the goods would not be delivered and there would be no drain from the 
reserves. A small number o f totally essential imports would be paid for with number two 
account sterling and for everything that fell in between these two extremes, the exporter would 
either have to queue or Britain would have to do without. As well as this, if the UK no longer 
extended credit to foreign importers, the speed at which foreign exchange flowed into the EEA 
would greatly increase. Therefore, Posner advocated removing the generous credit facilities 
that accompanied British exports and suggested that under Brutus, foreign importers would 
have to pay for the goods, in dollars, before they were shipped. After all, if the foreign 
importers did not pay the UK foreign exchange for British exports, it would have been 
impossible to operate the number three accounts, as there would be no funds in the EEA to 
offer to those who had reached the front o f the queue.
Posner also recognised that there would potentially be a problem with post-zero contracts, as 
all purchasers of British goods would prefer to pay in sterling. There would also be pressure 
on the UK to pay for her goods in dollars because the pound would not be trusted as a means 
of payment. However, he felt that his version of the Brutus scheme went some way towards 
negating that problem. This was because those who purchased British exports post-zero but
152
who wished to pay for them with sterling would no longer be able to use their number one 
account balances. Instead, they would be forced to buy their sterling from the British 
authorities in exchange for foreign currency or to acquire it from the holders of number two or 
number three accounts.
In spite o f all this, Posner regarded his Brutus 6 as both severe and complicated. He reported 
to Allen that ‘it seems an awfully elaborate steam hammer to crack one single nut’.51 Simply 
because it would present a very severe shock to the world financial system and might have 
very adverse trading consequences. As a result Posner was tom between his desire to start off 
with a simpler scheme reverting back to normal operations after a short period o f time and the 
fact that it was always easier to relax exchange control than make it stronger. In other words, a 
weak system o f control might lead to expectations that it will intensify at a later date. This 
would lead to a rapid drain from the reserves, forcing the hand o f the Treasury.
Posner also had doubts about whether the queuing number three account system could be 
operated efficiently. After all, it might well have been the case that foreign exporters simply 
refused to accept to queue in order to make their sterling convertible, instead demanding 
dollars and refusing to supply goods until they were handed over. This would have certainly 
been the case if the queue became too long. Alternatively, even if the foreign exporters 
accepted the new regime, they might have attempted to raise their selling price in order to 
counter the inconvenience o f having to wait several months for payment.
Under the regime, the UK would also have had to tolerate a floating market in number 3 
account transferable sterling. When the aim o f  Brutus was to protect the official rate and 
prevent a move to a floating system, this version of the scheme could only succeed by creating 
a cheap sterling market which after a time could degenerate into complete floating. However
ii ibid
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Posner recognised that the ‘risk of a fall in the rate would be greater without than with 
Brutus'52 3 and in extremes he preferred blocking to barefaced floating.
Officials began to realise that the controls required to make Brutus work were both 
complicated and severe. As each new variant of the plan was devised, it became obvious that it 
contained features that would make it unworkable. Consequently, new versions of the scheme 
had to be continually forged, so that the problems could be ameliorated. Each new version 
solved many of the pre-existing problems, but only at the cost o f  creating new ones.
On 9 May the Allen group met to consider the Posner plan.51 Allen himself recognised that the 
principal problem with the pre-Posner Brutus schemes for blocking the sterling balances was 
that ‘they suffered from the disadvantage that they allowed exchange to leak out, leading to  a 
situation whereby there was no free exchange left’.54 Under such circumstances, he agreed that 
there might be no alternative than to implement comprehensive import controls in the Posner 
vein. He felt that once blocking was introduced it would be essential to achieve a tight control 
quickly, if the objectives o f  conserving the remaining exchange were to be met. He therefore 
recognised that ‘blocking could never just be a short term measure to tide the UK over in a 
crisis’.55 Jeremy Morse, representing the Bank, also accepted that if Brutus were to  be 
implemented it would be difficult to avoid the need for elaborate import controls. He reported 
that the Bank would be in favour of ‘a rigorous system of import controls at an early stage’.56 
Although, like the rest o f his Bank colleagues he hoped it would never have to be put into 
action.57
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However, all agreed that Posner’s Number three account system was an innovative way to 
overcome the asymmetry between the timing o f payments for exports and imports to the UK. 
Yet, the attempt via the number three account to form a foreign exchange queue might have 
led to large scale reductions in imports to the UK which might have dislocated the home 
economy and perhaps destabilised the global financial system. However, it was also 
recognised that many developing countries had operated a queuing system in the past. In the 
case of Ghana, the scheme had be successful because those foreign exporters that were not 
prepared to queue for payment sold their currency at discount to those who were prepared to 
wait.58 For that reason the consensus with regards to the number three account, was that it 
should become the new standard in Brutus planning but that consideration would have to be 
given to the effects o f drastically curtailing the level o f British imports.
Even so, none o f the assorted officials shared Posner’s desire that number one accounts should 
be usable to meet pre-zero contract payments. Although this might mean that UK exporters 
would not be paid during the life of the scheme and that the UK authorities would have 
potentially been pushed into providing them with compensation, it did have some potential 
advantages. The benefit that the Allen group collectively saw in pressing foreign importers to 
pay in foreign exchange for their pre-zero contracts, was the same one that Rawlinson saw 
when he devised his finished version of Brutus 3. Namely that whilst the majority o f Britain’s 
overseas customers would default, a minority would not. This would mean that foreign 
exchange would trickle into London at the very outset of the scheme; ensuring that both the 
UK’s liquidity position was improved and the length of the number three account queue 
shortened.59
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Brutus 7 and 8
As a consequence of the Allen group's discussions, Rawlinson made some minor 
modifications to Posner’s plan. The changes were completed by 14 May and the new regime 
was christened Brutus 7.60 It was almost identical to its predecessor, something that 
demonstrated how far Posner had come with his work. In essence, Rawlinson made only two 
changes. Firstly, he tightened up the usage o f  the number 1 accounts in accordance with the 
wishes of the Allen group. Secondly he abolished the number 4 [Gamma] accounts. Under 
Brutus 6, these accounts had been completely blocked in much the same manner as number 1 
accounts. Rawlinson wisely realised that it would be far less complicated to merge the number 
1 and 4 accounts and to place gamma licence payments into the former.61 The Bank also felt 
that it would have been administratively difficult to operate such a complex system.62
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Figure 5.5
Brutus 7
Number 1 accounts fGammal:
Restrictions
■ Frozen and inconvertible except for:-
■ Minor personal payments to UK 
• Hardship payments to anybody
Uses
■ Transferable between holders and
■ In long-term balances will be financed via mobilisation of UK’s private portfolio 
holdings.
Number 2 [Alphal accounts:
■ These holdings are unconditionally convertible 
Number 3 fBetal accounts:
Restrictions
■ Inconvertible but not frozen
■ Holders must queue in order to attain convertibility rights. Once those rights have 
been attained the sterling is transferred to the No.2 account.
Uses
■ Purchase of UK goods and services
■ Transferable between holders
On 15 May the Allen group held another meeting to discuss progress. Allen him self hoped that 
Rawlinson and Posner would be in a position to put a progress report to Ministers in a matter 
of days.63 Whilst little else was discussed, it was clear that the Bank thought that chaos would 
ensue if payments for British exports already dispatched could not be taken from blocked 
number 1 accounts.64 However, there was general support amongst the Treasury cohorts for 
fully blocking these accounts. From their perspective, it would be problematic if countries 
with large sterling balances used them to pay for British exports. Almost in answer to Posner’s 
dilemma, in his construction of Brutus 6, the consensus was that it would be far better to start
63 PRO T295/490 M.V. Hawtin ‘Note of a Meeting Held in Sir Douglas Allen’s Room, Wednesday 15 
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with a general block and then to enter into negotiations for a gradual release of the balances. 
Furthermore, as the number two accounts would have been fully transferable, the negotiations 
post-zero would centre on the release of blocked number one and queued number three 
accounts. However, it was clear that countries that were in a balance of payments surplus with 
the UK might retaliate and attempt to  apply similar queues for payment. Therefore, a central 
objective post-zero would have been to negotiate the funding of the balances by foreign 
bankers and/or to mobilise Britain’s private portfolio holdings to meet that end.
With the meeting concluded Rawlinson formulated Brutus 8, in an attempt to bring the plan to 
some degree o f completion, ready for the Ministerial report.65 It was completed the following 
day.66 Under it, exchange control would have been extended not only to the sterling area but 
also to the Republic o f Ireland. However inflicting such a state o f affairs on Ireland would 
have been problematic given the extent to which her banking system was intertwined with 
Britain’s.67 In any case, Rawlinson’s elaboration o f Brutus 8 was little different from version 
seven or for that matter the Posner plan, upon which both were based. Yet again, three 
categories o f sterling were to have existed in the form o f  number one, two and three accounts. 
Broadly, their functions would have been the same. The only differences would have been that 
number one accounts would have been usable for some pre-zero contracts, namely, those that 
were expressed in sterling, in order to avoid legal complications. However where goods had 
been dispatched by Britain and not yet arrived at their foreign destination, even if the contract 
had been negotiated in sterling, number one account holdings would not be usable and the 
contracts would have to be re-negotiated in dollars.68 The number two account system 
remained unaltered but some modifications were made to the number three queuing account.
65 T29S/604 Rawlinson, ‘Brutus 8’, 16/5/68.
“ On 16 May 1968.
67 See T295/500 ‘Measures to Deal with Severe Outflows Including Blocking of Sterling Balances: 
Treatment of the Irish Republic (Operation Cranmer)'.
68 PRO T295/604 Rawlinson ‘Brutus 8’, 16/5/68
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Firstly, holders would have no longer been able to use their funds to purchase UK goods, 
although they would have been permitted to invest in British securities. Rawlinson felt that the 
problem of these securities being transferred between holders could be circumvented if they 
were stamped or marked in such a way as it make it clear they were not convertible.69 70This 
would ensure that British stockbrokers would refuse to transfer ownership. Secondly, 
Rawlinson devised a method to give the Treasury a tighter control over the tap. Under the 
number three account, holdings were transferable between holders and this offered a means for 
impatient foreign exporters to get out of sterling. However Rawlinson thought that if it could 
be arranged that once such queued sterling was transferred, the new holder went to the back of 
the queue it would take the pressure off the front and limit the foreign exchange drain.™
Figure 5.6
Brutus 8
Extension o f exchange control to OSA including Republic o f Ireland 
Number 1 accounts [Gamma]:
Restrictions
■ Frozen and inconvertible except for:-
■ Minor personal payments to UK
■ Hardship payments to anybody
Uses
■ Transferable between holders and
■ In the long-term balances will be financed via mobilisation o f UK’s private 
portfolio holdings.
■ Pre-zero contracts expressed in sterling where the goods have already been 
dispatched.
Number 2 lAlphal accounts:
■ These holdings are unconditionally convertible 
Number 3 fBetal accounts:
Restrictions
■ Inconvertible and frozen
■ Holders must queue in order to attain convertibility rights. Once those rights have 
been attained the sterling is transferred to the No.2 account.
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Continued
Uses
■ Purchase o f UK securities
■ Transferable between holders but if such a transfer should take place then new 
holder returns to the back of the queue.
In preparation for the ministerial meeting that was to take place on May 31, the Allen group 
met on the 23 May in order to discuss Rawlinson’s amendments to the plan.71 Allen himself 
was becoming increasingly worried about the fact that Brutus would be very difficult to 
unwind, even if it was accompanied by the mobilisation o f  private portfolio holdings. As he 
expounded
‘We could not expect to be able to wind up these [Brutus] arrangements 
for several years, although we could hope with the passage of time to 
make them more flexible’.72
However, much o f the discussion centred on the problem of imports and the operation of 
Posner’s licensing scheme. MacDougall, representing the DEA, felt that it would take a 
considerable time to bring into operation a full system o f import licensing post-Brutus. In the 
meantime, he argued that there would be a tremendous incentive for British importers to 
increase the number o f goods they brought into the country. Although, he recognised that this 
problem might be balanced out to some extent by the unwillingness for foreigners to supply 
goods in conditions where payment was uncertain. One possibility that McDougall foresaw, 
was to put in place a temporary import surcharge to plug the gap during the period in which 
the Posner import licensing machinery was being put into place.72
71 PRO T295/604 ‘Sir Douglas Allen’s Group’, 24/5/68. Present were Allen, Posner, Figgures, Glover, 
MacDougall, Balogh, Thornton, Hughes, Neale, McMahon, Leigh, Bennett and Hawtin.
2 PRO T295/604 Allen to Dowler, ‘Brutus’, 16/5/68.
3 PRO T295/604 ‘Sir Douglas Allen’s Group’, 24/5/68
160
Others suggested that a possible solution in the early days might be to get customs officers to 
mark the import documents with the appropriate alpha or beta classification when the goods 
arrived so that British importers deposited payment into the correct type o f account. However, 
such a system would have been unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, customs officers would 
not have been trained in its operation, in order to maintain secrecy, until after Brutus had been 
implemented. Consequently, for the first few weeks, during which time they would be learning 
how the new scheme operated, they would not be in a position to correctly identify which 
import should get which classification. As well as this, payments for goods imported to the 
UK were often made even before the goods had been cleared through customs and often even 
whilst they were still on the high seas.74 Of course, where the goods had already been paid 
for, the drain from the reserves or the sterling balances would have already taken place and the 
function of Brutus was to limit a further drain. The important question therefore was what to 
do about goods that had been landed but not paid for? The obvious solution, and the least 
taxing for customs, was to treat them all as Beta imports and make all payments into number 
three accounts. Where overseas exporters felt that their goods had been wrongly classified 
they could later make an application to have their funds transferred into their number two 
account.
In the case o f  inessential imports, the Allen group thought that the choice was between giving 
them a gamma classification for payments into number one accounts or prohibiting their 
import entirely. If there were a prohibition, customs would not allow the goods to be landed. 
Although in practise they would have to be impounded in the Queen’s warehouse, until the 
foreign exporter paid the shipping costs to have the goods removed. However, as the group 
was later to find out when it included a representative from customs in its planning, the 
Queen’s warehouse was of limited size and it w ould have been physically impossible to
* ibid
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impound all inessential imports.15 However, without such knowledge the group could only 
conclude that a general prohibition was preferable to a system of Gamma licenses and the 
administrative problems associated with them.75 6
Nonetheless, it was recognised that if the Brutus system was to be maintained for any period 
of time, it would be desirable to give preferential treatment to imports destined for re-export, 
even if these would have otherwise been deemed as inessential.77 After all whilst such raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods would initially be a drain on the reserves, once 
exported they would aid both the balance of payments the UK’s liquidity position. However it 
is important to recognise that a significant body o f extra personnel would have been required 
to track down which imports were specifically for re-export and it would have taken time to 
train them.
In many ways, during the early stages of Brutus planning in spring 1968, the Treasury was 
totally unrealistic in the demands that they proposed to make on Customs, British importers, 
exporters, and on the British banking system. For example, banks were expected to train their 
staff in the operation o f the numbered account system in the two-day Bank holiday period 
before Brutus was to commence.78 If more direct consultation had taken place between the 
Treasury and those parties who were expected to acquiesce, a semi-workable version of the 
scheme might have been developed more quickly. This was probably a fact that Treasury 
planners well knew but the strong argument in favour of secrecy overruled these 
considerations.
The Allen group could only make an educated guess as to how foreigners would react to the 
scheme, as prior consultation of any kind was obviously out o f the question. It was clear that
75 Dorothy Johnstone, a Commissioner at Customs, was not included or consulted about Brutus 
planning until 11 June 1968. See PRO T295/604 Memo by Rawlinson 11/6/68.
6 PRO T295/604 ‘Sir Douglas Allen’s Group’, 24/5/68.
77 ibid
162
the queuing system might have discouraged foreign suppliers from shipping goods, which 
would have made it difficult for Britain to obtain essential imports. However, it was 
recognised that if such a state o f affairs ensued it would be necessary to move increasing 
numbers o f imports over to the Alpha category thus speeding the reserve drain.79
The group also considered alternate means for limiting the queue on the number three account. 
One possibility was to put payments for pre-zero imports into the number one account and 
only place post-zero payments into the number three account. This would mean that those 
foreign exporters that had dispatched goods pre-zero but who had not already received 
payment would receive blocked currency once the goods arrived and that only contracts 
entered into affer Brutus was implemented would be placed into the queued sterling 
category.80 However, it was recognised that it would be very difficult to justify the different 
treatment afforded to pre and post-zero contracts. The general view was that a good amount of 
ill will on the part of foreigners would be avoided if both types o f payments went onto the 
number three account. Still, the group recognised that it would be necessary to establish the 
amount o f imports involved before any firm decision was taken.
The meeting o f  Misc.205, for which the Allen group’s discussion acted as a preliminary, took 
place on May 31. The Chancellor took the opportunity to report to his colleagues on the 
progress that the Treasury had made in the development of the scheme. He explained to them 
that Brutus was not advocated as a policy in its own right. Instead, he argued that it must been 
seen as a reserve option that was to be used as a last ditch attempt to protect the currency in ‘in 
a situation in which there was a substantial move out o f  sterling’. '1 Although he accepted that 
a floating rate would make Brutus unnecessary, he made it clear to the committee that there 
was a body o f  opinion within the Treasury that felt that ‘the rate could fall a very long way, *10
71 PRO T295/604 Rawlinson ‘Brutus 8’, 16/5/68 
79 PRO T295/604 ‘Sir Douglas Allen’s Group’, 24/5/68
10 ibid
11 PRO T295/604 ‘Draft Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer', 27/5/68.
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leading to extreme pressures in the UK on price levels and on cost o f living’.82 However, it 
was obvious that it could not be known from the beginning whether or not Brutus was a 
sufficient step that would make it unnecessary to either float or devalue. He also explained that 
if Britain did decide to float or to depreciate the pound, it might be necessary to accompany 
such action with Brutus in order to protect the rate.83 If events had turned out in this way, the 
operation would have resembled the Robot plan that was devised in 1952.84
The Misc. 205 committee approved the plan, although it is unlikely that any o f them apart 
from Jenkins and Wilson actually fully understood it.85 They concluded that ‘floating was not 
an acceptable alternative to Brutus’86 and if a serious crisis had erupted at this juncture it 
would be fair to say that Brutus would almost certainly have been implemented. As the 
committee had authorised the continuation of planning, Jenkins reminded his colleagues that
‘it is imperative that no leak should occur o f the fact that we have thought o f 
such a step. But it will be prudent to continue preparations so far as this can be 
done without significantly widening the number of people who know about 
them’.87
The Irish Republic
With renewed ministerial authorisation, Brutus planning continued into June. Brutus 8 became 
the agreed standard and much o f the planning from this point centred on the development o f 
detailed technical arrangements for each aspect o f the scheme. In early June, Posner, 
Rawlinson and the part-timers considered a number o f  issues related to the regime’s micro
“  ibid
83 PRO CAB 130/497 Jenkins to Cabinet/Misc 205, 29/5/68.
1,1 For a discussion of Robot see Burnham, P. Remaking the Postwar World Economy: Robot and 
British Policy in the 1930s. (Basingstoke: Palgrave,2003).
Both had studied economics before entering politics.
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development. Firstly, Rawlinson examined the problem of the Irish Republic.87 8 The central 
issue here was whether to apply the same framework to Ireland as the rest of the OSA. It was 
recognised that the Irish banking system was so intertwined with Britain’s that placing an 
effective barrier between the UK and Ireland would be difficult. In fact, it would have been 
nigh on impossible to police exchange control effectively between the two countries. The Irish 
banks kept most o f their liquid assets in London, UK notes and coins circulated freely in 
Ireland as part o f their regular currency and approximately 25% of the currency in Dublin at 
that time was sterling.89
If Brutus were to be successful, there would need to be prior consultation with the Irish 
government in order to give them time to ensure that their exchange control regime matched 
that o f the UK’s. However, Rawlinson accepted that such consultation would have to be ruled 
out for security reasons. Consequently, it would not have been possible to make the Irish 
Republic exempt from the rigors o f Brutus, even though full application would potentially 
cripple its banking system. If, after Brutus had been implemented, the Irish agreed to co­
operate then the restrictions could be lifted but not before.90
If the Irish had decided to co-operate post-zero, it would also have been necessary to ensure 
that British residents were not able to evade the new exchange control regime via the Republic 
of Ireland.91 However, it would have been unlikely that the Irish would have obliged if the 
Brutus import embargo were also extended to them. The UK would have to have conceded to 
the continued admission o f  Irish goods but it would have been important that goods from other 
countries did not enter Britain through the Irish gap. In order to avoid this, it would have been 
essential to strengthen the presence o f British customs.92
87 PRO T295/604 ‘Draft Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’, 27/5/68.
88 PRO T295/500 Rawlinson to Hoskin, ‘Brutus: Position of the Irish Republic’, 4/6/68.
89 PRO T295/SOO ‘Cranmer: The Problem of the Irish Republic’, 25/6/68.
90 PRO T295/500 Rawlinson to Hoskin, ‘Brutus: Position of the Irish Republic’, 4/6/68.
91 PRO T295/500 ‘Cranmer: Irish Republic', undated.
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If the Irish refused to collaborate and the full brunt o f Brutus was inflicted upon them, there 
would have been a grave risk of retaliation. Several o f the London discount houses put money 
into Irish Exchequer bills and the Irish banks operated a branch network in Northern Ireland. 
These funds might have been frozen in revenge, forcing the Treasury to release to Ireland from 
frozen number one accounts, amounts equal to the funds frozen by the Irish Banks.93 94
Overseas Expenditure and British Tourism
Rawlinson also recognised that the new exchange control regime would be problematic from 
the point o f  view of government overseas expenditure.
Figure 5.7 Estimated Overseas Expenditure 196894 £m
Overseas expenditure Cost
Military stations 250-300
Overseas aid 200+
Embassies 50-60
Subscriptions int. organisations 30
Overseas information 30
Debt interest 150
Total 710-770
The total government overseas expenditure for 1968 was estimated to be in the region of £710- 
770m and this would have represented a huge drain on the reserves. Therefore, the crucial 
question was whether there should be a fresh drive to curtail this type of expenditure. If  
spending continued, it would have to have been in the form o f number two account sterling or 
foreign exchange.95 In some cases, it might have been possible to push for garrison costs from 
number three accounts. This was something that Rawlinson felt that West Germany might 
have reluctantly agreed to, because a British military presence within German boarders was 
very much in its interests.96 Nevertheless, in every other case, cuts would have to be made;
"  ibid
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some embassies might have to be shut down and subscriptions to international organisations 
like the UN, defaulted on.
Rawlinson also recognised that it would be necessary to restrict and probably prohibit all non- 
essential overseas travel on the part o f British citizens.97 British holidaymakers would have 
required foreign exchange in order to finance their overseas expenditure and this would 
represent a drain to the EEA. Although, this restriction was something that Rawlinson felt that 
the public might have been prepared to tolerate.98 After all, the existing regulations were 
already fairly draconian. Holidaymakers could spend limitless sums in the OSA, but there was 
a maximum travel allowance of £50 per year in the NSA for holidays or £20 per day for 
business travel.99 Even so, this was not quite the same thing as prohibiting all travel.
However it was felt that countries where British tourism was important, such as Spain and 
Italy, might have been prepared to sell limited amounts o f currency in exchange for number 
three account sterling.100 Although, this would be an arrangement that would have to be 
worked out post-zero and in the interim all British travel would probably have to be banned. 
Yet, even where some countries agreed to the arrangement, it would have been vety likely that 
they would have wanted assurances that their foreign exchange would not be resold and used 
elsewhere. For example, the Spanish government might have demanded that any pesetas 
purchased could only be used for tourism in Spain and could not be resold to finance a British 
trip to France.101 Nevertheless, even if  such arrangements had been agreed to in the medium 
term, it would have been likely that in the early weeks of Brutus, British citizens would have 
been prohibited from leaving the country. Only as months and years went by, would they have 
been able to visit a very small number o f European locations. As well as this, any change in 
the British travel regulations, accept liberalisation, would have caused huge administrative
1,1 PRO T295/508 Rawlinson, ‘Brutus: Travel; Immigrants', 5/6/68.
98 Interview with Anthony Glover
99 PRO T295/508 Rawlinson, ‘Brutus: Travel; Immigrants’, 5/6/68.
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problems for the Treasury, the Bank o f  England, and the clearing banks. It would in all 
likelihood have also led to the bankruptcy o f the majority o f British travel agents.10 02
In many ways, June 1968 must be seen as a turning point in the world of Brutus planning. It 
was this attempt by Rawlinson and Posner, the chief Brutocratics, to work on the micro detail 
o f the plan that led them both to doubt its merits, workability, and the public reaction to it. By 
11 June Rawlinson expressed his concerns to Hawtin, the secretary o f the Allen group. Stating 
that
‘some o f us who have been concerned with the operation have been led by 
detailed study to a considerable mitigation o f the original enthusiasm. It could 
be useful to offer a hand to Ministers along the same path’.103
Whilst Posner commented that
‘The heart had gone out o f it [Brutus planning]. We went on because those were 
our instructions but it was clear it would just never have worked. It would have 
turned Britain into the equivalent o f  Russia during the 1930’.104
Imports, Exports and MIsc 205
Nonetheless, the remit was that officials should continue with the planning exercise and 
continue they did. Much o f the June work centred on the issue o f imports and exports under 
the new system. Rawlinson was adamant that the UK should still extend six months credit to 
foreign importers as an inducement to  them to continue to purchase British goods. In spite o f
101 ibid
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this, the Allen group was non-committal.105 *Glover in particular was opposed to Rawlinson’s 
position and was in favour o f abolishing the credit.100 He believed it could be assumed, firstly, 
that foreigners would still want to purchase British goods. Secondly, that they would be 
prepared to pay for them in a manner that was acceptable to the British government, unless 
they were prevented from doing so by their own government and finally, that it was unlikely 
that foreign governments would intervene. Whilst these assumptions were rather spurious, 
Glover was perhaps correct in asserting that the only way to  get buyers to pay in foreign 
exchange would have been to demand payment before the goods were dispatched. Otherwise 
once their six months credit had elapsed, they would try to pay with frozen sterling or default 
and the UK would have no leverage to make them pay in foreign exchange.107
As Robert Armitage, from the Treasury Solicitor’s office, confirmed, there would have been 
severe legal complications in forcing payment in foreign exchange afier the goods had been 
dispatched.108 If a foreign importer had refused to pay in dollars, the British supplier would be 
forced to issue a writ. However, under UK law the foreign importer would be able to pay what 
he owed straight into court from his frozen number one account. Yet, because that sterling 
would have been deemed unusable by the British authorities, the courts would be unable to 
pass it on to the British exporter who would still be out o f pocket. Consequently, the foreign 
importer would have legally discharged his debt, the UK would have earned no new foreign 
exchange, and the British exporter would be unpaid. Therefore, to both Glover and Armitage, 
it was a choice between potentially not getting paid at all, verses introducing a system o f pre­
payment which would certainly lead to the delay of export, congestion at the docks and a very 
large administrative problem for customs.109
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It was against this backdrop o f Catch 22ism, that on 13 June, the ministerial group Misc 205 
re-examined the scheme’s progress. The meeting also marked the ascendance of Barbara 
Castle, the Transport Minister, into ‘this most secret and powerful o f the Cabinet groups’." 0 
Before the meeting, Balogh had asked Castle to watch carefully what Jenkins said as ‘he 
feared it was “just and empty exercise” because the Bank would never agree to Brutus’.10 11 
Although, Balogh himself was adamant that blocking should be implemented in an emergency 
even if the Bank came out against. Whilst Castle could not see the British public accepting 
such a move from the Labour government, in its present state o f unpopularity, she was
‘heartened to find that Harold [Wilson] and Roy [Jenkins] had gone as far as they 
had done in preparing such far-reaching measures rather than face another bout of 
savage deflation’.112
Although little did she understand that Brutus was not an alternative to deflation but would 
probably have to be accompanied by it, if the UK was to avoid sucking in too many imports in 
its aftermath.
Whilst Jenkins was keen that his colleagues would agree to continued planning he recognised 
that it would be unrealistic to suppose that the group could decide in advance to automatically 
invoke Brutus should the reserves fall to a given level. To that, Castle asked whether in an 
emergency there could be ‘any alternative to Brutus?’113 For Wilson the answer was a guarded 
no, ‘Only multilateral action which we hope will come when they [the Americans and 
Europeans] look over the brink and see what we must do otherwise’." 4 In that sense, Wilson 
had very much reverted to his old blackmail gambit. It was clear to him that Brutus was not a 
venture to be embarked upon whilst other options were still open. That it was only to be used
110 Castle, B. The Castle Diaries: 1964-70. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1984), p.462.
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in an emergency, when their backs were against the wall, where the threat of it (Brutus) did 
not open the wallets o f  the international community. To Wilson’s mind, there would then be 
no alternative to it, even though it might have degenerated into floating."5
Wilson, as usual, was also preoccupied with the security implications o f this type of planning. 
He advocated a tightening up of procedures so that the names of all those concerned would be 
held in one central list and he asserted that no departures from it would be permitted without 
specific prior authority.14 516 Indeed, Sir Burke Trend had made him aware that the advances in 
planning had necessitated more consultation by the Treasury with other departments. Such 
consultation was required to ensure that the plan devised was as efficient as possible, but with 
it came increased risks of a leak. Trend suggested not only restricting the number o f officials 
involved, but also limiting the number of Wilson’s Cabinet colleagues that were aware o f  its 
development.117 In fact, there was probably more likelihood of leakage from ministers than 
from officials. Trend also advocated a new codeword. For
‘now that we have reached Brutus 8 (and, as I understand Bootstrap 8 
as well!) there is something to be said for changing both code words 
which should mean nothing at all to anybody save those who are 
indoctrinated’.118
After all, Brutus was hardly a neutral codeword. Although Rawlinson chose it in honour o f  the 
Ides o f March, it did have some rather awkward connotations. In many ways, it could be seen 
as Britain stabbing her sterling area allies in the back and it may have been possible that those 
who were not indoctrinated would guess what the operation entailed from the name alone.
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Wilson’s Mise 205 were happy to endorse the new security arrangements, one supposes party 
out of practicality but perhaps because it would help to affirm the committee’s role as the 
dominant economic policy forum and reduce the rest of the Cabinet to a glorified rubber 
stamp. Therefore, Brutus became Cranmer."9
The Euro-Dollar Market
Meanwhile, officials in the Treasury continued their planning. Rawlinson set about 
investigating the implications o f  Cranmer on the Euro-Dollar market and reported his findings 
to Allen on 17 June.* 120 It is unclear why it took Rawlinson so long to attend to this aspect o f 
planning, when the Allen group requested a paper on it at its very first meeting in March. One 
can only conclude that Rawlinson had decided that it was necessary to work initially on 
developing a practical version o f  Cranmer and that to focus on more detailed issues at an early 
stage would have been the planning equivalent o f putting the cart before the horse.
The Euro-Dollar market was operated by Banks, who accepted short-term deposits in dollars 
and then re-lent them for short periods. Banks would lend dollars to other banks and private 
borrowers and the market was a useful method for redistributing surplus liquidity. The British 
Euro-Dollar market was operated by both British and foreign Banks and by April 1968 was 
valued at around $17.3 billion.121 In the UK, the banks that operated the market earned their 
profit from the mark-up between the borrowing and lending rates and by switching dollars into 
sterling and thereby lending to the EEA.
In the context o f Cranmer, there was the fear that the blocking o f the sterling balances would 
arouse suspicion that foreign currency balances would also be blocked, culminating in the
"9 This changeover formally occurred on 20 June 1968. Although some documents used the new code 
word before this time, others still used the old one after the 20 June deadline.
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withdrawal o f the Euro-Dollar balances from the UK.122 This would have been problematic for 
the British banks that operated the market, as they tended to lend out funds for longer periods 
than they had access to them, safe in the knowledge that new deposits would cover the 
shortfall. If there had been a failure in confidence amongst those that had deposited in the 
market there would almost certainly be a run on the banks. This would put the banks in the 
difficult position of having to meet liabilities when they had already lent on the dollars. This 
could very well have meant that British banks would have had to default in order to prevent 
themselves going under.
This curious problem can best be elaborated on by the use o f a hypothetical example. If, for 
argument’s sake, British banks had liabilities to overseas residents o f $4,200m on a term of 
three months but had lent 20% o f  the money out for five months, they would be in tremendous 
difficulty post-zero. Under Cranmer it would have been unlikely for the banks to accrue any 
new dollar deposits that they could use to meet their liabilities, because potential investors 
would no longer have confidence in the British market. Consequently, the banks would have 
found themselves owing $4,200m at month three but they would by short by $840m until 
month five.
It was plain in the case of the Euro-Dollar market, that there would be two possible courses of 
action under Cranmer.123 Firstly, to do nothing and simply note that its continued operation 
would be one o f  the many risks associated with blocking. The second alternative was to block 
Euro-Dollar liabilities at the moment o f inception. For Rawlinson, the solution was to do 
nothing. A run on Euro-Dollars would not directly limit the success o f the Cranmer block, as it 
would not precipitate the haemorrhaging o f  Britain’s foreign exchange. Whilst it could have 
led to a number o f  British banks going under, Rawlinson recognised that there could be no *125
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question of the Treasury bailing them out.124 Instead, he considered whether it might be 
prudent for the Treasury to stop the imbalance in the Euro-Dollar market pre-Cranmer. After 
all, if blocking was to be implemented in the distant future, and the market had already been 
curbed, the problem would be gone. However, Rawlinson recognised that in the pre-Cranmer 
world, the Euro-Dollar business was very profitable for Britain and to remove it would greatly 
reduce Britain’s invisible earnings. Furthermore, if the market was restricted, it may well have 
led to a reduction in confidence in sterling, resulting in the very situation that the Treasury was 
trying to avoid. The answer then, was to do nothing and to recognise that the problem of Euro- 
Dollars was one, on a growing list o f difficulties, which could occur if  Cranmer was enacted.
GATT, EFTA and the IMF
Meanwhile William Hughes, from the Board o f Trade, simultaneously examined the Cranmer 
implications for the regulations governing international trade.125 This was perhaps the only 
commissioned micro-study where the results did not all add to the already immense list of 
problems. For Hughes believed that Cranmer would not have conflicted with either the GATT 
or EFTA conventions, as both organisations allowed quantitative import restrictions to be 
imposed by countries that were in balance o f payments difficulties.126 However, in order to 
remain on good terms with GATT, Hughes believed that it would be necessary, as time went 
on, to introduce token quotas for goods that were completely prohibited at the start.
Yet, the fact that UK would have had a legal justification for her actions under both the GATT 
and EFTA articles would not have in any way diminished the fact that such action would have 
given ‘a severe shock to both institutions which they might not survive’.127 Furthermore 
Cranmer would almost certainly have led to the end o f multilateral trade; instead, bilateral
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arrangements would have to have been implemented. This would have meant that the UK 
would have to use her bargaining power as one of the world’s largest importers and exporters 
to kick start trade. Such bilateralism would have resulted in Britain being able to export less 
than she would have done under multilateral agreements, something that would not help either 
the reserves or the balance o f  payments.
Hughes also recognised that the implications o f a British anti-import stance reverberated 
further than the potential demise o f  both GATT and EFTA. As British imports accounted for 
around 9% of the world total, it was clear that any sizeable reduction on the part of the UK 
could cause ‘an upset in the world markets big enough to affect the course of world trade and 
perhaps the stability o f  some countries’.127 28 Ideally, the Treasury should have conducted a 
detailed study of both the likely impact o f  a British import reduction on world trade and the 
possible effects o f bilateralism on the British capacity to export. However, Rawlinson, who by 
now agreed with the Bank that Brutus was an empty exercise, concluded that
‘It is a laborious exercise and I doubt whether we can carry it far as part 
o f the current contingency planning, at least in the immediate future and 
with present resources’.129 *
It was also clear that whilst both GATT and EFTA might tolerate the Cranmer regime, if they 
continued to exist in its aftermath, it was very unlikely that the IMF would co-operate. This 
was because Article VIII o f  the Fund’s agreement with the UK forbade restrictions on current 
payments and transfers without appeals to the Fund.150 It would also have been an offence
127 ibid. It was possible that if the UK moved to bilateralism other countries including the US and 
France would move in the same direction and GATT would collapse.
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against ‘the spirit and letter o f the IMF articles’131 for Britain to have moved to a bilateral 
system of trade. The implications of this were quite serious for the Treasury. In order to gain 
IMF approval, it would have been necessary to court it in advance, something that was out of 
the question because o f the immense security considerations. However, without IMF backing, 
the UK would surely have lost her rights to draw on the fund. This would have been disastrous 
in the early days of Cranmer when foreign exchange would have been in short supply.
The Number Three Account Reconsidered
The Bank’s opposition to the Cranmer scheme had not in any way diminished as planning 
intensified. If anything, it had increased. It doubted the utility o f the proposal and was 
unconvinced that it would be administratively practical. In particular, it had begun to develop 
grave reservations about the successful operation o f the number three queuing accounts. 
Bennett was especially dubious, as the rate for number three account sterling would have 
depended on the rest o f the world’s view on the length o f the queue and the exchange rate at 
the time of release.132 It would have been very difficult for foreigners, in the early days, to 
form a judgement on which to base a rate for number three account sterling. The market in it 
might only have established slowly and speculatively. Under such circumstances, Bennett 
doubted whether foreign exporters would be prepared to accept this type of sterling as 
payment for goods. Their assumption would be that the UK would be unable to maintain the 
current sterling parity for long. Consequently, foreign exporters would be likely to either put 
their selling prices up, causing inflation in the UK, or to demand payment in foreign exchange 
thereby defeating the object o f the account.133
Of course, the problem o f confidence in sterling might have been reduced if the rate o f number 
three account sterling could be guaranteed. This would have removed uncertainty in the minds
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of foreign exporters, if it could be made to look credible, but it would not provide any 
assurances about the length o f the queue.1'14 Even so, the Bank doubted whether it would 
actually be possible to administratively operate the queuing system effectively. Under the pre­
existing proposal, transfers from number three to number two accounts would have been 
allowed in tranches determined by the Treasury. Places in the queue would have been 
designated on a first come first served basis. However, in practise the Bank felt that it would 
have been very difficult to combine the queuing system with transferability.115 This was 
because tens o f thousands o f  individual accounts would have been involved and it would have 
been quite unmanageable for British banks to keep track of all the queued sterling.116 One 
must remember that when the scheme was devised, banks were operating before the use o f 
computers was widespread and would probably have had to track the funds manually with 
written ledgers.
If Cranmer was to be successful, the Bank felt that it would have to be greatly modified. They 
suggested a new and very complicated system that would have operated in the following way:
• Number one accounts: Fully blocked as under Brutus 8.
•  Number two accounts: Fully convertible
•  Number three queuing accounts: individuals and companies would be ineligible to 
hold these and foreign banks would hold a monopoly over them. Once a bank’s 
holdings o f this type o f  sterling reached the top of the queue it would be transferred to 
the number two account where it would be fully convertible. *1345
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•  Number four accounts: all pre-zero sterling would be paid into these accounts. They 
would be transferable between holders but this type of sterling would be frozen.
The main feature o f this proposal was that only banks would be able to queue and not 
individual sterling holders. When a foreigner received payment from the UK that qualified for 
number three account entry, that money would be credited to their number four account. This 
account would be transferable between holders but its balances would not qualify for a place 
in the convertibility queue.137
The Bank envisaged that overseas banking institutions, who would be the only holders of 
number three accounts, would buy the number four account sterling from their customers and 
deal between one another. This would mean that individuals and companies that received 
number four account sterling would not have a place in the queue. Instead, they would either 
sell their holdings to a bank at discount, which would queue for conversion rights, or they 
would instruct the bank to hold the funds on their behalf as number three sterling. As a result 
the number four account holders would have had the opportunity of obtaining a discounted 
value at a time of their choosing by selling to the banks or else sharing in whatever sterling 
was released at the full rate to the bank at which they held their account.
At intervals, when the Treasury felt that releases could be made from the reserves, an 
announcement would have been made that a certain percentage o f number three account 
sterling held by the banks could be transferred to the Number 2 account.138 The system would 
have been simple to operate from the British perspective, as there would be no need for British 
banks to keep track o f  individual parcels o f  sterling as they moved around the market. The
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onus would have moved entirely onto the overseas banks. These Banks in tum might be glad 
to operate it, as it could potentially have been very profitable. After all, if number four account 
holders were not prepared to wait for conversion they could hand over their rights to the bank 
at whatever discount rate the bank cared to operate. All o f this made these modifications 
attractive to the Bank. It would ensure that damage to its key support groups would be 
minimised if Cranmer was ever implemented: domestic banks would not be burdened by it and 
foreign banks would profit from it.
The main drawback with the Bank’s proposal was it that would have involved serious 
modifications to the Cranmer scheme. Under the existing proposal, the number three account 
system was envisaged as a method o f getting foreign exporters to supply the UK with goods 
on credit. The transferability between non-residents was not essential to its operation as it was 
intended simply as an added incentive to foreign exporters to accept the new system. It would 
have been far easier for the planners to remove the transferability rights than to completely 
restructure the scheme around foreign banks, when it could not be certain that they would ever 
undertake to operate it.139 What was also clear was that the Bank of England system amounted 
to introducing an officially organised floating rate for UK imports whilst operating a fixed rate 
for exports.
For Rawlinson the new scheme was unworkable-
‘Our position vis a vie foreign suppliers is uncomfortable- we should be 
saying- “We will pay for your goods in No.4 account sterling. This in itself 
is o f little use to you. You must find a bank to buy it. If you cannot find a 
bank to buy it, or do not like the banks terms, there is nothing in our system
in
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which will ever make this sterling useful to you. No.4 sterling will never be 
convertible in your hands’.140
On 28 June the full Allen group considered the Bank's proposal.141 Rawlinson accepted the 
Bank’s objection to the number three account but instead of opting for the Bank’s plan, had 
reformulated Cranmer so that it no longer allowed transferability between number three 
account holders. However, the Bank was keen to stress that even with transferability removed 
the volume o f work that the existing scheme would entail would be enormous. Furthermore, it 
would have been very unlikely that foreign banks would have be prepared to undertake it and 
the bmnt of it would fall on British institutions. However those that favoured the existing 
scheme, or perhaps more accurately those that had got to the stage were they felt that the 
whole exercise was pointless and could not stomach a complete re-write, were at pains to 
defend the existing number three account. They argued that the workload would only build up 
over time and that other systems could be put in place on an ad hoc basis if Cranmer was ever 
to be implemented.142
To Douglas Allen, the Bank’s proposal was only ever likely to work if a guaranteed time limit 
for queuing was given for number three account sterling. Without a time limit, he could not 
see that foreign Banks would agree to the system. However, to his mind, it would have been 
difficult for the Treasury to contemplate giving such a guarantee, in unknown circumstances, 
and implementing it would undoubtedly lead to calls for its extension to number one 
accounts.143 He recognised that whilst the existing system was flawed it was likely to work for 
a certain length o f time and it would give the UK some breathing space in which to set up a 
comprehensive import quota system. Consequently, he urged that the existing queuing system,
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minus transferability should be adopted as part of the Cranmer plan. While post-Cranmer, he 
accepted that they would have to watch the situation very carefully.
Jaty
By July 1968, most o f the central issues relating to Cranmer planning had been aired if  not 
resolved. Much of the work that occurred during the month focused on brining the whole plan 
together into one final draft. So that in the unlikely event that ministers called ‘stand-to’, 
blocking could be implemented in a matter of days. Moreover, because officials had become 
so horrified by the potential consequences of Cranmer, they wanted to put it to bed and instead 
focus their efforts on a more workable alternative. Even so, there were still some issues that 
had not yet been decided upon and it was necessary to work them through before they could 
leave the scheme to gather dust. The ability of the Treasury officials to plan for a course of 
action that they knew would be both disastrous and unlikely pays testament to their 
professionalism. As Rawlinson reported to Hoskin ‘The likelihood that Cranmer will be 
needed in the near future has receded but HMT is still under firm instructions to complete it by 
the end o f  August and put the papers away.’144 By this stage, the spirits o f Rawlinson and his 
planning cohorts must have ebbed.
In early July, officials considered in more detail the sorts o f  import reduction methods that 
they might use in a Cranmer environment. It seemed that there were two broad alternatives. 
Firstly, to implement a comprehensive system o f physical import restrictions, by putting 
together a list o f prohibited imports and devising a quota system to limit the number o f  other 
types o f non-prohibited goods entering the country.145 The second alternative was simply to 
rely on the import-licensing scheme, with its Alpha, Beta, and Gamma classifications, for the 
duration o f the block. Officials recognised that both schemes were technically feasible but that
144 T295/605 Rawlinson to Hoskin ‘Cranmer’, 22/7/68.
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both had potential drawbacks. The problem with implementing a system o f  physical 
restrictions was the same as it had always been. Namely that it was impossible to plan for it in 
secret and that the system would have to be built up around Cranmer post-zero. As well as 
this, customs would have to learn the new system quickly and would have to impound 
prohibited goods, leading to congestion at the ports.
However, it was recognised that in the long-term physical restrictions was a better bet than 
sticking with import licensing. This was because the licensing scheme would add to the 
amount that would eventually have to be paid off from the frozen number one account. As 
instead o f the goods being impounded and/or returned, the foreign seller would receive 
payment under the Gamma license into his number one account. Officials also believed that 
foreign exporters were more likely to understand the physical restriction system. Therefore, 
less unwanted goods would arrive under it than would arrive under licensing.146 It would also 
be fair to say that the planners preferred physical restrictions because it had been done before 
and it was easier to predict how it would operate and what potential problems would emerge 
under it. Hence, it was decided that licensing would be used only in the interim and once 
customs could be trained to operate the physical restriction scheme, that method would 
supersede it.
Androcles
During early July, the Treasury team also turned their attention to the problem o f  mobilising 
private portfolio holdings. Such mobilisation was central to the Cranmer scheme because the 
proceeds o f sale were to be used to fund the rundown the number one account balances. At 
first sight, it seems a great omission that planners waited until such a late stage in the 
development o f  Cranmer before they turned their attention to this issue. Though, it must be 
remembered that the plan for mobilisation did not originate from Cranmer but was considered
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as a contingency plan in its own right, firstly under the codename Bootstrap and latterly 
Androcles, from as early as 1965.* 147 Furthermore by July, both Rawlinson and Posner had 
come to view it as an acceptable standalone alternative to Cranmer in its own right.148
However, within the Cranmer context it was recognised that there were three potential 
methods that could be used to bring about mobilisation. The first was to abolish the existing 
investment currency market and create a new one in which UK residents may sell their 
overseas securities or foreign exchange proceeds of sales to non-resident number one account 
holders.149 This proposal could have been implemented without fresh legislation and UK 
citizens might well have made a profit from the sale because those who were desperate to get 
out o f sterling might have sold their number one account holdings to UK residents at 
substantial discount.
Nevertheless the scheme, if enacted, would have been very slow acting because the UK 
authorities would not have been forcing their citizens to sell their holdings but instead 
requiring them to sell only to number one account holders i f  they ever decided to divest 
themselves of their securities.150 Equally, the fact that number one account holders would be 
selling at discount would mean that the scheme could never have been regarded as a complete 
and proper solution. Instead the Treasury felt that if Cranmer were implemented, it could be 
used as an interim measure to let holders get out o f sterling if they could not wait long enough 
to get a full refund.
The second alternative was for the UK authorities to compulsory acquire all o f  the foreign 
securities held by its residents, with a view to selling them.131 Whilst this would give the
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government complete control over the operation it would have required fresh legislation and a 
great deal o f administration. Consequently, it would have taken several months to put in 
motion. However, when the government came to sell the securities there would have been 
trouble in terms of both the price that the government would pay its citizens and the amount of 
money that could hope to be generated from the sale. After all, when one places £4,000m152 of 
securities onto the market for sale simultaneously, there will be a considerable depreciation in 
value. Consequently, a second variation of this proposal was envisaged, whereby instead of 
selling the securities, HMG would use them as collateral for a loan, although, this could only 
postpone the debt and substitute the creditor.153
To my mind, a more workable alternative would have been to pool the securities once 
acquired and offer them to the number one account holders instead o f payment. This would 
mean that it would be the sterling holders and not HMG that would have suffered when large 
amounts were simultaneously cashed in. Indeed the fact that large-scale encashment would 
have reduced the returns might well have induced the new owners to hold onto the securities.
The third technique was similar to the first in which UK residents voluntarily sold their 
holdings abroad. The principal difference would be that the government would take fresh 
legislative powers would enforce the sale. Citizens would be instructed to sell either all o f 
their holdings or a proportion of them, with the proceeds being repatriated to the UK.154 Whilst 
a system o f compulsory registration would be required to enforce the scheme the 
administrative workload would be reduced; it would be the citizens themselves that sold the 
securities, and not Whitehall officials.
152 This amount is based on the December 1965 Bank of England Review of Private portfolio holdings 
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The planning group did however recognise that there were some serious problems that would 
emerge with the enactment o f Androcles, irrespective of the version chosen. First was the 
obvious political fallout. No such operation had been embarked upon in peacetime and there 
would have been a great deal o f  discontentment amongst British citizens, who would be far 
from overjoyed that their assets had been compulsorily purchased. All the more so because 
few outside economic circles understood the nature o f  the crisis that Britain faced. Even much 
of the Cabinet was ignorant o f  the true plight o f sterling.155 Second, there would also have 
been severe political criticism abroad. Massive sales o f overseas securities if done quickly 
would, as I have already mentioned, have an adverse effect on the world market. This point 
cannot be emphasised enough; British dollar securities represented 1/20 o f the entire US stock 
market.156 Third, at that time the dividends from the securities amounted to approximately 
£150m per annum.157 The mobilisation of the portfolio would provide the British government 
with a lump sum of foreign exchange but only at great detriment to future invisible earnings. 
However, all o f the officials w ere agreed that ‘these objections are outweighed by the need to 
do something towards repaying No. 1 accounts’.158
On the other hand, officials w ere in no hurry to decide which of the three proposals should be 
implemented under Cranmer. This was because it was not essential to the successful operation 
of the blocking regime to have worked out the mobilisation technique in advance. It was 
enough at this stage simply to outline a number o f alternative proposals and then examine the 
issues in more depth post-Cranmer. They also advocated requisitioning more expert help once 
blocking had been implemented, as the security implications would not be so grave. 
Furthermore, post-Cranmer all o f the Treasury’s administrative resources would have been 
devoted to implementing the block and if some sort o f public committee or commission could
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be established to deal with the Androcles aspect, it would take a great deal o f pressure off the 
Treasury’s workload.159
Telling Whitehall
By the middle o f July, much o f the detailed Cranmer planning had been concluded. From now 
on, it was simply a process o f tying up loose ends. The final issue that the planning group 
concerned themselves with was the process by which they would indoctrinate their Whitehall 
colleagues into the operation o f the system post-zero. After all, there were great differences 
between Cranmer and the devaluation. The devaluation had been quite a simple operation that 
was easily explained. Much of the planning in preparation for it centred on its presentation to 
the rest o f the world. With Cranmer, presentation would again be important but the scheme 
itself was very complicated and officials that were not involved in its development would have 
required a great deal o f explanation at every stage.160 Rawlinson believed that when and if new 
officials were indoctrinated, they would need something in writing proceeded by an oral 
explanation. He also anticipated that the present small circle o f planners would have been the 
only ones who knew o f the scheme’s existence until stand-to was ordered. However, he was 
prepared to advocate the inclusion of the Foreign Office at a much earlier stage, as they would 
play a pivotal role in presenting Cranmer to the world.161
It was also essential to consider how news o f the plan would be communicated to the British 
posts overseas in the build up to the operation.162 Broadly, there were two means of 
transmitting such information. The first was to send ciphers to all the relevant posts. However 
because o f the large number of embassies and consulates that would have to be informed the 
Foreign Office would have required four days notice, in order to make the necessary
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preparations. This would mean that some posts would be informed earlier than others and if 
the operation was called off at the last minute a large number of people who did not need to 
know o f Cranmer’s existence, would.161 The second alternative was to send sealed envelopes 
to the posts. However, this carried even more disadvantages. It was possible that they could go 
missing in transit and it was unclear whose responsibility it would be to guard them. More 
importantly, it was likely that if Cranmer was implemented at a much later date, the plan 
would have altered and the contents o f the envelopes would have been out o f date.163 64 It 
seemed, therefore, that the first option was the least worst.
There was also the problem o f informing Ministers to consider.165 It was probable that if the 
decision to implement Cranmer were taken, it would be Misc.205 that gave the order to stand- 
lo. Nonetheless, it would almost certainly have been necessary for the entire Cabinet to ratify 
their decision. However, as has already been stated, the scheme was not one that would be 
easy to grasp from a brief oral exposition. If the Cabinet as a whole were to do anything more 
than rubber-stamp it, they would have to have a copy of the master plan sometime before the 
meeting. This however came with risks, because any paper circulated would be seen by a large 
number of officials and might result in leaks. Therefore, Rawlinson was forced to conclude 
that ‘in practise it may still be that only Misc.205 would really grasp the scheme as a 
whole’.166
On 17 July, Allen ended the planning aspect o f the exercise stating that he ‘did not think any 
future meetings o f  the group would be needed until September’.167 To his mind all of the 
various micro-issues involved in Cranmer planning had been aired. Although the attempt to tie 
up the loose ends created more ends than there had originally been, it was time to end the 
exercise. Allen had never been enamoured by the scheme and those that had been, were no
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longer favourably disposed to It.167 68 The change in heart o f those on the ground can be traced to 
point at which Brutus 8 was completed and the focus shifted to micro planning. It was from 
this moment onwards that Rawlinson and Posner began to consider the implications of the 
scheme for Britain and the international system in detail and that the horrors o f  it became 
apparent. This does not mean that they had, by this stage, decided that floating would be the 
only viable alternative. Instead, they hoped that it would be possible to implement an 
alternative second order instrument that was more palatable and which reduced the likelihood 
o f being forced into Cranmer in the first place. The possibilities included implementing 
Androcles by itself as a means of bolstering the reserves; winding up the sterling area to stop 
capital outflows but above all else getting the sterling area countries to voluntarily agree to 
freeze their own holdings. In short, they were banking on Basle.
Summary
This chapter has sought to reconstruct the deliberations o f the sterling contingency planning 
network in its attempt to craft Operation Brutus. The plan was a complicated and highly 
technical second order instrument that was designed to preserve, under emergency conditions, 
the third order goal of fixed exchange rates by blocking the sterling balances, in order avoid 
both the devaluation and/ or floatation of sterling. Although officials from the Bank still 
regarded Brutus as non-viable, because of the implications for its key client groups, its 
officials still collaborated with the Treasury in the production of the plan. It is arguable that 
the reason that the Bank was so keen to maintain network relations was that it would enable it 
to scupper the exercise from the inside. However, this proved unnecessary. As planning 
progressed, Treasury officials quickly came to  realise the true implications o f  the full 
Cramner scheme, which would require a ban on foreign travel, rationing at home and the 
vesting o f  citizens private portfolio holdings. Furthermore, given that the OSA used sterling
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as its reserve asset it was likely that world trade would break down, as its balances would be 
blocked. Consequently, the Treasury came to doubt the merits and workability o f blocking. It 
was, however, recognised that unless a crisis avoidance network could be formed which was 
able to devise a second order instrument that made blocking redundant, if a future sterling 
crisis materialised there might be no alternative to Cramner.
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C hapter 6- The 1968 Basle Agreement
In chapter two, I explained that the policymaking process within the core executive was best 
viewed in terms o f policy networks. I also stated that within the realm o f external economic 
policy, two types of network appeared to exist. These were (a) the crisis avoidance and (b) 
contingency planning networks. The former attempted to manipulate policy instruments in 
order to ensure that a crisis of sterling would not materialise, whilst that latter planned for 
emergency action in circumstances where crisis avoidance had failed. Thus far, this thesis has 
mainly focused on the work of contingency planning networks. It has done so in terms of an 
analysis o f the FU group’s [first order] plan to devalue the pound and the Allen group’s 
[second order] scheme to block the sterling balances. In this chapter, I propose to examine the 
work o f one of the crisis avoidance networks that operated during 1968. In the analysis that 
follows, it will become clear that both types of networks operated in a context o f path 
dependency. That the output o f the crisis avoidance networks shaped the context within which 
the contingency planning network operated and vice versa. However, it is important to stress 
that this chapter does not begin at the point at which the last one left off. This is because the 
activities and membership of the crisis avoidance network greatly overlapped with those of 
the Allen group and for a time, both operated simultaneously. However, it would have been 
too difficult to weave a discussion o f this network’s behaviour into the preceding chapters 
without creating confusion. Therefore, the chronology must be skewed in order to preserve 
the argument.
In this chapter, I intend to outline the origins and development o f the 1968 Basle agreement, 
which was crafted by an avoidance network where the Bank acted as hegemon. The scheme 
was designed to ensure that the official sterling balances o f the OSA would be protected 
against the ravages of further devaluation and in so doing actually prevent the necessity of 
devaluation. This is because with the agreement concluded, one o f the threats to the stability
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o f the currency would be neutralised and confidence in sterling would increase. The 
agreement itself was successfully negotiated during the summer o f 1968 and comprised two 
parts. The first was an undertaking by a large number o f central banks, with the BIS acting as 
an intermediary, to provide a $2 billion medium-term loan. This facility was to be used only 
to cover foreign exchange loss to the EEA incurred through the direct diversification of the 
OSA’s official and private balances and could not be used to finance a British trade deficit. 
The second part comprised a pledge by the OSA, that it would halt the direct diversification 
o f its official balances, which had begun after the devaluation. In exchange, the UK extended 
a dollar value guarantee to 90% o f its balances. This meant that if the pound was again 
devalued, the balances would be written up in order to maintain their dollar purchasing 
power. Of course, it was not benevolence that drove British policy-makers to negotiate such a 
settlement, but practical considerations about the best way to stabilise the currency. For if the 
sterling area’s accounts could be made inert through the judicious use of carrot and stick, one 
of the sources of pressure on sterling would be neutralised.
Preliminaries
Whilst ministers in the Labour government were kept apprised, they were in no way the 
architects o f the Basle agreement and they did not take an active part in the dialogue. In total, 
ministerial involvement was limited to the decision to authorise the negotiations in the first 
place and to report on the success o f them, to the House of Commons, in the aftermath. The 
Treasury’s involvement in the development o f the proposal was also limited, at least in the 
early stages. In truth, the Bank masterminded the whole operation. It devised the plan, 
examined its feasibility, conducted preliminary negotiations with other central banks at the 
BIS and only when it concluded that there might be some chance o f success, did it begin 
consultations with the Treasury. At the Bank, the key players were Kit McMahon, advisor to 
the governors, Jeremy Morse, Executive Director, Rupert Raw, Head Dealer, John Fford,
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Executive Director, Maurice Parsons, Deputy Governor and of course the Governor himself, 
Leslie O’Brien.1
Initial discussions within the Bank can be traced back at least as far as January 1968.2 Both 
Raw and McMahon worked together, during this period, and produced the Bank’s first paper 
on the subject. They recognised that, in the immediate aftermath of devaluation, with £2 
billion of assistance already outstanding and with little likelihood of improvement in the 
balance of payments during 1968, the situation was perilous. It was made all the more so, by 
the fact that this was accompanied by ‘substantial moves out o f  sterling by both private and 
official OSA holders’.3 They recognised that it would be essential to improve confidence in 
the currency in order to attract inflows of private funds, to try to contain OSA diversification, 
and to consolidate and rephrase official debt. Therefore, as a minimum objective they 
advocated attempting to renew the pre-existing Basle arrangements, negotiated in 1966, for a 
further 12 months.
However it was recognised that because the Bank had drawn on all its available facilities, and 
would in time have to repay them, the renewal o f the Basle arrangements would not actually 
provide further assistance, but would instead have to be used to finance existing liabilities. 
Furthermore, in the wake o f the devaluation, it was not thought out o f the realms of 
possibility that the EEA would have to finance as much as £750-£1000 million of 
diversification. Consequently, Raw and McMahon argued that it would be best to push for 
some additional credit, from wherever it could be obtained.
In principle, they felt that there were three possible means with which to gain the urgently 
needed additional resources. The first was to engage in bilateral negotiations with a number of 
central banks and foreign governments. The second was to approach the IMF and the third,
' Interviews with Sir Jeremy Morse, Sir Kit McMahon and Lord Croham
2 Bank OV44/159 Raw and McMahon, ‘Extension of the Basle Arrangements’, 16/1/68.
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was to use the BIS as an agent, through which participating governments would provide 
credit. This third alternative was o f  course the method that had been used in 1966 to raise 
support to help offset fluctuations in the sterling balances. O’Brien welcomed the initiative 
and his preference was for it to be conducted under the umbrella o f the BIS, rather than 
bilaterally or via the IMF.* 4 *This was because he believed that it was unlikely that participating 
countries would be prepared to proceed on a bilateral basis and that the IMF route was a non­
starter. The Fund was already overburdened and O’Brien believed it unlikely that they would 
be able to launch such a support operation in less than a year.3
However, one issue that the Bank, and McMahon in particular, found it difficult to decide 
upon was the use to which any new funding would be put. Was it to be used as a mechanism 
to halt diversification or to actually/urnf it?6 Up until 1968, UK policy had centred on the first 
objective. Credits had been sought from the BIS in order to improve confidence in the 
currency, thereby reducing the propensity o f  OSA holders to divest. Yet, if a facility o f  
monumental proportions could be gained, it would in theory be possible to fund the wholesale 
windup of the currency’s reserve role and to bring about ‘a controlled and moderate 
withdrawal into a financial Little England’.7
This was however as far as the discussions advanced in the Bank and for some unfathomable 
reason the issue was put on hold until early March, when a draft o f McMahon’s paper on ‘The 
Future of the Sterling Balances’ was circulated within the Treasury.8 In that paper, the 
problem o f sterling post-devaluation, was outlined. McMahon argued that the difficulty did 
not centre on the NSA balances, because they now stood at £900m, were comprised almost 
entirely of working balances, and therefore the scope for further diversification o f them was
’ ibid
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limited. Therefore, he concluded that the existing 1966 BIS facility remained an ‘appropriate 
form o f stabilising mechanism’.9 On the other hand, he reported to the Treasury that the same 
could not be said about the balances of the OSA. The declining confidence in sterling, in the 
wake o f devaluation, had in his view triggered a move from indirect to direct diversification. 
As well as this, because of the Labour government’s decision to reduce its defence 
commitments East o f  Suez, a large number o f OSA countries would have to increase their 
military funding, and it was likely that this would be accomplished, in the short-term, by 
drawing on their balances. He believed that it was also unlikely that the OSA private balances 
would continue to grow in size, because the lack of confidence in the currency had reduced 
the will o f depositors to hold sterling. Consequently, McMahon argued that an increase in the 
private balances could not be counted on to offset the diversification of official balances, as 
had previously been the case. The worst case scenario was that the sterling area’s holdings 
might fall by as much as £500m during 1968. This was not a strain that the EEA could have 
borne, even if by some miracle there was a turnaround in the balance of payments. Therefore 
there was a danger that the new ‘sterling parity could not be maintained’.10
McMahon therefore advocated pushing for further international monetary co-operation, just 
as he and Raw had done in their preliminary Bank discussions. Whilst the existing BIS 
arrangement was designed to deal with fluctuations in the balances they could not finance a 
long-term downward trend. As the threat from NSA movements was deemed small, the 
solution was to devise new arrangements that would finance the run-down of both the official 
and private OSA balances. It would be necessary to obtain at least $1.5 billion and preferably 
$2 billion worth o f support, because of the potential scale of the withdrawals. Such credits 
could not be short-term in nature, as they would be used to cope with a permanent, 
irreversible movement on a substantial scale.
’ ibid
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The Treasury was broadly supportive of the Bank’s proposal." Ryrie in particular agreed with 
the Bank’s decision to come down in favour of a BIS scheme, rather than one backed by the 
IMF. If the Fund route was to be pursued it would have been necessary to establish a new 
framework whereby the UK was entitled to draw new credits above the normal 200% limit, 
but without any special restrictions being applied to the way that British economic policy was 
conducted. However it was felt unlikely that the Fund’s directors would be so obliging, as 
extension o f credit on this magnitude would likely have provoked ill feeling from other 
countries. It is arguable that they would have resented Britain’s special treatment. The BIS 
route offered greater flexibility. The Bank of International Settlements could act as an agent 
to a group of central banks, keeping the books o f the scheme and helping to get it started in 
the first place.* 12 Alternatively it could act as a principal; borrowing in its own name and 
lending the funds accrued to the UK. Such a scheme would also represent the continuation of 
the system of credits that was put in place in 1966.
With Treasury approval o f the proposal, O ’Brien put the issue in a very preliminary manner 
to the other central bank governors that made up the Basle club, on 7 April 1968. He covered 
much o f the same ground that McMahon and Raw had done in their examination of the issue. 
However he made it clear that he did not wish any financing o f  the sterling balance problem 
to be contingent on the UK ‘issuing guarantees on..[the]..sterling holdings to the sterling area 
central banks’.13 The Bank’s predisposition against offering guarantees had not weakened any 
since it had first rejected the possibility, during the contingency planning for the devaluation 
in the mid 1960s. The arguments against, in April 1968, remained the same. Namely, that 
instigating guarantees from a position of weakness would reduce rather than increase 
confidence. Furthermore, it would not be possible to extend the cover to all sterling holders.
" PRO T312/1953 Ryrie to Goldman ‘Building on Basle’, 6/3/68.
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Those that were excluded would be inclined to diversify, even if  they had in the past remained 
loyal.14
At the meeting only Brunet, governor o f the French central bank, questioned O ’Brien’s stance 
against guarantees.15 There was however, general agreement amongst the other governors that 
the deterioration in confidence in sterling had become a dominant factor in the wish for 
diversification and that this made the problem both immediate and important. As well as this, 
the preference for gold, as opposed to sterling or dollars, had also increased within the OSA. 
Especially as the US move to a two-tier gold market meant that many bankers thought that the 
possibility o f a revaluation o f the metal was highly likely in the near future.16
The governors at Basle were generally supportive o f the British proposals. Although, they 
recognised that their governments would ultimately have to be brought into the negotiations. 
However if this was done too soon, there was every likelihood that the plan would be leaked, 
especially as so many would be aware o f  it. If news came out at such an early stage, and 
nothing came o f the negotiations, then the collateral damage for sterling in terms of 
confidence would be high. This placed the central bankers in something o f a quandary; they 
could not very well withhold details from their governments whilst they negotiated the 
particulars. The solution was for the Bank o f  England to engage in bilateral negotiations with 
the BIS, in order to devise an elaborated version o f the scheme. This would greatly reduce the 
guilt o f the central bankers; whilst they were aware o f the proposals they would not have been 
actively involved in shaping them. Only after the scheme had been well worked out would it 
be presented to the governors in May or June 1968. As the central banks would not be 
discussing the proposal until then, ‘they would not have to inform their governments’.17
14 Bank OV44/I60 ‘Should We Give Guarantees?’, 16/4/68.
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However, it seems that there was another lull in the Bank’s efforts to develop a workable 
proposal. One supposes that the Bank's attention was diverted to the preparation o f papers for 
Douglas Allen’s group on Operation Brutus. Or more specifically, to the attempt to dissuade 
the Treasury from taking the blocking exercise any further. For the Bank were very strongly 
of the view that the idea o f blocking was
‘an act of hostility and betrayal towards countries which have built up holdings of 
sterling through normal international trading...There are effectively no half 
measures with blocking. Any measure of interference with convertibility would 
have disastrous effects. In the short-term, it would be bound to provoke a flight 
from the non-blocked balances; in the long-term we should have to expect to 
liquidate all o f the sterling balances even if we only blocked part o f the balances 
fora  short time’.18
It was not then, until 1 May that attention returned to Basle, when Ferras, the Managing 
Director of the BIS, and MacDonald, Head of its Banking Department, visited the Bank to 
begin their discussions.19 The object was to produce a detailed blueprint that could be 
presented to the central bank governors at their next meeting on 10 May. It seems then, that 
both the BIS and the Bank were very last minute in their approach to the whole exercise. 
However, the talks appeared fruitful and O’Brien reported to the Treasury that he expected 
that an outline of the scheme would be ready by the middle o f  the next day and in fact was 
able to provide them with a sketch of the proposal by 3 May.20
The facility was to be for an amount equivalent to $2 billion, subject to the agreement o f all 
concerned. The Bank would have preferred to push for $3-4 billion, but recognised that this
18 Bank OV44/161 ‘Blocking’, 9/5/68.
19 PRO T312/1953 Goldman ‘Sterling Balances: Building on Basle’, 1/5/68
20 PRO T312/1953 Morse to Goldman, 3/5/68.
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was impossible.21 The $2 billion would be raised by a group of central banks, under the co­
ordination o f the BIS. The aim would be to provide a ‘safety net’ for the UK to protect the 
reserves from future falls in the sterling area balances, below the £3,080m benchmark.22 Once 
the facility came into being, the UK would be entitled to draw on it to meet reductions in the 
balances below that benchmark. It was proposed that the funding would be made available for 
a period o f three years, but that the Bank would not have to make repayments for a further 
two years. After which, repayments would be spread over a period o f five years, in equal 
quarterly instalments. O f course the Bank would only be obliged to repay the portion of the 
facility that was used and would have the right to make payments earlier than the suggested 
schedule, if this was to its advantage. However, the 3+2 year facility proposed by the BIS was 
not considered long enough by the Bank for the UK’s requirements.23 A ten-year drawing 
right would have been greatly preferred, and at the very least one lasting five years. 
Nonetheless, the Bank recognised that three years was better than nothing at all, and that in 
practise the date o f  termination was effectively the date for re-negotiation.
Under the proposal, the participating central banks would enter into agreement with the BIS 
and would consent to make funds available up to the amount o f the facility, for the purpose o f 
financing it. However, Ferras and MacDonald concluded that the arrangement would be more 
palatable to the central banks, if the scheme could be designed so that drawings from their 
funds could be minimised.24 One way o f  accomplishing this was to call on OSA central banks 
to deposit some o f  their NSA currencies with the BIS. If  the UK needed to draw on the 
facility to fund the conversion o f some o f  the OSA’s balances, it would initially be the OSA’s 
non-sterling currencies, deposited at the BIS that would be made available to the Bank to 
cover the costs o f  conversion.25
21 Bank OV 44/160 Fenton to McMahon ’The MacDonald Scheme', 18/4/68.
22 PRO T312/1953 ‘Outline of a Possible New Facility for the Bank of England’, undated.
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If this proved to be negotiable, it would mean that the OSA would in effect finance the 
facility themselves through their dollar deposits to the BIS. The Bank promised to ‘use its 
best endeavours to persuade OSA central banks to make such deposits’.25 6 It recognised that if 
it proved negotiable, the Basle club would be more likely to co-operate, as its fear that the 
facility would be used up in a matter o f weeks would be greatly allayed. However, it is 
difficult to see what could have induced the OSA to comply. It was not as if the Bank was 
going to offer to guarantee their balances as a sweetener. Even when the offer of a guarantee 
was extended as part o f the proposal, many o f  the OSA countries still greatly resented the 
UK’s request.27 In that sense, the Bank was overly optimistic in its initial assumptions. 
Goldman, at the Treasury, also recognised that if the involvement o f the OSA were to be 
requested, it would mean that they would have to be brought into the UK’s confidence at an 
early stage.28 With this came the risk o f  a leak and the possibility that the OSA would want to 
have some input in the formation o f the initial blueprint. If the sterling area was able to 
muscle in on the preliminary negotiations, there was the potential for the balance of any 
settlement to be tipped heavily against British interests.
The Move to Guarantees
These were not the only objections to the proposal. By the beginning o f May, Dudley Allen, 
the official at the Bank responsible for basing with Australia, had begun to have further 
doubts o f his own.29 He anticipated that if the Bank were successful in obtaining the safety net 
at Basle, the facility might actually encourage OSA countries to move out o f sterling. He 
argued that the size o f the facility would significantly influence the attitudes of the OSA. If it 
were not large enough to fund all o f the sterling area’s balances, all o f the holders would
25 PRO T312/1953 ‘Outline of a Possible New Facility for the Bank of England', undated.
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‘jump off quickly in order to ensure that they can freely convert’.30 The facility would 
therefore be quickly exhausted, Britain would have further indebted herself to the tune of $2 
billion, and half the sterling area balances would still be in existence.31 Indeed, several o f the 
central bank governors, at the Basle negotiations, made it clear that they could ‘not envisage 
any further support operation for the UK going beyond the one now under negotiation'.32 
Therefore, once the facility was used there could be no hope of getting additional credits to 
finance the windup o f  the remaining balances. The only way to avoid this problem would 
have been to ration convertibility and place strict limits on the portion o f each OSA balance 
that could be converted into dollars. However, ‘rationing convertibility’ was another way o f 
saying that part o f the sterling area’s balances would be blocked.
If this route were taken, the flight from the non-blocked OSA balances would have to be 
financed by the Basle facility. However, it was extremely likely that the partial blocking o f 
the OSA’s balances would greatly reduce confidence amongst NSA holders. Although the 
NSA’s sterling holdings were at an historic low after devaluation and was mainly comprised 
of working balances, the partial blocking o f OSA funds could induce the fear, amongst NSA 
holders, that it would not be long before their balances were also made inconvertible. This 
could again destabilise them and place intolerable pressure on the EEA.
To Dudley Allen, the solution was for the Bank to guarantee a portion o f the OSA’s sterling 
holdings from the start, rather than to use the facility to fund diversification.33 For if the 
balances were guaranteed the scheme would no longer be a safety net to fund diversification, 
but a scaffold to stabilise the balances. After all, if the OSA could be assured that their 
balances would be protected against the effects o f a possible future devaluation, this would 
increase the confidence o f holders and reduce their propensity to divest. Furthermore, if the
30 ibid
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guarantee were offered only in return for an undertaking by the OSA not to diversify any 
further, the balances would not only be stabilised but would become completely inert.
However, it was clear that such a guarantee could not be gold-value in nature, for if there 
were a revaluation o f the metal, the Bank would be forced to make large payouts.34 The 
solution was to guarantee to maintain sterling’s purchasing power in relation to the dollar, if  
the pound was devalued. This could be accomplished in two ways. The first would be for the 
Bank to offer foreign exchange to the OSA to make up for any shortfall in the purchasing 
power of sterling after a devaluation. If this option were pursued, then the Basle facility 
would be drawn upon to make the payments. The second and more promising possibility was 
simply to offer to write-up the sterling balances to maintain their dollar purchasing power. 
This would involve no call on the facility, as no foreign exchange would be offered as part o f 
the arrangement.35 It offered the possibility o f stabilising the sterling balances without having 
to make any use whatsoever o f the Basle facility and it was therefore the course of action that 
Dudley Allen advocated. In theory, it would have been possible to pursue the strategy without 
gaining any additional credits from the Basle club. However, it was recognised that in 
practise, it would probably prove necessary to make certain concessions to the OSA in order 
to get the proposal o ff the ground. It was likely that the OSA would demand, as the price for 
its participation, the further liquidation of a significant proportion of its sterling holdings. If 
this price had to be paid, the Basle facility would finance it.
Allen’s departure was however, rather a bold one. This was because it flew in the face of the 
Bank’s pre-established line on guarantees. Since the Bank had dismissed the arguments in 
favour o f guarantees in the mid-1960s, the well-rehearsed arguments against them became 
part of the fabric o f the Bank view. However, it was clear that it was the Bank view that 
needed revision and not Allen’s. In fact it is arguable that if the Bank had not been so quick to
35ibidBank OV44/I61 ‘Sterling Balances: Approaches to the OSA- Exchange Guarantees', undated.
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reject the possibility o f guarantees pre-devaluation, the change in parity and the contingency 
planning that came in its aftermath would have never have been on the agenda.
John Fforde agreed, at least with Allen, that if the choice was between a safety net or a 
guarantee, it was the latter that should be embraced.36 He accepted that if  the UK opted for a 
safety net, it would simply be a matter o f displacing the liabilities to the sterling area with a 
debt to the BIS creditor countries. Although the Bank had been in the past loath to advocate a 
system o f guarantees, Fford recognised that a credible guarantee would avoid the need to 
actually get into more debt, as it would not actually be drawn upon.37 He argued that the 
Bank’s opposition to guarantees had been conditioned by a number o f  arguments relating to 
the circumstances that prevailed before devaluation. However
‘the present situation is quite different. Devaluation has occurred and we are 
confronted with massive diversification after devaluation, which we are 
trying either to “refinance” or reverse in order to avoid descent into total 
disorder’.38
By opting for a guarantee, it was possible that Britain’s reserve currency role could be 
maintained. The Basle club had come to similar conclusions at its meeting on 10 May, and 
argued strongly that Britain should review its opposition to the extension of exchange 
guarantees. The Treasury’s historical memorandum on the Basle Agreement argues that it was 
this pressure that made the Bank reconsider its view.39 Of course, Dudley Allen must really be 
credited. In any case, discussions continued in the Bank. Some argued that the guarantee 
proposed could never be acceptable to the OSA: because in return for its extension, the
Bank OV44/161 Fforde ‘Safety Net’ ,17/5/68.
17 ibid
38 ibid
T267/29 ‘Historical Memorandum on the Sterling Balances’, undated.
202
sterling area would have to pledge that it would refrain from further diversification.40 This 
would mean that it would in effect be agreeing to voluntarily suspend convertibility on some 
portion of its assets. The doubters argued that liquidity was an essential constituent o f a 
reserve currency and that it was therefore unlikely that the OSA would welcome the proposal 
with open arms.
However, those that had come the favour the approach, argued that although in theory the 
sterling balances, pre-guarantees were fully convertible, in practise they were not. The 
sterling area was well aware that if  all its members pressed for full conversion rights 
simultaneously, the UK would have to refuse because the EEA could never meet the bill. 
Therefore, the offer o f a guarantee might be accepted because under the present situation 
holders were at risk both in terms o f devaluation and convertibility. With a guarantee, ‘they 
could at least be assured they would be protected against further devaluation’.41 The 
supporters argued that the UK should seek to limit OSA diversification to the extent that 
sterling made up at least 50% o f the sterling area’s reserves. The facility, provided by the 
Basle club, could be used in order to fund the reduction in the balances to that level. The 
remaining sterling would be locked in and guaranteed. However, the mechanics o f the lock in 
mechanism were yet to be decided. In principle, there were two possibilities.42 The first was 
simply to ask the OSA to enter into a formal undertaking not to diversify any further, in other 
words to extract a solemn promise. The second was to formally embody the agreement, by 
issuing long-term bonds that would be both illiquid and non-transferable.
On 24 May, O ’Brien reported the change o f heart, with respect to guarantees, to Douglas 
Allen.43 He argued that the proposal had many advantages from the UK’s point o f view. The 
funds involved would cease to be liquid and consequently their volatility would be removed.
40 Bank OV44/16I ‘Sterling Balances of the Overseas Sterling Area’, 21/5/68 and PRO T312/1953 
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There would also be a corresponding reduction in the amount of sterling that was available in 
the market for speculative use.43 4 Furthermore, he argued that a guarantee with corresponding 
obligations on the part o f the OSA would be preferable to one without strings attached. For 
under the later scenario, if a new crisis erupted even with guarantees in place, it would be 
likely that the OSA would switch out o f sterling.45 However, if the proposal was accompanied 
by some measure of locking in, it would not be possible for the OSA to convert their holdings 
and the effect o f the crisis would be greatly reduced. The price for negotiating the lock-in 
would probably be that the OSA would wish to diversify some o f its funds before the new 
system was implemented. If all o f the countries concerned reduced their sterling balances to 
50% of their reserves, the cost would be £700m and this could be financed by the Basle 
facility.46
By this stage, O’Brien and his colleagues at the Bank had come to favour the issuing of long­
term bonds and thought them the best means of locking in the remaining sterling.47 Such 
bonds would be expressed in sterling, with a maintenance of value clause in terms of the US 
dollar. The bonds would be repayable to the OSA seven years after they had been issued, in 
ten equal instalments over a number o f years. The rate o f  interest payable on them would have 
to be high in order to make them an attractive prospect and it was thought that some limited 
transferability between holders might also be desirable.48 Only the OSA’s official balances 
would be eligible for the scheme, as the costs o f extension to private holdings would have 
been too high. In any case, local exchange control restrictions prevented the conversion o f  
private holdings in a large number of the sterling area countries.49
43 PRO T312/1953 O’Brien to Allen, 24/5/68.
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By 30 May, the Bank had also begun to consider how it would go about negotiating the 
settlement with the OSA.'° The general line devised was that because the UK was heavily in 
debt and in balance o f payments deficit, it could not afford any extra pressure on the reserves 
from the sterling area. Consequently, the UK was asking for co-operation from the OSA in 
the halting o f diversification. As the OSA might not be happy at having to hold sterling, the 
UK would be prepared to extend exchange guarantees. Some in the Bank also argued that a 
sterling area conference should be called in order to conduct the negotiations. It would ensure 
that progress could be made more swiftly, as there would be no need for the UK to send 
delegations to each o f the OSA countries. However, this line was quickly dropped because it 
would ‘have the drawback o f facilitating some "ganging up” against Britain’.50 1 52 In other 
words, if  multilateral talks were held, the agreement that was hammered out might be less 
favourable for Britain, because the OSA countries might work together in order to improve 
their respective bargaining positions.
By 6 June, Douglas Allen had concluded that the proposals had been developed enough to put 
them to the Chancellor for consideration.’2 This was made all the more urgent because, on 9 
June, O’Brien would again meet with the central bank governors in Basle, to order to further 
refine the proposal. Without Jenkins’ consent, it would have been impossible for the governor 
to express the Bank’s fresh view, on the desirability o f guarantees. The Chancellor however, 
recognised the sense of the proposals and whilst he would not allow O’Brien to positively 
endorse the change in strategy he authorised him to state that the government did ‘not rule out 
the possibility o f some form of exchange guarantee’.’3
The response of the central bank governors, at the meeting on 9 June, was mixed. Whilst the 
bankers were positive about the scheme itself and the UK’s ‘new position on guarantees had
50 ibid
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been well received' other difficulties emerged.54 The biggest hurdle, as far as the Basle club 
was concerned, was the fact that governments would have to be involved in the negotiations, 
in order to authorise the participation o f their respective central banks. Whilst the 
Scandinavians, Germans, Italians and the Dutch reported that they expected little difficulty 
the Federal Reserve had made little progress with the US Treasury. This was because o f the 
latter’s preoccupation with taxation policy. The Japanese had difficulties with respect to 
lending long-term and could only agree to lend renewable short-term loans. The French were 
unlikely to participate at all, because of their balance o f  payments difficulties and the 
Belgians were positively obdurate.55 However, it was recognised that by the end o f July 1968, 
it would be necessary to open bilateral discussions with the OSA and that it would therefore 
be crucial for the central banks to obtain, by the beginning o f July, assurances that the facility 
could be negotiated.
Yet, by 13 June, the prospects looked much improved, at least with respect to the Unites 
States. The President was taking a considerable interest in the scheme and saw no difficulty in 
terms of gaining congressional approval.56 Furthermore, US officials suggested that Harold 
Leaver, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and Jenkins’ second in command, should visit 
Washington for further discussions.57 Nevertheless, work at the Bank and Treasury on the 
broad blueprint continued. Both organisations again turned their attention to the precise 
mechanics o f the guarantee operation. The familiar alternatives of bonds verses undertakings 
were considered at great length and became known as Plan A and Plan B respectively.
Bonds verses Undertakings
Up until this point, the Bank had favoured proceeding on the basis of bonds (plan A). This 
was because it would achieve a greater degree o f locking-in and from a presentational point of
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view, it would greatly increase confidence in sterling. However, by 19 June it had begun to 
have some serious doubts.58 It was clear that there would be considerable administrative 
difficulties for the departments that would have to control the stock. This was because they 
would have to gather a large portion o f the sterling balances, held cash, equities, and 
securities and replace them with bonds. As well as this, it was obvious that if the bonds were 
to be designed in a form that was to be attractive to the OSA, interest rates would have to be 
high. These interest payments would significantly increase the amount that would have to be 
paid back to the OSA at the end of the life o f the bonds. Further research also revealed that 
even with high rates o f interest, a large number of sterling area countries would be incapable, 
under their existing laws, o f holding such a security, as they required a minimum liquid 
reserve level as backing for their domestic currency.59 It was also likely that the OSA would 
regard an attempt by the UK to replace a liquid with an illiquid asset as a partial blocking 
operation.60
The Bank concluded that undertakings, also known as plan B, would be more negotiable. 
Under the plan, 80% of the OSA’s sterling holdings would be guaranteed against a further 
devaluation o f  the pound. Although the percentage chosen seems almost arbitrary, the Bank 
decided upon it because roughly 20% o f  the OSA’s sterling holdings comprised working 
balances. Even if the sterling area continued in its bid to diversify it would have been 
impossible, because o f its need to pay for British imports, to hold any less than this figure.61 
Therefore the British authorities would be providing guarantees as an incentive to hold onto 
the remaining 80%, and only that remainder would be eligible for compensation in the event 
o f another devaluation. The guarantee would be given with the provision that it would be 
activated 30 days after a devaluation. This was because if it was given on the first day, the
51 PRO T312/1953 Goldman to Allen ‘Building on Basle: Next Steps’, 19/6/68.
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British authorities might have subsequently found that the dollar also devalued and that funds 
were needlessly wasted.62
In return for the guarantee, the sterling balances would not be locked into bonds but instead 
each country would undertake not to reduce the total sterling proportion o f its reserves below 
a minimum percentage.63 Ideally this undertaking would be met for a total o f seven years and 
the guarantee would either expire or be renegotiated during the summer of 1975. The precise 
percentage o f sterling that each country held would be decided upon during negotiations. 
Ideally, it would be the pre-existing one, but if this could not be agreed upon then British 
negotiators would be authorised to lower it to 50%. The undertaking would mean that OSA 
countries could only draw on their sterling in the same proportion as they drew on their NSA 
currencies. Whilst if they decided to increase the size o f their reserves, they would have to 
ensure that their minimum sterling proportion (MSP) was not breached and this would 
actually involve increasing their sterling holdings.64 So whilst the funds would not be locked 
in, it would be impossible for sterling area countries to simply move out o f sterling at a whim, 
because they would not be able to discriminate against it. O f course, where reductions in the 
balances had to be made the Basle facility and not the EEA would fund these.
All o f the guaranteed sterling could either be held in special Guaranteed] accounts, which 
would make policing possible, or they could stay in the form they were already in, providing 
holders declared their reserve levels monthly.65 A charge would however be made for the 
facility, based on the differential in interest rates between the London and New York 
markets.66 There was no doubt, as far as the Bank was concerned, that Plan B would not only 
offer fewer administrative problems but that it would also be preferred by the sterling area.67
62 Bank OV/44/167 ‘Maintenance of Value Guarantee', 9/7/68.
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It was recognised that whilst it would be more difficult to police the scheme, especially if G 
accounts were not used, it would involve less actual diversification. This was because the 
funds were not actually locked in. As a result, OSA countries would not have to convert any 
o f their sterling into NSA currencies to meet their balance of payments needs, as they would 
have needed to do under Plan A. Hence, there would be fewer calls on the Basle facility. Plan 
B would also mean a lower interest rate burden on the Exchequer and the balance of 
payments over the years.68 It would be easier to negotiate with the OSA because ‘it had a less 
ridged and more voluntary appearance and would retain the liquidity o f their reserves’.69 
However unlike the parallel discussions that were taking place between Treasury and Bank on 
Operation Brutus, agreement was easy to come by and the Treasury were happy to accept the 
Banks preferred course.70
Preparations for the OSA Negotiations
Both the Bank and the Treasury also recognised that although they had not yet received firm 
undertakings from the Basle group that the facility would be provided, it would be prudent to 
continue planning for the second stage o f the negotiations with the OSA. This was because 
O’Brien would, in a matter o f weeks, return to Basle to formally seek the facility. If 
agreement was reached at that meeting in early July, bilateral negotiations with the OSA 
countries would have to begin immediately, if there was any hope o f minimising concern in 
OSA countries and concluding the settlement by September.71 It was clear that once the 
creditor countries had in principle accepted that the new arrangement could be worked out, 
negotiating teams would have to travel to each OSA country in order to obtain agreement to 
plan B. The negotiations would be started via a message from the Chancellor, which would
68 PRO T312/1960 ‘Record of a Meeting in Mr Goldman's Room’, 19/6/68.
69 PRO T312/1953 ‘Sterling Area Working party’, undated.
70 Bank OV44/164 ‘Note of a Meeting in Mr Figgures Room at the Treasury’, 20/6/68; PRO
T312/1960 ‘Record of a Meeting in Mr Goldman's Room’, 19/6/68; Bank OV44/164 ‘Record of a 
Meeting in Mr Goldman's Room’, 19/6/68.
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be sent to all OSA governments. The message would extend an offer to send a negotiating 
team, which would comprise a Bank and a Treasury representative.71 2 73It was likely, that in 
each case, the Bank’s representative would hold more sway with the sterling area country in 
question than the Treasury man would. This was because the Bank, unlike the Treasury, 
cultivated close links with the sterling area member countries.71 It employed a number of 
officials to act as its servicing agents to foreign central banks and these individuals would 
have a greater intimacy with the local officials. Because o f the importance the Bank attached 
to ensuring that its representatives took part in the negotiations, it decided that these officials 
would be allowed no summer leave and those that had already booked holidays were 
compensated for their loss.74 It was anticipated that the negotiations with the OSA would take 
place between 15 July and mid-August, with the hope o f presenting the completed exercise to 
the BIS on 7 September.75
On 26 June, an inter-departmental meeting was held to further discuss these issues. Goldman 
chaired it and representatives from the Treasury, Bank, Commmonwealth Office and Foreign 
Office attended.76 It was agreed that British posts, in all o f the OSA countries where 
negotiations would take place, would be informed of the guarantee scheme. Plan A and B 
were again reconsidered and it was concluded that the OSA countries would be offered a 
choice between the two.77 One supposes that this was decided upon because although the 
OSA would not look favourably upon plan A, the UK by pretending to negotiate for it, would 
soften up resistance to plan B, the intended scheme. It was also decided that negotiators 
should attempt to press for an agreement lasting seven years but that one lasting five would be 
adequate. Whatever length was negotiated clearly had to be uniform, because the agreement
71 Bank OV44/164 ‘Note of a Meeting in Mr Figgures Room at the Treasury’, 20/6/68; PRO 
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would appear rather ramshackle if different countries negotiated different durations. Equally, 
it was deemed important that negotiators should avoid giving offence by ‘presenting the 
proposals too much as a “take it or leave it” proposition’.78 It was also felt vital to avoid 
giving the impression to the OSA that the proposals were being imposed upon the sterling 
area because the Basle group required them in return for providing the facility. O f course, the 
reality was that they were. It would have proved impossible to negotiate with the Basle 
countries if the UK had not made some moves towards a guarantee system.
It would not however prove possible to talk to all countries simultaneously, in the way it 
would have been if  a multilateral conference were convened. Still, the group recognised that it 
would be imprudent for the negotiators to simply get the OSA countries to sign the agreement 
in a conveyor belt manner.79 It had been decided that whatever agreement was reached would 
be uniform and this uniformity could not be maintained if countries approached later in the 
negotiations would not accept the terms that had been agreed by other countries in earlier 
negotiations. Consequently, it would be necessary to hold two rounds of talks with each 
country. During the first round, the UK would be able form a general picture o f  the sort of 
agreement that all o f  the countries were prepared to accept and during the second round, that 
agreement would be ratified.80
The Basle Facility is Offered
Of course, all of these discussions and preparations would have been in vain if  the Bank was 
unable to extract the funding from the Basle club in the first place. On 7 July, O ’Brien met 
with the other central bank governors, at the BIS, in an attempt to negotiate the facility. He 
again reiterated the Bank’s revised position regarding guarantees and confirmed that if the 
facility was made available, representatives would be dispatched to the various OSA countries
78 PRO T312/1960 ‘The Basle Scheme and the Sterling Area: General Negotiating Brief .undated.
79 ibid
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in order to obtain their co-operation.81 However Ansiaux, Governor o f the Belgian National 
Bank, again voiced his objections and in particular he argued that he did not think it was wise 
for the central banks to place themselves under such a credit risk. One supposes that he 
doubted Britain’s balance of payments would improve enough to allow her to pay back, to the 
central banks, her drawings under the scheme. In any case, he concluded that the risks would 
be too great unless the OSA central banks placed all o f their future accruals o f NSA currency 
into a BIS account and that they did not make withdrawals from these accounts, except for 
balance of payments purposes. This would ensure that a large part o f the Bank of England’s 
drawing on the facility would be met by the OSA’s NSA holdings.
However, this was not something that O’Brien could agree to. It would be difficult enough to 
get the OSA to forgo their sterling conversion rights, but quite impossible to get them to agree 
to deposit all o f their NSA currency with the BIS. All that O’Brien could do was to pledge 
that he would put the proposal to the OSA in the hope that several o f them would deposit at 
least some of their funds. Ferras however leapt to O’Brien’s defence, as did Stopper, who was 
representing Switzerland.82 They both reminded Ansiaux that it was more important to 
convince the OSA not to diversify any further, than to make it put NSA currencies on deposit 
at the BIS. After all, the aim was to ensure that the present structure o f the OSA reserves was 
maintained and not to alter it further by forcing the sterling area to change who they deposited 
with.
From this point onward the mood o f the meeting changed. Although the French were not 
prepared to participate, all o f the other central bank governors were positive. In some cases 
their governments had not yet authorised participation but the Bank was assured that gaining 
it would be a mere formality. Zijlstra, acting in his role as President o f the BIS, concluded 
that in principle the facility could be raised but that nothing could be finalised until after the 80
80 ibid
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UK had concluded the negotiations with the OSA. At which point, it would be possible to 
judge whether, and to what extent, these visits had been satisfactory. However no agreement 
of undertaking was signed by the Basle governors and the Bank had to be content with spoken 
assurances. To the modem day observer, this does seem like something of a risk. Without a 
signed agreement, it was possible that the Basle club could go back on its word come 
September. However, it is important to remember that within banking circles ‘the spoken 
word retains, or used to retain, a higher status and the written word remained less formal’.83 
This would certainly add credence to the old adage that a banker's word is his bond.
It appeared that the word o f the central bankers was also enough for Jenkins. The following 
day he reported to the House of Commons, on the success o f the negotiations. In particular he 
stressed that the facility ‘offer[ed] the prospect o f greater stability in the functioning o f the 
international monetary system’.84 Although he stated that consultations with the OSA would 
take place, he did not make it public that a guarantee scheme was to be negotiated. It would 
appear though that O ’Brien was not quite so reticent. When he returned to London, on the 
same day, he made clear to financial journalists that it was a guarantee scheme that was to be 
negotiated with the OSA.85
Exchange Control and Operation Brandon
Now that the Basle group had agreed in principle to provide the facility, certain members o f 
the Treasury had concluded that the negotiations with the OSA could effectively be used to 
kill two birds with one stone. Rawlinson in particular was o f this view. He had for some time, 
been alarmed at the amount o f British private portfolio investment that was leaving the *145
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country and moving into the OSA, and in particular to Australia. Some steps had already been 
taken to thwart the outflow, most notably the Voluntary Programme being operated in 
conjunction with the Australian government. Under it, the Australians entered into agreement 
with the UK to voluntarily restrain the amount o f British capital that entered their boarders. 
However, Treasury calculations suggested that the outflow was still exacerbating the balance 
of payments deficit, to the tune o f £50-100m per year.86 Rawlinson had, since at least January, 
considered more radical ways o f tackling the problem. In particular, he had in mind a 
proposal code named Operation Brandon, which had formed an integral part o f the Cranmer 
exercise. The object o f Brandon was to reduce the scheduled territories to the British Isles and 
extend exchange control to the sterling area. This would mean that the regime that was being 
applied to the NSA would be extended to the OSA and it would become impossible for 
British citizens to move their capital offshore. O f course if Brandon were implemented, the 
sterling area would cease to exist.87
In the past, the idea had been rejected because there was the fear that its implementation 
would provoke the diversification o f OSA sterling reserves.88 However, if the guarantee 
system could be put into place, the prospects o f retaliatory diversification would be reduced to 
nil. Rawlinson believed that the OSA negotiations that were to take place to bring about 
agreement on guarantees could also serve as a useful vehicle through which to implement 
Brandon. As it was clear that very few o f the sterling area countries would loose much if 
exchange control was extended.89 Nonetheless, the fact that the Treasury was considering 
Brandon was something that greatly alarmed the Bank. When Morse got wind of what was to 
be considered he quickly informed the governor. Stating that
86 PRO T295/514 Rawlinson to Figgures ‘Brandon and Androcles', 18/6/68.
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‘We have said, and I thought Douglas A llen accepted, that once we have 
struck our bargain on guarantees and undertakings with the sterling area we 
cannot...impose exchange control on them, except possibly as part o f a 
package of total crisis measures’.90
However, Posner, Figgures and Hubback had all independently come to the conclusion that to 
introduce Brandon to the negotiations would complicate and possibly endanger any chance of 
agreement with the OSA.91 Posner thought that it would ‘also look very odd’ if the UK 
approached the OSA soon after the guarantee issue had been settled and told them that the 
Treasury was ‘considering the virtual abolition o f  the OSA’.92 93Figgures was rather more 
optimistic on this score. He accepted that ‘a decent interval should elapse but need it be more 
than a few months?’91 Therefore whilst the majority o f Treasury officials rejected 
Rawlinson’s suggestion that Brandon should be added to the Basle agenda, there was still the 
possibility that it could be put into operation quite soon after the guarantee scheme had been 
enacted.
If the UK were to have any chance of implementing Brandon in the aftermath o f Basle, it was 
clearly essential for the British negotiators to avoid discussing exchange control with the OSA 
during the talks.94 If however, the OSA broached the issue the UK would be put into 
something of a quandary. If the negotiators denied the possibility and Brandon was later 
implemented the whole thing would ‘smack o f blatant deceit’ and the OSA might renege on 
the Basle Agreement.95 Yet, if negotiators confirmed that the British authorities had not ruled
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out the possibility, it would be possible that certain countries, including Australia, would 
refuse to sign altogether. The rather optimistic hope amongst Treasury officials was that the 
OSA would not raise the issue during the negotiations. This would give the British authorities 
the freedom of movement to impose Brandon in the aftermath.96 Jenkins himself thought that 
it w ould be ‘wrong and dangerously imprudent to tie our hands here and now by ruling out 
the possibility of Exchange Control, and saying in the negotiations that we have done so’.97 
He too  recognised that whilst it would be desirable to make the ending o f the sterling area a 
part o f  the Basle negotiations it was not a practical course. His considered view was that the 
aim o f  negotiators should be to keep the government uncommitted about the future possible 
imposition of exchange control, even if price of this was a less satisfactory agreement with 
the OSA.
If th is stance was not possible and agreement seemed unlikely with certain countries unless 
the U K  committed itself to maintaining the sterling area, then Jenkins suggested a fall back 
position. This would involve the insertion o f a review clause into the agreement, which would 
be activated if Britain implemented Brandon.98 It would give OSA countries the right to 
reconsider their participation in the scheme, and in all probability, the UK would have to 
reduce the minimum sterling proportions in order to keep Basle alive. However, if countries 
like Australia were still prepared to renege on Basle then it would have to be Brandon that 
was abandoned. As Ryrie pointed out ‘the success o f Basle is essential and the extension of 
exchange control is merely highly desirable’.99
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OSA Negotiations
By 25 July, negotiations were well underway with 17 of the 41 countries concerned.100 By 
which point only the Bahamas had declared its willingness to be a signatory. Fiji had accepted 
the undertaking to remain in sterling but would not sign the agreed minute, because it did not 
want the guarantee on the terms offered. The discussions with the rest o f  the 17 produced no 
concrete results and the negotiating teams had moved on to their next ports o f call. However, 
it was apparent that none of the countries approached had declared themselves as opposed to 
the general line o f the British proposals. The Bank was optimistic that each of them would 
eventually sign the agreement and their delay was thought simply to be a means for them to 
strike the best possible bargain.101 After all, it would have been foolish for them simply to 
sign up until they knew more about what the UK would agree with other countries.102
However, the requirement that 20% of reserves should be held in non-guaranteed sterling had 
given quite a lot o f difficulty in a number of countries. Although there was no doubt that a 
concession on this point would help towards agreement and that it would not prove costly, 
provided sterling was not devalued.103 On this issue o f the OSA depositing some of its NSA 
funds at the BIS, little concrete progress was made. However, a number o f  OSA countries did 
indicate a willingness to investigate the possibility.
Yet, the one issue on which there was general criticism from the OSA was that o f the charge. 
In a small number of countries, this took the form o f opposition to any form of charge but in 
the majority o f cases, the objections were simply to the level o f the charge. Those in London 
co-ordinating the exercise came to the conclusion that if  the principal reservation to the
“  PRO T312/1963 ‘Sterling Area Negotiations: Report on Progress’, 25/7/68.
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scheme were the charge, then it would have to be lowered or possibility removed.104 For 
Ryrie, the choice was between making the concessions before the first round of discussions 
had been completed, verses waiting until the second round had begun before yielding.105 If the 
concession were granted immediately, there was the chance that potentially difficult 
countries, like Australia, would sign up during the first round. However, it was possible that if 
the concession was made too soon, Britain’s bargaining position would weaken. After all, it 
was possible that even if the idea of the charge was dropped altogether, the OSA would use 
the second round as a vehicle to push for concessions on more important issues, namely the 
MSP.106
Indeed, some countries, most notably New Zealand, had already pressed for a lower MSP 
than the one being prescribed by London. Although, this was not a concession that London 
could tolerate. For if all o f  the OSA was to press on this issue, much of the Basle facility 
would be wiped out in the financing o f it. Many of the countries were also pushing for more 
frequent reviews of the agreement but again this was something that London was not 
predisposed to. The hope, o f  course, was that the scheme could be negotiated for seven years 
and not a day less.
However Kenya, New Zealand, and Ireland had all, as part o f the negotiations, asked for 
assurances that the UK would not impose exchange control at a later date.107 It would seem 
then, that the Treasury’s optimism during the Brandon discussions had been greatly 
misplaced. The hope had been that the OSA would not broach the issue, thereby leaving the 
British authorities with a free hand to extend exchange control in the aftermath o f the 
negotiations. The only possible line that could be taken was that ‘this question had nothing to
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do with the negotiations'.108 However if countries like Kenya and New Zealand, which had 
little to loose from the imposition of Brandon, were asking for assurances, it was very likely 
that Australia which had a great deal to loose, would also broach the issue. In her case, she 
was very unlikely to accept the line that exchange control had nothing to do with the present 
negotiations and it was possible that she would not sign without some very firm undertakings 
on the part o f the UK.
Australia
Australia’s disposition against exchange control was made overt when William McMahon, 
the Australian Chancellor, wrote to Jenkins in July. He stated that
‘it would be wholly unfortunate if your government were to take further action 
to restrict the outflow of capital to Australia...I fear too that it would add 
strength to the considerable body of opinion in this country which favours an 
early and substantial shift o f our overseas reserves out o f sterling’.109
In short, the message was that any move by Britain, towards Brandon, would be accompanied 
by rapid retaliatory diversification on the part o f Australia. It would seem then, that the 
British negotiating team in Australia would have their work cut out for them. Furthermore, it 
was recognised that the successful conclusion of discussions with the Australians was critical. 
Many OSA countries regarded the Australians as the ‘leaders’ o f  the sterling 
area.ll0Consequently, several of the smaller countries were waiting to see what the Australian 
reaction would be before they signed up themselves. Without the backing o f the Australians, 
it was clear that the scheme would never get off the ground.
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The negotiating team arrived in Canberra in late July. Because o f the importance o f the 
negotiations, Sir Frank Figgures, the Head of Home and General Finance, represented the 
Treasury. Francis Cumming-Bruce accompanied him from the Foreign Office and Dudley 
Allen from the B ank."1 Allen himself admits that he and Figgures were little more than 
amateurs, that they had no real training and that it was ‘ludicrous to call what went on, 
negotiations’." 2 In any case, the first full day o f talks began on 29 July and it became 
immediately apparent that the Australians were dragging their heels."3 They argued that their 
pattern of payments and the decentralisation o f decisions meant that they did not know what 
percentage o f sterling they held at any one time. Therefore, in order to be sure that they were 
not breaching their MSP it would have to be set at a very low level. In fact, the Australians 
wanted their MSP to be at least 5% lower than what was being suggested by the British."4 
This would mean a move from 52% of reserves held in sterling to a maximum of 47%.115 The 
discussion highlighted the fact that Phillips, the governor o f  the Reserve Bank o f Australia, 
and Wright, one of its most powerful economists, very much disliked the idea of being locked 
into sterling and loosing the freedom to arrange their reserve assets."6
The preliminary negotiations continued into 30 July and whilst the Reserve Bank o f Australia 
did most o f the negotiating, the Australian Treasury struck out a clear line on several issues. 
Firstly, Sir Richard Randall, its Permanent Secretary, made it clear that an agreement o f  seven 
years was far too long. This was because much could change in that time. The fact that Britain 
was greatly reducing its overseas defence commitments meant that Australia would have to 
greatly increase its own military budget and some of the costs o f this would have to be met *1
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from the reserves.117 The Australian Treasury also objected to the charge and argued that it 
was actually more reasonable for Australia to charge Britain than vice versa! As the Reserve 
Bank’s sterling holdings would, to all intensive purposes be made inconvertible, it was felt 
only right and proper that Britain provided a compensatory package. Of course, to the British, 
that compensation was being provided in the form of a dollar value guarantee.
After the meeting was concluded, Figgures spoke privately with Randall. The latter confirmed 
that in Banking circles there was ‘a large and powerful group urging for a massive 
diversification into gold’." 8 Furthermore, the Reserve Bank’s policy was to reduce their 
sterling proportion to 35% o f their total reserves.119 The present governor, Philips, had only 
taken office recently and was not in a position to challenge this policy even if he wished to. 
The Australian’s were also anxious not to be ‘done’ by Britain.120 However, the success of the 
negotiations would depend very much on the response o f Gorton, their Prime Minister. Yet 
Gorton was impulsive and unpredictable, he ‘was not particularly interested in sterling and 
didn’t understand it’.121 This would make the negotiations with the political class tricky. 
However, Randall was conscious o f the fact that the rejection of the scheme by Australia, one 
of the largest sterling holders, would make the whole thing unworkable. He was therefore tom 
between promoting Australia’s national interests and carving out a compromise that would 
free his country from the odium o f being seen as the wreckers o f Basle.122
Back in London, Goldman had been kept apprised of the situation. Both he and his sterling 
negotiations group recognised that concessions would have to be made in order to bring about 
Australian agreement to the plan.123 One possibility was to remove the charge for the scheme
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altogether. The Bank was however not happy for this to occur and could only be pushed to 
accept a reduction in it. The group was also loath to allow the Australians to reduce their MSP 
by 5%. Although the Basle facility could easily fund such a movement, the group argued that 
the scheme was devised on the basis that no OSA country would hold less than 50% of their 
reserves in sterling.124 As I have already established, a 5% reduction in MSP would have 
taken the Australians below this threshold. Goldman argued that because the Australian’s 
desire for such a reduction stemmed from their fear that they might accidentally breach a 
higher MSP, the solution was for the negotiators to continue to press for 50%, on the 
understanding that if their reserves accidentally fell below this figure, the UK would not 
regard this as an infringement on the agreement.125 On the issue of the scheme’s duration, the 
group was still adamant that no ground could be yielded. The seven-year life cycle had not 
proved problematic to other countries. It was therefore suggested that the negotiators should 
press the Australians to agree to the full length, but on the understanding that they would have 
the right to a review after three and a half years.
These concessions did have some effect on the Australian position, but not the desired one. 
Instead o f calling for a 5% reduction in MSP, they were now demanding one of 17%, which 
would bring their total sterling holdings down to 35% o f  their reserves.126 Furthermore, it was 
proving to be impossible to negotiate any further with the Reserve Bank, because Philips had 
left Australia on business and would not return until 26 August.127 This was problematic for 
Britain. Although a large number o f  OSA countries had agreed to the guarantee scheme in 
principle, they were refusing to sign until Australia had been brought on board. Although 
discussions with the Reserve Bank had halted, the negotiators continued to court the 
Australian Treasury. Randall did not, however, help any to dispel the deadlock. He stated that
124 Harold Lever, the Financial Secretary, was however more prepared to contemplate a much lower 
MSP in the case of Australia, if it would help to bring about a long-term agreement. See PRO
T312/1963 Lever to Jenkins, 5/8/68.
125 PRO T312/1963 ‘Sterling Negotiations Group', 1/8/68.
126 PRO T3I2/1926 ‘Telegram No. 1000’, 1/8/68.
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the only conditions under which Australia would accept a 50% MSP was if the agreement 
lasted one year or until the end o f 1969 at the latest. At which point the Australians would be 
able to reappraise the situation and perhaps extend the scheme until 1971, if their MSP could 
again be lowered.128 This o f course was not in the spirit o f the proposal that had been worked 
out in Basle, and it was extremely unlikely that the Basle club would extend the facility on 
such term s.129 Even if they did, the scheme would no longer be one that would stabilise the 
sterling balances in the medium term, but one that would bring about a disorderly retreat. For 
it was clear that the facility being offered by the Basle bankers was to be the last o f its kind. If 
in 1969, the UK had not made a monumental recovery in her balance o f payments, she would 
have no means with which to fund the further reductions in MSP that the Australians were 
calling for. As well as this, because o f the need for a uniform agreement, a one-year scheme 
would also have to be negotiated with the rest o f the OSA and come 1969 further reductions 
in their MSP’s would have to be financed.
The negotiators in Australia were therefore in quite some difficulty. This was exacerbated by 
the fact the Australian ministers and officials were ‘allegedly’130 pre-occupied with 
preparations for their budget and were therefore unable to devote their full attention to the 
negotiations. It also seemed that they did not understand the significance o f the proposal. The 
only solution that the negotiators could devise was for a British Minister to visit Canberra, in 
the hope that it would bring about a more satisfactory outcome.131 However, it was recognised 
that a visit by a junior minister would, in all probability, not have the desired effect. But that 
the presence of the Chancellor ‘would surely be welcomed and would probably be 
successful’.132
128 PRO T312/1926 Johnston to Commonwealth Office ‘Telegram no. 1031 ’, 6/8/68.
129 PRO T312/1963 Goldman ‘Governor’s Conversation with Mr. Philips', 9/8/68.
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On 7 August, Jenkins himself considered the issue.133 Whilst he recognised that ‘the 
Australians were the key to the success o f the sterling area negotiations’ and that it was 
crucial to reach agreement with them in time to have the negotiations completed before the 
September Basle meeting, he was not convinced that a visit by him, to Australia, would be 
wise.134 This was because it would be difficult for him to make the trip without attracting 
publicity and it would be likely that the world media would guess, correctly, that the 
negotiations were not going to plan. This could only serve to further reduce confidence in 
sterling. Furthermore, he doubted that the Australians would co-operate with a Chancellor 
that had masterminded the withdrawal o f British forces from the region.135 The solution was 
for someone else to go. The prime candidate was the governor of the Bank of England, Leslie 
O’Brien: because he was not politically connected with the British government. However, if it 
proved necessary to dispatch him, it would be essential that he attracted as little attention as 
possible.
O’Brien agreed with the strategy but believed that it might be possible for him to intervene in 
a manner that would have no chance o f attracting media attention and on 9 August he 
attempted a bout o f telephonic negotiation with governor Philips. However Philips’
‘reaction to all this was apparently not very favourable...he stuck obstinately 
to the early Australian view of the undesirability o f strict formal agreements 
and of their tying themselves up for as long a period as we would wish...the 
governor therefore was not to please with the outcome of his talk’.136
In the meantime, the Chancellor authorised the negotiators to make further concessions to the 
Australians. They were to offer to abandon the charge altogether, to be prepared to guarantee
153 PRO T312/1926 ‘Note of a Meeting Held In the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room’, 7/8/68.
134 ibid
133 PRO T312/1927 ‘Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room', 29/8/68.
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100% o f sterling holdings rather than 80% and to push for an agreement o f five years 
duration, with the right to terminate in 1971.137 In exchange for these concessions, it was 
hoped that the Australians would agree to an MSP o f  50%. However, negotiations did not 
progress any further. The final decision lay with Prime Minister Gorton, who had become ill 
with flu and he was unlikely to be well enough to consider the proposal before 19 August.'38
Basle Contingency Planning
The lack of success concerning Australia led to heightened tension in London and officials 
began to doubt whether it would be possible to conclude the scheme. Therefore, both the 
Treasury and the Bank began to independently develop contingency plans. Ryrie, in the 
Treasury, recognised that if agreement had not been reached with Australia in time for the 
Basle meeting on 7 September, there was the potential that it could ‘deal a heavy blow to 
confidence.’139 However, because the press had not been told that the final agreement was 
expected at the September meeting, Ryrie thought that it would be possible to salvage the 
situation. O f course, some sort o f public statement would have to be made but it might prove 
to be enough simply to report that the OSA negotiations were progressing smoothly and that 
the precise date o f commencement would be fixed as soon as the negotiations had been 
completed.140 The Bank however recognised that if  such a line were taken, the press would 
probably push the British authorities into providing a firm date at which they expected the 
agreement to be in force.141 If no such date were offered, confidence would suffer because the 
press would presume the negotiations were going badly and report this. Yet, in offering a
137 PRO T312/1926 ‘Note of a Meeting Held in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room’, 7/8/68.
I3'  PRO T312/1927 ‘Note for the Record: Sterling Negotiations’, 15/8/68.
139 PRO T312/1964 Ryrie to Hubback ‘Sterling Negotiations’, 16/8/68.
140 ibid. Although by 29 August many of the British newspapers had been prematurely informed by 
Schiller, the German Finance Minister, that the agreement was to be ratified at the September BIS 
meeting and that the UK was having difficulty in reaching agreement with some of the OSA countries. 
See ‘Insurance Scheme for Sterling Still Unresolved', Telegraph. 28/8/68.
141 Bank OV44/170 ‘Sterling Negotiations: Contingency Planning', 23/8/68.
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date, it was possible that Britain would make herself a hostage to fortune, if agreement had 
not been reached by it.
The main worry in the Bank was not that agreement would not be reached by September but 
that no agreement would be reached at all.142 It was essential to get the OSA to agree to at 
least a three-year deal in order to be able to obtain the facility from the BIS, and this was 
proving to be a sticky issue with Australia. If no accord was reached with her before the 
September meeting Britain’s bargaining position would be greatly reduced. The Australians 
would become aware that the success o f the whole scheme depended on their assent and they 
would likely negotiate for a ridiculously low MSP. Kit McMahon in particular was greatly 
worried about the consequences o f  failure. He believed that if the negotiations collapsed 
completely there would be such a blow to confidence that the pound would probably be 
forced to float.143
However as Anthony Glover, secretary to the sterling negotiations group pointed out ‘it 
would never have been the case that the agreement fell through. Instead, it would have been a 
matter o f offering yet more concessions until the stragglers were brought back on board '.144 In 
short, Britain would have to have accepted Australia’s MSP demands and pushed the 
agreement through in October rather than September. O f course, the danger remained that by 
agreeing to such a low MSP, so much of the Basle facility would be used up in the financing 
of it, that it would be impossible for the UK to make the scheme last the full five years. 
However Roy Fenton, in the Bank, made it clear that ‘it is extremely unlikely that, even if the 
negotiations end as badly as can be imagined [and very low MSP’s have to be agreed to], 
there would be a call for more than $2,000 million’.145 Furthermore, it would not actually 
have been that problematic if the UK had to use up the full facility in order to bring about the
142 Bank OV44/170 ‘Sterling Negotiations: Contingency Planning’, 27/8/68.
143 Interview with Sir Kit McMahon
144 Interview with Anthony Glover.
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agreement. The guarantee itself did not require a dollar backing. If there was a further 
devaluation o f sterling, it would simply have been a matter o f writing up the sterling balances 
and there would be no requirement to use foreign exchange.
Australian Negotiations Continue
By 26 August, both Jenkins and Wilson had become personally involved in the negotiations. 
Wilson had written to Prime Minister Gorton and Jenkins had spoken with his opposite 
number, Treasurer William McMahon, over the telephone.146 These interventions seemed to 
have the desired effect and the Australians promised a decision, one way or another, by 4 
September.147 William McMahon gave the Chancellor the impression ‘that the Australian 
reply, when it came, would not be unfavourable’.148 It emerged that the whole issue was to be 
discussed by Gorton and McMahon on 28 August and the hope was that if  agreement could 
be reached quickly, it would no longer be necessary to send O’Brien over to Canberra, and 
that the possibility o f adverse publicity would be negated.
After the Australian Ministerial meeting took place, the British negotiators were able to glean 
the details o f it from various sources and pass them onto London. It emerged that the 
Australians were calling for an MSP o f  40% but that in practise they proposed to hold 45% of 
their reserves in sterling.149 150This in itself was not problematic and could easily be financed by 
the Basle facility. However the Australians still objected to being locked into sterling for such 
a long period and it emerged that they would only sign the agreement if they had the 
unilateral right to terminate, with three months notice, at any point during the five-year 
duration.190 Officials in London were greatly disappointed by this tum of events. For in many
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147 Bank OV44/170 ‘Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room’, 26/8/68.
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ways ‘the Australian attitude was now more negative than it had been before the discussion 
was raised to Ministerial and Prime Ministerial level.’151 It seemed that O ’Brien would, after 
all, have to travel to Canberra.
Whilst Wilson recognised that the visit was necessary, he was worried about the adverse 
publicity that it would draw.152 Prof. Schiller, the German Finance Minister, had already 
leaked to the press that the negotiations were not progressing smoothly and the press was now 
well aware that the discussions were supposed to be wrapped up in time for the September 
Basle meeting.153 O’Brien’s visit, if detected, would only add further fuel to the fire. Wilson 
decreed that the official line, upon press reports of the governor’s visit, would be that ‘the 
general position was alright but that there were one or two points which we and the 
Australians wanted to discuss’.154 However, O’Brien’s trip went completely unnoticed and 
later the story emerged that he travelled in disguise.155
O’Brien’s discussion with the Australians took place between 31 August and 1 September. 
During the talks, he stressed how important the negotiations were, because this was 
something that the Australians did not seem to realise. He also made it clear that Australia 
would be blamed if it became known that it had stood in the way o f an agreement.156 His main 
objective was to obtain an agreement not lasting less than three years and he was authorised 
by Jenkins to lower the prescribed MSP for Australia to 33.5% as opposed to the previous 
50%.157 He was also authorised to forgo the charge for the scheme and to extend the guarantee 
to not 80% but 100% o f the sterling balances. However, he was not allowed to forfeit to
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Australia the right to terminate the agreement if the UK decided, at a later date, to impose 
Brandon. Instead, all he was prepared to concede was that the Australians would have the 
right to review the agreement, if exchange control was extended.158 This would, with further 
negotiation, leave the way open to implement Brandon if the drain on the reserves continued.
The visit was relatively successful and although the British authorities had prepared a 
contingency plan, in the form o f  getting the US to put pressure on the Australians, it turned 
out to be unnecessary.159 The decisive factor proved not to be O’Brien’s negotiating skills, but 
the fact that he had asked Rupert Raw to accompany him. For Raw and Gorton had been 
friends at university and had rowed in the same boat at Oxford. It seemed that the presence of 
an old comrade at the negotiating table was enough to make the unpredictable Gorton 
reconsider.160 In exchange for a 40% MSP, Gorton undertook to enter into agreement for a 
period of three years, with possible extension to five.161 Whilst there would be no charge for 
the facility, O’Brien did not have to undertake to extend the guarantee cover to 100% of 
sterling holdings as the Australians were happy with protection for 90% of their balances. 
However, both Gorton and Treasurer McMahon made it clear that they wished the right to 
terminate the agreement, if the UK extended exchange control. This was something that had 
to be conceded by the British; it did however make the possibility o f Brandon more remote. 
O f course, as Ryrie had already pointed out, the successful conclusion o f Basle, which would 
in effect make over £2,000m o f the sterling balances inconvertible, was far more important 
than paving the way for Brandon.162 The latter would only aid the balance of payments by 
£50-100 million per year. In any case, now that the negotiations had been successfully
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completed, Figgures and Allen, who had in effect been ‘held hostage’143 in Australia 
throughout the whole of August, could return to London.
With Australia as a signatory and the charge for the guarantee dropped, the vast majority o f 
sterling area countries that had not already signed did so.163 64 Although agreement had not yet 
been reached with all countries, the Governor was confident that with the majority now on 
board, the BIS ‘would find it difficult to withhold the facility’.165 His optimism proved well 
founded, because the Basle club declared themselves as satisfied and the facility was 
extended on 9 September.166
Conclusion
It is clear that the successful conclusion o f the 1968 Basle agreement represented the Bank’s 
finest hour. This is all the more apparent, when one considers the sheer size and scope o f the 
negotiations. It was necessary for the Bank to court twelve central banks in order to gain the 
facility in the first place, and then it negotiated the guarantee scheme, with the help o f the 
Treasury, in forty-one sterling area countries.167 In short, the Bank was able to develop a 
trans-national policy network in order to bring about its objectives. Furthermore, the 
implementation o f the guarantee system amounted to second order change. This is because a 
new instrument was crafted in order to protect and stabilise sterling within the fixed rate 
Bretton Woods system.
However, Roy Jenkins, in his memoirs, argues that the Basle agreement ‘provided a $2 billion 
credit under cover of which we could set in train the overdue dissolution of the sterling
163 Interview with Lord Croham
164 PRO T312/1965 Symons to Goldman ‘Group Meeting’, 3/9/68; ibid, ‘Sterling Area Negotiations: 
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area'.167 68 Yet, the suggestion that Basle in any way represented the wind up of the sterling area 
or the reserve currency role is patently absurd. The facility was not intended to fund the run 
down of the balances and in truth, the extension o f  guarantees to the OSA served to stabilise 
the reserve role o f  the currency. In fact, after Basle had been concluded the volume o f the 
sterling balances was to increase rather than retract.169 Therefore the operation did not 
represent the swansong of the area, but instead injected into it a new lease of life.
Equally absurd is the suggestion by Shonfield that Basle was adopted as an easy option.170 His 
argument is that the British authorities were not prepared to bring about the managed decline 
of sterling area or the reserve currency role and therefore they opted for Basle. The truth of 
the matter is that both the Bank and the Treasury were more than prepared to oversee the 
dismantling o f sterling as an international currency, and to beat the retreat into a financial 
little England. The early Bank papers, drafted by McMahon and Raw, envisaged that the 
Basle facility would be used for just this purpose. It was only when it became apparent that 
any facility provided, could neither be of long enough duration nor large enough size, to fund 
the windup o f sterling's reserve role that the Bank opted for the guarantee scheme. Even after 
this change of attitude had been brought about, a significant body o f opinion within the 
Treasury had come to the conclusion that if the reserve role could not be removed, then at the 
very least it might be possible to use Basle as a vehicle to extend exchange control to the 
sterling area, thereby dismantling the distinction between the NSA and the OSA. However, as 
has already been demonstrated, this proved incompatible with the objective of securing the 
Basle agreement. The irony is that official opinion in Whitehall had come to favour the 
bringing about o f ‘an orderly retreat o f the international currency role’.171 Nevertheless,
167 Interview with Sir Jeremy Morse.
168 Jenkins, R. A Life at the Centre. p.25J-6.
169 See Chapter 1.
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Chapter 7- Hecuba and Priam
The successful completion o f the Basle agreement marked an important watershed both in 
terms of the operation of the sterling area and the way that contingency planning was 
conducted. Many o f the ramifications o f the agreement in relation to the sterling area were 
discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I shall focus on its implications for 
policymakers working in the sterling contingency planning network. The principal argument 
is that the implementation o f the Basle agreement by the crisis avoidance network 
significantly altered the context in which the contingency planning network operated. The 
guarantee scheme actually met many o f the Cranmer objectives. Consequently, contingency 
planners were to consider courses o f action, to be implemented under conditions o f crisis, that 
had hitherto been thought taboo. Courses that amounted to third order change.
By the summer o f 1968, those that were involved in the development o f the Cranmer scheme 
had come to the conclusion that for various reasons the plan, which blocked the sterling 
balances by force, would have been unworkable.' However, before the successful conclusion 
of the Basle agreement in September 1968, there was a distinct lack o f viable alternatives. It 
was rather fortuitous then, that the Bank was able to get the sterling area en masse to agree to 
the implementation o f  the guarantee. For the guarantee was blocking by other means. This 
was because in return for its extension, the balance holders had to undertake not to diversify 
their funds any further.2 In effect, they had chosen to block their balances voluntarily, in 
exchange for compensation should the rate again plunge. As an official from the Bank put it, 
we ‘would be right in saying that under the proposed [Basle] agreements the countries 
concerned would be voluntarily forgoing conversion’.3 O f course, Basle did not represent the 
implementation o f the full Cranmer scheme. Firstly, the settlement was not reached by force.
1 PRO T295/604 Rawlinson to Hawtin, ‘The Horror of Brutus', 11/6/68
2 Government Command Paper: ‘H.M. Treasury: The Basle Facility and the Sterling Area’, (Cmnd. 
3787, October 1968), p.6.
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Secondly, in reality many o f the official sterling holders kept sterling in excess o f their 
prescribed minimum sterling portions and would have been free to reduce their holdings until 
they reached their MSP. Finally, holders were also able to draw on their balances to meet 
trade deficits, providing that they drew in equal measure on their NSA holdings. This means 
that the operation was an attempt, via partial blocking, to stabilise the balances of the sterling 
area and to reduce the likelihood that the balance overhang could undermine the strength of 
the currency.
Whilst the private OSA balances and all o f  the NSA balances were exempt from the guarantee 
the former proved to be resilient to tremors in confidence, having remained remarkably stable 
even after the devaluation.4 Although these balances amounted to some £ 1,300m, throughout 
much of the OSA, local exchange controls prevented the possibility of significant switching 
out o f sterling.5 Only in Kuwait and other Middle East states were the private balances 
thought vulnerable. However, if a crisis emerged, the Bank felt that there was only scope for a 
loss of £ 100m from this source.6 The NSA balances were valued at £803m in September 1968 
and were more problematic because they had stood at £ 1220m during the summer.7 They 
were extremely volatile and much more o f a cause for concern. Even so, it is important to 
remember that Britain’s holdings in NSA securities far outstripped the value o f the NSA 
liabilities and that even if there was further diversification from this source it was unlikely to 
be more than £200m.8 Furthermore in a time of crisis, where NSA diversification was the 
source or a contributing factor, it might have been possible either to extend the guarantee to 
its holdings or, if this was not successful, to block only its balances.9 Therefore, if another 
sterling debacle did materialise, it would have been likely that somewhere in the region of
3 Bank OV44/168, ‘Sterling Balances', Fenton to Hubback*, 24 July 1968.
4 PRO T321/2J44 H. Copeman to Hawtin, ‘Holdings of NSA Sterling’, 13/1/69.
3 PROT312/2I32 ‘Contingency Planning: Priam’, 11/10/68
6 ibid
7 PRO T321/2544 H. Copeman to Hawtin, ‘Holdings of NSA Sterling’, 13/1/69 
'ibid
9 Of course, both types of action were inherently risky. To extend the guarantee might well have 
diminished its credibility, whilst blocking the NSA balances would probably have unnerved the OSA
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£300m would be wiped from the reserves. If the balance o f  payments had recovered this 
figure could have been manageable, if it had not it would have been crippling.
Under crisis conditions, the strengthening o f the exchange control regime by reducing the 
scheduled territories would have been the only mechanism apart from the blocking of the 
NSA balances that would have been required to bring about full Cranmer. Nevertheless, to do 
the former would have incurred the wrath o f the Australians, probably culminating in them 
reneging on Basle, something that has already been made clear in the previous chapter.10 
Therefore, Cranmer was no longer relevant. Its implementation by force would only serve to 
bring about the undoing of an agreement that had been so tricky to get off the ground in the 
first place and one that met the central Cranmer objective.
If a crisis still erupted under the Basle regime of partial voluntary-Cranmer the only viable 
alternative would have been to float. This was because any exchange crisis that did occur 
would have done so under conditions similar to blocking in any case. As far back as March 
1968, officials had recognised that if blocking had failed to hold the rate, then floating would 
Vbe inevitable." If  however, once floating had been embarked upon, Basle did not succeed in 
stopping the rate from falling too far, its usefulness would be diminished and it would have 
been likely that it would have been replaced with the full Cranmer system. As Posner reported 
to Douglas Allen:
‘If we are ever forced to choose between Cranmer and Hecuba
[floating], I am tempted (post-Basle) to choose Hecuba: but 1 fear that
as it would have feared that it would only have been a matter of time before blocking was also 
extended to its balances.
10 PRO T312/21/31 Rawlinson to Allen, ‘Hecuba/Priam’, 12/11/68.
11 PRO T312/2549 ‘Contingency Planning’, 15/3/68.
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the risks o f  being forced to move from Hecuba to Cranmer are 
great’.12 13
Hecuba
It was because of this altered context that from September 1968, contingency planning 
centred on the techniques for floating sterling under the codename Hecuba. This was not the 
first time that the Treasury team had devoted their attention to planning for the possibility o f a 
float. William Ryrie and Kit McMahon had looked into it as early as a month after the 
devaluation11 and the codename Hecuba had itself been applied to floating discussions from 
as early as mid-July 1968.14 However, it was not until the conclusion of the Basle agreement 
that the Treasury team gave the issue their undivided attention and began to plan for it 
seriously.
The administrative organisation of the planning process was very similar to that o f Cranmer. 
Yet again Sir Douglas Allen chaired the group whilst Rawlinson, and to a lesser extent 
Posner, dealt with the plan’s operational development. William Ryrie, an Assistant Secretary 
in General Finance, also participated as did Sir Frank Figgures who had taken over from 
Goldman as the head o f the Finance: Home and General group. Although Goldman had been 
promoted to the rank o f second secretary and was responsible for the entire overseas section 
of the Treasury, he too took a close interest. The Bank was also heavily involved in the 
deliberations and was represented by its deputy governor, Maurice Parsons, along with 
Jeremy Morse and Kit McMahon.15 The group involved in this planning exercise was much
12 PRO T312/2131 Posner to Allen ‘Contingencies’, 11/9/68.
13 PRO 12/2549 McMahon and Ryrie, ‘The question of planning for floating’. 20/12/67.
1*TsR O T312/2130 Hoskin, ‘The Hecuba Group’, 22/7/68.
15 Nicky Kaldorhad expressed an interest in joining the group but Sir Douglas Allen refused him 
access (PRO T312/2131 Rawlinson to Allen, 24/9/68) because he found that Treasury irregulars did not 
work well together and Posner had already been assigned (Interview with Lord Croham). See also 
PRO T312/2131 ‘Hecuba/Priam Group: Note of a meeting’, 6/11/68 for a full list of those involved in 
Hecuba planning.
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smaller than that for Cranmer. No longer were officials from the Board o f Trade and Customs 
consulted. The group was made up almost entirely of Treasury and Bank representatives.
The fact that the Treasury only compiled nine files on Hecuba when they produced twenty- 
four on Cranmer is not a sign that they took the operation any less seriously. Instead, it is an 
indication that planning for a float was a much less complicated business when compared 
with the blocking exercise.16 Its simplicity also explains the reduced number o f  officials 
involved and the lack o f inter-departmental co-ordination. The actual process of 
implementing a floating rate was and is very straightforward. All that was required was for 
the Treasury to signal the Bank that it should no longer use the foreign exchange held in the 
EEA to protect the rate.17 Therefore planning did not centre on the technicalities o f  pulling the 
operation off but instead on tactics and accompanying measures. Thus, Hecuba is in many 
ways less interesting than Cranmer from a planning point o f view. Its development was 
straightforward. Officials did not have to devise and apply innovative techniques to bring 
about a workable scheme and learning on the part o f officials was made conspicuous by its 
absence. There was no attempt on the part o f the Bank to scupper the exercise, because they 
regarded it as a lesser evil and it was their preferred course o f action in an emergency.18 
Therefore, both the Treasury and the Bank were able to work together harmoniously.
There is perhaps only one sense in which Hecuba was more interesting than the blocking 
exercise. For unlike Cranmer it was not simply left to gather dust. As Rosalind Gilmore, the 
Principal who acted as secretary to the Hecuba group from November 1968 points out, ‘I 
recall something o f Hecuba since it was a plan which ultimately was used’.19 Hecuba was 
dusted off and drawn on as the basis o f  the float during the subsequent Heath administration.
16 PRO T312/2544 ‘Contingency Planning: Hecuba', undated.
11 ibid
18 PRO T312/2130 Goldman to Principal Private Secretary, 1/5/68.
19 Correspondence with Rosalind Gilmore, 3/2/03.
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Therefore whilst it was a less interesting exercise it was one that was actually implemented 
and one that amounted to third order change.
Hecuba itself was not designed for a  deliberate move to a floating rate as a policy objective in 
its own right.20 Like Cranmer but unlike Basle, it was very much a contingency operation. It 
was designed to be implemented in an emergency in which floating was forced upon the UK 
/because of a lack of foreign exchange to protect the fixed rate. The scheme, whilst in many 
ways related to Cranmer, was seen as distinct from it. This was because the implementation of 
Hecuba would not have automatically entailed a move to full blocking, especially now that 
Basle had been concluded.21 However, it was recognised that under Hecuba it might become 
necessary to block as well and thereby introduce the whole Cranmer regime.
The Treasury anticipated that three types of event could trigger a move to floating rates 
between October 1968 and the spring budget o f 1969. The first was the balance o f payments 
weakness.22 The expected turnaround in exports had not materialised and the Treasury could 
not predict when and if this would occur. In the meantime, the continuing trade deficit would 
drain both the reserves and confidence in the currency, perhaps culminating in an 
insurmountable speculative attack. The second was the possibility that British unions would 
engage in serious strike action, undermining both confidence in the economy and the physical 
capacity to export. In short, the very thing that had caused the 1967 devaluation.2'1 Third, it 
was possible that the side winds o f another currency crisis, that had little to do with the 
relative position o f sterling, could affect the currency.24 Ostensibly, this had been the cause of 
the March crisis.25 It had been the belief amongst speculators that there was to be a 
revaluation of gold, which had triggered it. In the autumn, it was possible that more o f that
20 PRO T312/2544 ‘Contingency Planning: Hecuba', undated.
21 PRO T312/2544 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate’,
13/12/68.
22 PRO T312/2544 ‘Contingency Planning: Hecuba’, undated.
25 ibid
24 ibid
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sort o f pressure could resurface. In particular it was widely held that the German mark was 
undervalued and the French franc overvalued. If it was believed that Germans would revalue, 
sterling holders might well switch into marks in order to make a speculative gain. Conversely, 
if the franc was devalued speculators might conclude that the pound would follow suit 
thereby triggering a dash out o f sterling.26 However, this third type of pressure was to be 
planned for separately by the Treasury under the codename Priam. Its development will be 
discussed in some detail in the latter half o f  this chapter.
Under the circumstances outlined, sterling would have been forced onto a floating rate 
because of the lack o f  resources to defend the existing rate or even a new devalued one. 
However floating under these conditions would have been unfavourable because without any 
resources it would have been impossible to  manage the rate or slow its demise.27 Therefore, if 
such a crisis materialised, the first question was whether it would be possible for the British 
authorities to add to the already enormous short-term debts by engaging in further borrowing. 
The central issue was whether funding would be made available on acceptable terms and even 
\ if it was available, was it in the UK’s interest to continue borrowing its way out of trouble?28 
If, like during the March gold crisis, additional support was provided the situation would have 
been made manageable and the need to float would have been negated. Under conditions 
\where international support could not be garnered, there would be no alternative to floating.
If once floating had been embarked upon, the rate fell only to $2.30, it might have been 
possible to preserve the global fixed currency system. On the other hand, if floating resulted 
in a tremendous drop in the rate, many other countries including the US would probably have
27 Jenkins, R. A Life at the Centre, p.234.
“  PRO T312/2131 ’Hecuba Priam Group’, 6/11/68; PRO T312/2544 ‘Hecuba: Note of a Meeting in 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room’, 22/1/69.
27 PRO T312/2J44 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate’, 
13/12/68.
28 T312/2130 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Contingency Planning’ 24/5/68; PRO T312/2130 
‘Contingency Planning for Floating: Note of a Meeting', 16/7/68.
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been forced to devalue or float themselves.29 One possibility that the Treasury planners 
envisaged was that if the decision to float was taken, an international conference could be 
convened with the markets closed for the duration. The conference could be utilised to discuss 
the wider questions o f the global economy and not just the UK rate.’0 In other words Britain, 
by floating, could act as the central player in the destruction o f the ailing Bretton Woods 
system and negotiate the formation of a New World order. However, all were not agreed on 
the benefits o f holding such a gathering. For if  the conference was unsuccessful in bringing 
about a new global regime it could have resulted in diminished confidence in sterling, thus 
pushing the rate down to a very low level.11
However, if sterling had floated, the rate would almost certainly have moved downwards, 
irrespective o f the actions of its managers. The Treasury itself recognised this but hoped that 
over time the fall would be self correcting and that the currency would rise to $2.20-$2.30.12 
Nonetheless, it was possible that the OSA would regard the Basle agreement null and void, 
under a system o f  floating rates, and resume in its bid to diversify. If this occurred it was quite 
probable that the rate would have fallen to well bellow $2.00.13 It was also anticipated that if  
the rate floated, the adverse effects on import prices would have appeared much more quickly 
than the benefits to exports through enhanced competition.14 This was because British 
importers, fearing that the rate would go into uninterrupted decline, would probably have 
attempted to purchase large amounts o f foreign goods at the point o f floatation, before the 
value o f the currency diminished too much. This would only have served to worsen the 
/ British trade figures, which in turn could only damage confidence yet further, bringing about 
another reduction in the rate. Ironically, the importers would have been in the position o f
”  PRO T312/2544 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate’,
13/12/68.
50 PRO T312/2544 ‘Contingency Planning: Hecuba’, undated.
31 ibid
32 PRO T312/2544 ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate', 13/12/68; PRO T312/2544 ‘Hecuba: 
Note of a meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room’, 22/1/69.
33 PRO T312/2544 ‘Contingency Planning: Hecuba', undated.
34 PRO T312/2544 ‘Hecuba- Part II: A Programme of Action’, undated.
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bringing their fears into reality. Although, in the long run, the decision to float would actually 
have aided the balance of payments. This is because the fall in the exchange rate would have 
made foreign goods more expensive and so less would have been imported."
The mechanics of floating
If  during a sterling crisis where no additional funding was made available by foreign 
governments and MISC 205 took the decision to float, the programme of action would have 
resembled the following. The Foreign Office would have sent messages explaining the 
decision to the IMF, GATT, G10 and the OSAprior to the event.16 Clearly, informing such a 
large number of organisations in advance would have borne great risk of a leak, perhaps 
resulting in greater speculative pressure. Nevertheless, it was recognised that to offer 
forewarning would bring certain advantages. Firstly, it might have served to scare the 
international financial community into providing additional support under acceptable terms, 
thereby removing the need to float. If it did not, then the advanced notice may have increased 
the chance that foreign governments would co-operate with Britain under the new system. 
Indeed, for the move to a floating rate to be successful, the acquiescence of both the IMF and 
the OSA would have been essential.'17 In the case of the former, the UK would have been in 
breach of its IMF articles at a time when it was already heavily in debt to the fund. As for the 
latter, the UK would have to have appealed for solidarity and support in order to ensure that 
they continued to uphold their side of the Basle agreement under floating rates.
Once diplomatic courting had been embarked upon, the UK authorities would implement the 
float. As has already been stated, the actual executive action would have been 
straightforward. The Bank would simply have ceased to use the EEA to hold the sterling 
exchange rate. O f course, the decision to float would not in any way have excluded the
35 ibid
36 ibid
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authorities from further intervention in the exchange markets in order to moderate and 
manage movements in the floating rate. However as the decision to float would have been 
taken as a direct consequence of limited foreign exchange, the UK’s scope for intervention 
and management would probably have been extremely limited.38
The decision to float and its implementation could have both occurred instantaneously, unlike 
the more long-winded Cranmer. As the float would have been from a position of weakness, 
the first step after initiation would have been to stand back from the market and see where it 
took the rate. It would also have been essential to have at hand a range o f measures for speedy 
introduction should the pattern o f events have demanded them. Such measures would have 
helped to steady confidence and check the first fall in the rate. Although, it was recognised 
that it would have been an error to implement too many deflationary policies too soon, as 
there would have been nothing to fall back upon if the rate took a sudden plunge in later 
months.
In order to improve confidence abroad the Treasury considered the following accompanying 
measures. First, that the initial announcement o f  the decision to float should also contain 
references to an increase in the Bank’s base rate, in order to attract hot money to London.39 
Second, that credit policy should be tightened. Although, at this stage, it was not possible for 
the Treasury to outline how this should be accomplished, as this would depend on the credit 
measures that would already have been in place at the time a decision to float was taken. 
Third, that it would be desirable for the government to declare the intention o f cutting public 
expenditure.40 It was also recognised that one o f  the main domestic policy aims would have 
been to ‘...destroy peoples notion that all prices and factor incomes will rise proportionally to
” ibid
38 PRO T312/2544 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate',
13/12/68.
39 Although the Treasury felt that increasing interest rates would have no effect (PRO T312/2130 
'Contingency Planning: Note of a Meeting’, 1/7/68) the Bank did not agree (PRO T312/2544 Paper by 
the Bank of England ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate’, 13/12/68).
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the fall in exchange rates.’40 1 O f course without intervention, they would have done. The move 
to a floating rate would certainly have led to inflation through the increased price of imports. 
The Treasury had calculated that for each 10% reduction in the sterling rate, there would be a 
3% domestic price rise.42 However, to stop a wage price spiral under Hecuba it might well 
have been necessary to
‘..impose a straightforward freeze on all wage rates for six months 
from the moment o f the float, followed by a further six months of 
severe restraint’.43
Floating rates and the sterling area
Under a regime of floating rates, it would still have been possible for British citizens to move 
their holdings offshore and into the sterling area. Such capital outflow would have been 
disastrous and ideally would have been prevented via the implementation o f operation 
Brandon.44 However, it was recognised that the execution o f a system of exchange control 
restrictions would not have been in the spirit o f the Basle agreement.45 Therefore, under a 
system of floating exchange rates, the Treasury would have had to choose between Brandon 
and Basle. It is likely that they would have stuck with Basle initially but that they would have 
attempted to convince their sterling area partners, and Australia in particular, to voluntarily 
agree to the imposition of exchange control in the weeks that followed.46 Whether or not 
Australia would have co-operated is debatable. For whilst the vast majority of the sterling area
40 PRO T312/2544 ‘Hecuba- Part II: A Programme of Action’, undated.
41 PRO T312/2Î44 J. Williamson to F. Figgures ‘Exchange Rates’, 13/12/68
42 PRO T312/2J44 ‘Hecuba- Part II: A Programme of Action’, undated.
43 ibid
44 Before the conclusion of the Basle agreement Rawlinson was in favour of the extension of exchange 
control as an accompaniment to Hecuba or even as an exercise in its own right (PRO T312/2130 
Rawlinson ‘Floating: Exchange Control’, 20/6/68). After Basle was put into operation he recognised 
that Brandon would not be compatible with it (PRO T312/2131 Rawlinson to Allen ‘Hecuba/Priam 
Group’, 5/11/68).
45 ibid
44 PRO T312/2544 ‘Hecuba Part II: A Programme of Action’, undated.
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would not have been inconvenienced by such a step, Australia's balance of payments was 
greatly aided by the outflows of sterling to her shores. However, Australia would have 
suffered even greater inconvenience should Britain have been forced to implement the full 
rigours o f  Cranmer, something that Harold Wilson would undoubtedly have gone to great 
lengths to convey.
However, the most important objectives in Hecuba planning were that (a) the OSA would 
continue to abide with the terms of Basle and (b) that a method could be devised for operating 
the guarantee, which had been intended for a fixed rate devaluation, under conditions of 
perpetual floatation. The former was not really within the bounds o f  contingency planning and 
could only be assured through thorough diplomatic negotiations at the point of floatation. The 
latter was an important and technical issue that took up a great deal o f the planners’ time, 
particularly the representatives from the Bank.47 For if a method for operating the guarantee 
under floating rates could not be devised, the objective o f continuing with Basle could not 
have been adhered to. This would have been disastrous. For with the voluntary partial block 
gone, the rate would undoubtedly have fallen far further, possibly to the level that it is at in the 
present day. Under such circumstances, the only recourse would again have been to introduce 
an undiluted dose of Cranmer.
It was recognised that floating would produce a further weakening in confidence in sterling as 
a reserve currency and a loss o f trust in the UK from the sterling area.
‘It would be thought that the UK, having got the OSA committed 
to the sterling agreements on the understanding that these were to 
provide support for the existing system o f fixed parity
47 As Rawlinson reported to Allen ‘The Bank have it in hand but seem to be finding it difficult’ PRO 
T312/2131 Rawlinson to Allen ‘Hecuba/Priam’, 12/11/68. See also PRO T312/2J44 ‘Sterling 
Agreements: Floating Rates’, 30/12/68.
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convertibility...had abandoned complete responsibility -  in a way 
even less acceptable than blocking’.4*
Thus, the Treasury concluded that it would be the aim of the sterling area, under such 
circumstances, to reduce its sterling assets as much as possible without incurring excessive 
loss. The move to a floating rate might also have fuelled concern within OSA governments for 
the private balances held by their citizens culminating in a loosening o f exchange control in 
order to allow private balance holders to switch from sterling into other currencies.49
However, while it was recognised that the vast majority o f the OSA would no longer wish to 
hold sterling, it would have been almost impossible for them to get out without seriously 
depressing the rate.50 In short, they would be obliged to continue to hold the currency; if they 
did attempt to diversify, they would be cutting off their own noses to spite their faces. Those 
that did wish to take the risk would probably have waited until they received their first 
payment under the terms o f the guarantee before they  moved out. But those that held sterling 
in excess o f their prescribed MSP could easily have disposed o f the surplus without any 
repercussions, except o f course to the rate.51 It is likely that only those countries with very 
small holdings that could be converted quickly w ould move out of the currency straight away, 
because the gains that they would make from the guarantee would have been insignificant. 
Indeed, if any single country breached its MSP level, it would have had a vested interest in 
getting out o f sterling as quickly as possible;52 its balances would no longer be guaranteed and 
it would be essential to divest before the rate plunged too far.
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In order to keep the OSA on board and to prevent the Basle agreement from unravelling, the 
assorted Hecubites concluded that after the float there should be a series o f round table talks in 
London to which all the sterling area countries would be invited.”  It was also recognised that 
it would be necessary to court the Australian’s, before the full sterling area was consulted.53 4 If 
Hecuba had been implemented during the latter half of 1968, it is certain that the round table 
discussions would have primarily been concerned with the settlements to be made to the OSA 
at the end o f the first 30 day period and the methods for transacting future payments.
Under the Basle agreement, the guarantee was to be implemented if the sterling-dollar rate fell 
and remained for a period of thirty consecutive days below its present parity by more than a 
margin of 1%.55 However, no provision was made for the operation of the agreement under 
further changes in the rate after that period and no system had been devised to deal with the 
possibility o f a rise in the rate.56 One must of course remember that a floating rate must be 
expected to rise as well as fall. If the rate did rise, the existing agreement would not have 
obliged the sterling holders to repay the corresponding amount o f compensation that was paid 
to them by the UK for the original fall.57
Therefore, the over-riding objective o f the consultations would have been to ensure the 
continued adherence of the OSA countries to the Basle agreement. The essential ingredients of 
which would have been the holding o f a minimum percentage of their reserves in sterling in 
exchange for the dollar-value guarantee. If this could be attained then it would have been 
important that the OSA also agreed to reverse payments when and if the rate rose. If this were 
all agreed to, under a floating rate there would have been a settlement between the contracting 
parties on the last day o f each calendar month, based on the average rate for the whole o f  the
53 PRO T312/2544 ‘Operation of the Basle Agreement Under Hecuba- Minute of a Meeting in Mr 
Figgures Room at 3.30pm on 17* December 1968', 18/12/68.
54 ibid
35 PRO T312/2544 ‘Sterling Area Agreements: Floating Rates', 30/12/68.
56 PRO T312/2552 ‘Sterling Agreements: Implementation of the Guarantee’, June 1969.
57 PRO T312/2544 ‘Operation of the Basle Agreement under Hecuba’, 18/12/68.
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month. If this average rate were below the previous months, then the UK would have made 
payment on all eligible balances, to restore their sterling value in terms of the US dollar.58 If 
the rate was above that of the previous month, it was hoped that the countries o f the OSA 
would make a sterling payment equivalent to the rise in the dollar value o f  the eligible 
balances to the UK. For without such repayment the sterling balances would grow greatly 
beyond their original size, being bolstered by payments from the UK every time the rate fell, 
even if it again rose.59
To the Treasury, the system o f writing up the balances based on the average fall or rise in the 
rate over each thirty-day period was the most fair and equitable method. Perhaps the least just 
would have been to demand that the guarantee would only be written up at the time that 
sterling returned to a fixed rate.60 Although it is unlikely that the sterling holders would have 
accepted such a proposition through choice. In fact, if it was forced upon them, it is almost 
certain that the vast majority o f them would have disposed o f their holdings as quickly as 
possible. It is probably for this reason that the Treasury ruled against such a system and not on 
the grounds of justice.
The most equitable system, from the perspective o f the OSA, would have been to make both 
the payments and reversals on a daily basis.61 It would have ensured that the balance holders 
had an up-to-date dollar value and not one that was up to a month out o f date. However the 
operation of such a system would have proved administratively difficult as it would have been 
necessary to track the balances of thirty-one major balance holders daily, in order to ensure 
that they did not breach their MSP’s and then make the correct level o f payment. Furthermore, 
under a system o f  floating rates, the rate does not just change from day to day but also from 
hour to hour and minute to minute. It would have been impossible to increase and reduce the
58 ibid
”  PRO T312/2544 ‘Sterling Area Agreements: Floating Rates', 30/12/68.
“  PRO T312/2130 ‘Contingency Planning for Floating: Note of a Meeting’, 1/7/68.
61 PRO T312/2544 ‘Sterling Area Agreements: Floating Rates', 30/12/68.
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amount of sterling credited to the balances in line with the continual fluctuations in the 
exchange rate throughout the day.62
Thus the operation of the payments system on a monthly basis, seemed to the Treasury, to 
strike the appropriate balance between administrative practicality and the provision of an 
equitable and seemingly legitimate guarantee system. O f course, it would have been 
administratively easier to simply make payment based on the rate on the 30th day o f each 
month rather than the average rate for the whole month.6’ It would have saved the valuable 
hours that were to be employed in calculating an accurate average from the thousands of 
fluctuations that would have occurred in the rate. Yet, it was recognised that if settlements 
were to be based on the market rate on the last day of each month, rather than the average for 
the whole month, problems would arise. There would be incentive for both parties to the 
agreement to intervene in the market to influence the rate on the last day, to their respective 
advantage. Equally, the guarantee's method of implementation would likely have been leaked 
to the press, resulting in private speculation against the assumption that the UK would have to 
intervene to reduce its costs.64 Therefore, the adoption of the average rate system seemed both 
fairest and most practical.
It is likely that the vast majority o f the sterling balance holders would have seen sense and 
recognised that it was in their interest to continue the agreement. However, it is also extremely 
probable that they would have used their not inconsiderable bargaining leverage to bring about 
some concessions on the part o f the UK. Firstly, it is probable that they would have claimed 
that the MSP’s imposed upon them were more onerous, because at the first implementation o f  
the guarantee only 90% o f their balances would have been written up. Consequently, they 
would be making losses on 10% of their holdings.65 However, if  the UK had allowed the OSA
62 ibid
63 PROT312/2552 ‘Sterling Agreements: Implementation of the Guarantee’, June 1969.
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to reduce its sterling holdings the diversification would have placed a great deal o f strain on 
the rate, perhaps nullifying the effect o f the guarantee. Therefore, this was not a point that 
Britain could afford to concede.
Secondly, the OSA would rightly have argued that under a system o f floating exchange rates 
the 10% of their holdings that was not covered by the guarantee would again be reduced in 
value if the sterling parity continued to fall.6* It is likely that they would have pushed for the 
extension of the guarantee to the entirety o f their holdings and it is almost certain that the 
British authorities would have granted such a concession. This would have been an acceptable 
price to pay to keep the agreement in place and might well have reduced the grumblings of 
discontentment amongst holders who felt that their prescribed MSP levels were crippling.
Thirdly, the Treasury whilst hopeful that the OSA would accept that the principle o f reverse 
payments was fair and equitable conceded that this might not be the case. If it was not, then it 
is likely that it would have negotiated for one o f two fallback positions. The first and least 
unfavourable o f the two being that the reference rate for reverse payments would be the 
exchange rate at the end o f the first thirty day period.6 7 In other words, if the pound initially 
fell to $2.20 this would be the base rate and the agreement for reverse payments would begin 
this level and not $2.40. Under such an agreement, if the value of the pound rose to $2.35 the 
UK would get no reverse payments. If however it fell to $2.10 but then rose back to $2.40 the 
UK would get a 10% rather than a 30% reverse payment. This would mean that the increased 
funding from the guarantee that the OSA received at the end o f the first thirty days would not 
have to have been paid back even if the rate recovered. Only if  the rate again fell and then rose 
would any reverse payments be required and this would only be up to the level o f the rate at 
the end of the first thirty-day period.
66 PRO T312/2130 ‘Contingency Planning for Floating: Note of a Meeting', 16/7/68.
67 PRO T312/2552 ‘Sterling Area Agreements: Implementation of the Guarantee’ June 1969.
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If the OSA had refused this more generous settlement and was not prepared to accept the 
operation of a reverse payment in any form, it is clear that the agreement would not have 
lasted very long. Although, I am almost certain that the OSA, whilst suspicious of British 
motives and interests, would have recognised that it was in its collective interest to sign up to 
New Basle. For no one would have been able to predict to what level the pound would have 
fallen and the agreement, whilst constraining, would have afforded the balance holders a great 
deal o f protection. I am sure that whilst the OSA would have pressured the British authorities 
for a lower MSP they would have accepted the existing levels when the UK offered to extend 
the guarantee to 100% o f holdings. It is difficult to discern the outcome of the discussions on 
reverse payments but it is unlikely that the sterling area would have refused them directly. At 
worst, the UK would probably have to have made concessions concerning the reference rate 
for such payments.
However, new Basle would not have provided a long-term solution to the problem o f the 
sterling balance overhang. Whilst it would have stabilised the balances it is unlikely that the 
holders would have agreed to hold them ad infinitum. In the medium-term, the OSA would 
have undoubtedly called for substantially lower MSPs or perhaps even reneged on the 
agreement. With no resources to fund the once and for all windup of the balances, it would 
probably have been necessary at a later stage for Britain to negotiate a controlled 
diversification over several years. If, as under Robot, the OSA had been given a yearly quota 
o f balances that they could convert, an ‘orderly retreat’68 could have been brought about and 
this would have done the least damage to the rate. Whether or not the OSA would have agreed 
to such a settlement is however another matter.
It is also difficult to discern precisely what impact Britain’s fluctuating exchange rate would 
have had on the global fixed system. To a great extent, the effect o f  the move would be totally
61 Interview with Sir Jeremy Morse
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(dependent on the level o f the exchange rate that Britain was able to attain.69 However, whilst 
we can be certain that the rate would have fallen it is difficult to determine to what level. The 
specific rate achieved would have been dependant on the following variables. First, the degree 
to which the OSA diversified those holdings that were in excess o f its prescribed MSPs; 
Second, whether or not the OSA private balances continued to remain stable; Third the extent 
to which the NSA converted its holdings and finally, the position of the balance o f  payments.
It is possible that if there was little movement from any of these sources that the rate would 
remain stable and would not fall below $2.30. But given the already low level o f confidence in 
sterling during the fixed rate regime it is improbable that the balances not covered by New 
Basle would have remained stable under a floating system. What is certain is that a move 
below $2.30 was very possible and this would have had damaging repercussions. Whilst it 
would not have automatically entailed that the other currencies would also have had to move 
to a floating rate, it would have been a wrecking move that would have, at the very least, 
triggered competitive devaluations on a global scale. It is likely that other countries would 
only have floated if either the pound moved so erratically that numerous competitive 
devaluations and revaluations were required or where confidence in the international system 
had completely ebbed. Neither possibility would have been outside the realms o f  probability.
The Bank recognised that a
‘...floating pound without resort to blocking would be very likely to 
precipitate other exchange rate disturbances- in particular a US embargo.
Out of such a situation we might possibly get fairly quickly a new 
international monetary arrangement with new parities across the Atlantic,
69 PRO T312/2544 Paper by the Bank of England ‘Management of a Floating Exchange Rate’, 
13/12/68.
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perhaps a new price of gold and perhaps ultimately a more stable prospect 
for sterling’.
By the winter of 1968, many in the Treasury had also come around to this point o f view. The 
continual currency crises of sterling and the dollar led to a change in ideas. Although floating 
was never to be advocated as a positive policy option, the Treasury would no longer shrink 
from it if their backs were against the wall. Posner in particular had concluded that floating 
would not necessarily have been the worst possible outcome. For it would bring about
‘..a system where rates move more frequently, by smaller amounts, upwards 
as well as downwards and without political crises’.70 1
Priam
As has already been alluded to, Hecuba was not the only contingency plan that was devised 
during the autumn/winter period. The other major operation that was planned for was known 
as Priam. Although it was developed simultaneously to Hecuba and is in many ways 
indistinguishable from it, it has been decided for the sake o f clarity, to examine it separately 
rather than to weave it into the preceding discussion.
Priam was devised in order to prepare for the possibility that were would be a devaluation o f  
the French franc, by a margin o f  10-15% during the coming months.72 The Treasury 
recognised that if this occurred under conditions where the balance of payments and 
1 confidence in sterling had not improved, the repercussions on the currency would be 
Disastrous. This was because a move on the part o f the French would represent a 1%
70 PRO T312/2130 Paper by the Bank o f England ‘Contingency Planning’ 24/5/68.
71 PRO T312/2131 Posner to Figgures ‘Flexible Exchange Rates', 4/12/68.
72 PRO T312/2132 Ryrie to Hubback ‘Contingency Planning for a French franc Devaluation: Questions 
to be Considered', 22/7/68
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revaluation of the pound at a time when confidence in it was ebbing and result in a £50m per 
year adverse effect on the UK’s balance of payments.73 It was thought likely that those balance 
holders that were not bound by the Basle agreement, who already believed that the pound was 
overvalued, would come to the conclusion that the UK would also be forced to devalue in 
order to maintain Britain’s competitiveness and to bring about the long overdue improvement 
in the balance of payments. Under such conditions, it is likely that a massive speculative 
outflow from London would have resulted.
For the Treasury, it was difficult to determine where the outflow would go. One possibility 
was that sterling balances would be converted into francs as holders might have believed that 
in the aftermath o f a franc devaluation the currency would now be safe from further tremors.7'' 
Although it is more likely that the funds would have been moved into Germany because for 
quite some time the Deutchemark had been considered undervalued.75 Therefore the chances 
of the mark being devalued were negligible and if it were re-valued, holders would have made 
a speculative gain.
It was, however, just possible that the markets might regard the adjustment as an inevitable 
one and that if the pound had by then picked up some strength and the balance of payments 
was seen to be improving, it might just weather the storm. However, this optimistic outcome 
could not be counted on. The practical question was what defensive measures should the UK 
authorities employ to defend the currency under such conditions?
One possibility would have been to take no immediate action affecting the exchange markets 
but to move immediately in the field o f import controls or exchange control in order to protect
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and improve the balance of payments.76 However, it was recognised that this kind o f action 
alone might simply have served to confirm the suspicions amongst sterling holders that the 
currency was about to collapse.77 A second possibility was that the UK authorities should 
consider implementing a further devaluation themselves.78 Such a course would probably 
have aided the bid to improve the balance of payments in the long-term, and unlike during the 
March gold crisis it was no longer out of the question. Nearly a year would have passed since 
the preceding devaluation in November 1967 and any subsequent devaluation would no 
longer be so close to it in time as to make it indistinguishable from a move to a floating rate. 
In spite of this, it is extremely unlikely that a further devaluation would have been a viable 
policy option. This was because it would have been forced under conditions in which the 
reserves were either very low or in fact exhausted and it would have been impossible to hold 
the new rate.79 The third and least desirable alternative would have been to implement a full 
Cranmer regime, though this option had all but been discounted by the Treasury at this stage, 
much to the relief o f the Bank.80 This only left floating and the implementation of some form 
o f Hecuba.
Therefore, in many ways the hypothetical French crisis greatly resembled the actual crisis that 
took place the previous March. The courses of available action were similar if not identical; 
the main difference being that it was probably Hecuba and not Cranmer that would have been 
implemented if the situation became uncontrollable. As with March, the Treasury were keen 
that no extreme measures should be taken at the outset and that the object in the first day or 
two would be to buy additional time and use it to get further financial support for the pound, 
if  it was still available. The obvious gambit was again, the one used during the March crisis, 
namely that the markets should be closed (by the now traditional bank holiday) and that the
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77 ibid
78 PRO T312/2132 ‘Contingency Planning: Devaluation of the franc’, 11/9/68.
79 ibid
80 PRO T312/2132 Hoskin to Rawlinson “Priam’, 25/9/68.
254
time gained should be used to persuade the Americans to provide further support.81 The 
second alternative would have been to use exchange control powers to stop any new foreign 
exchange contracts whilst allowing pre-zero contracts to be completed.82 In short, it would 
have meant the temporary suspension of convertibility.
The main advantages of the former method are that it would have completely stopped any 
outflows from the UK for the duration o f the bank holiday and that it least resembled 
blocking.83 However, it could not be done without some potential side effects. For if it was to 
be resorted to again, the British authorities would not necessarily have had the excuse of an 
American request the close the markets to justify their actions. It would have been obvious to 
the speculators that it was sterling’s weakness and not the dollar’s that triggered the action. 
As well as this, it is doubtful whether it could have been continued for more than a few days 
without reducing domestic confidence in the banking system and this may not have been long 
enough to negotiate further support from the Americans.84 There were also some serious 
questions about its legality. For with hindsight it was recognised that the previous March bank 
holiday was not in the spirit o f the 1871 Bank Holiday Act, because the banks had remained 
open for domestic business.85 If the operation were to be legal, the Banks would have to be 
completely shut down. Furthermore, the previous closure had brought about some tiresome 
side effects with respect to wage negotiations. This was typified by the attempt o f a police 
constable to claim double-time for working during a public holiday!86
The temporary suspension o f convertibility would have negated many o f the side effects o f 
implementing a bank holiday, including the risks to domestic confidence. The procedure 
would have been simpler and quicker to bring about, as it did not necessitate the convening o f
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the Privy Council or the signature of the Queen. It did not involve any intervention with 
domestic business and it could probably have been operated for longer.87 O f course, it most 
resembled blocking. Whilst the Treasury might have called it the ‘temporary suspension of 
full convertibility’ it would have in effect been the implementation of Brutus I. Although 
unlike during March, it is very unlikely that the regime would have been intensified to a full 
block if  the US failed to co-operate. Instead, as has been stated several times, the move would 
have been to some form o f Hecuba. However, the main difference between Priam and full 
Hecuba was that under Priam
‘If we were forced to float we should envisage this as being temporary, 
to be followed by immediate further international discussions to settle as 
quickly as possible the future pattern of exchange rates and measures to 
support and maintain them’.88
The expectation was that the period of floating would be short and that once the pound re­
pegged it would be at the $2.40 rate.89 However, I am inclined to agree with Sir Jeremy Morse 
when he states that ‘once we float its plain Hecuba and that’s it’.90 For as I have already 
argued, the balance of probability pointed to the fact that if Britain floated other currencies 
would have followed. If they did not, I accept that it would have been slightly easier for 
sterling to return to a fixed rate, assuming of course that the international financial community 
was prepared to back the pound. However, it is doubtful that confidence in the re-pegged 
pound would have been high and it might again have been pushed off its peg by overzealous 
speculators. If other currencies had followed Britain, I believe that it is more likely that the 
general regime o f  floating rates would have begun. This is because, for the politicians, the 
more difficult decision would have been to un-peg the rate. The fact that it was only supposed
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to be temporary would have helped them to make the decision. Once the course o f action had 
been embarked upon, it is likely that they would have welcomed the fact that currency 
management had been depoliticised and that they were free from agonising over the balance 
of payments.91 They would therefore have little incentive the reverse the decision. This would 
be true both in Britain and abroad. However, if the UK authorities were successful in their 
quest to gain additional support, in the early days o f a crisis and before the decision to float 
had been taken, they could have contemplated reopening the markets without any major 
change in policy.92 Although, if, even with the added US support the rate could not be 
maintained then the Treasury would yet again have had to fall back to their contingency 
plans.
The Priam Network
Priam, like Hecuba, was not punctuated with any degree of policy learning or innovation on 
the part o f the officials involved in its development. For the most part, the same group of 
officials developed both plans and Priam in its operation would have, if things turned out for 
the worst, turned into Hecuba. However, the fact that the Treasury was devising the plan gave 
them a useful pretext to continue dialogue with their opposites in number in the US and 
expand the policy network. During the Chancellor’s visit to the US in the middle of October, 
he broached the subject with Fowler, the US Treasury Secretary.93 However, it was clear that 
the US had not realised the likely difficulties that would emerge for sterling from a 
devaluation o f the franc or the urgency with which counteraction would need to be 
considered. For Douglas Allen, there seemed to be an opportunity in including the Americans
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in their discussions.94 Firstly, as I have already stated, it would ensure that the channels of 
communication stayed open. Secondly, it would mean that the US was alerted to the dangers 
and could prepare contingency plans of their own, so that unlike during March there would be 
no delay their decision to back the pound.95
When Fowler passed through London on his whistle stop tour o f Europe in early November, 
Priam was the main subject that he discussed with the Chancellor.96 Although, this did not 
imply that the Americans regarded an early move on the part o f the French as more probable 
than it had been in the past. In fact, the Americans thought the likelihood o f a French 
devaluation in the coming months to be negligible.97 However, they conceded that if  the 
French did devalue they were likely to do so by an excessive amount, possibly by up to 20%. 
For Fowler believed that
‘The French would do this as a wrecking tactic designed to bring 
about a collapse of the international monetary system, thus 
increasing the chance that in the end the price o f gold would be 
raised’.9*
This was because for de Gaulle, devaluation would represent a defeat o f the highest order. 
Therefore, if  it seemed inevitable he might seek to deflect opinion by bringing down the 
whole international monetary system.99
Furthermore, Fowler felt that if a crisis did materialise there would be the need for 
multilateral consideration on any change in parities. This could have been accomplished by
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the convening o f an international conference at which a common course of action could be 
hammered out. For the Americans, the principal aim o f such a conference would be to 
encourage the French not to move at all, and if  this could not be achieved, to ensure that they 
did not move too far. However, Fowler was clear that if  the French did make a wrecking 
move
‘The US would give up gold and float. In his view there was no 
question whatsoever o f a rise in the price o f gold. This required 
an act o f Congress and neither the present Congress nor the 
Congress which has just been elected would agree to a rise in the 
price of gold’.100
Although if the French moved by only 10% this would not have been enough to pressure the 
US into floating but it might have been enough to force Britain to take such action. Therefore, 
for Jenkins, it was imperative that if any conference took place, the exchange markets should 
be closed for the duration in order to avoid pressure on sterling.101
It was evident from the discussions that the Americans remained extremely suspicious of the 
French and that even if they did not expect the worst; they thought that it was prudent to plan 
for it.102 However, this was not a view shared by Kit McMahon at the Bank. For him Priam 
was a pointless exercise. Perhaps he was also speaking for his colleagues when he stated
‘I think we all believe that the chance of Priam being touched off 
in the next two or three months is pretty negligible: hence it does 
not seem worth wasting much time on it’.103
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Although Rawlinson was initially scathing of McMahon’s sentiments, by the middle of 
November he too had come around to this point of view. For on 13 November General de 
Gaulle had publicly stated that the devaluation o f the franc would be an ‘absurdity’.104 
However, it was wise o f Rawlinson to continue with the exercise in spite o f this because by 18 
November it seemed that the General had changed his mind.
In many ways, de Gaulle’s public declaration that there would be no devaluation was not out 
o f  line with the tactics that Callaghan should have pursued before the British move. The 
decision to move days later did not necessarily represent a U-tum on the part of the General or 
his government. As Sir Kit McMahon pointed out, in the run up to any devaluation it is often 
necessary for politicians to tell bare faced lies.105 If they did not and the markets guessed what 
was to happen before the fact, the speculative pressure would have been unbearable.
For, in the case of the French, the remarks were uttered the day after they had raised their bank 
rate and restricted credit as a response to mounting speculative pressure.106 Of course de 
Gaulle might have been attempting to quell that strain but his speech and the deflationary 
package backfired, alerting markets to the deteriorating situation.107 Consequently, gold sales 
in Paris increased and the German mark broke through its ceiling in Paris. Speculators 
believed that there would be a chance o f revaluation for the mark and this attracted funds out 
o f London and into Bonn.108 According to Jenkins, on Friday 15 November alone, the British 
authorities had to spend more than $250m in order to keep the pound from the floor.109 In fact, 
the total loss recorded between 13 and 27 November amounted to £337m [$808m]."° By 
contrast, the total reserves stood at £ 1520m [$3650] or £270m [$650] when debts to the EEA
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are taken into account."1 The true reserves were in minus figures and the situation was, again, 
far worse than during the build up to the devaluation.
The N ovem ber Crisis
On Sunday 17 November, Douglas Allen was ‘thrice rung up...from Basle by the Governor on 
an open line’.10 12 What emerged was that the French, quite to everyone’s surprise, had decided 
that borrowing their way out o f  their financial difficulties was not an acceptable proposition 
and that ‘the General was prepared to eat his words on devaluation.’113 They intended to move 
their rate down by some 15% unless the Germans were prepared to revalue part way to  meet 
them.
Such a state o f affairs was awkward for Britain for a number o f reasons. Firstly, if the franc 
devalued by such an amount it would have been the equivalent o f a sterling revaluation of 
1.5%.114 This would have been problematic because many in the financial community still 
lacked confidence in sterling at its current rate. It is likely that fears would have surfaced 
amongst them that the pound would have to follow the franc down so that Britain could 
compete with French exports. Whether or not the British government intended to embark on 
such a course of action, it was possible that they would be forced to because of the mounting 
speculative pressure on the pound in the days and weeks after the French had moved.115
Secondly, the situation was confounded by the fact that a rumour of a mark revaluation was 
already attracting funds out o f London.116 In short, there were two sources o f pressure that
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plagued sterling at this point. O f the two, only the German problem really afflicted sterling at 
this stage. However, after a French devaluation money would not have been leaving London 
simply because there was a chance of making a quick gain in Germany. It would be leaving 
because balance holders would fear that it would only be a matter o f time before Britain, with 
her ailing balance o f payments, made further adjustments o f her own.
In the face of such pressure the Treasury believed the ideal solution for Britain would be for 
the franc to devalue by 10% and the mark to revalue by no less than 5% but possibly as much 
as 10%.117 This would have been advantageous for two reasons. Firstly, if the two currencies 
moved simultaneously, their new rates would balance one another out thus avoiding the 
disequilibrium o f  a solo French venture.118 This would mean that the French would gain no 
competitive advantage over the UK and few would think that the pound would have to follow 
the franc down. In fact, if both the franc and mark moved by 10% it would actually have 
amounted to a British devaluation o f 1%."9 Second, the revaluation o f the mark would stop 
the movement o f funds from London to Bonn. It was also possible that the higher interest rates 
in London would have attracted back much o f the currency that had left in the first place.
On Monday 18 November, the Chancellor held a series o f  meetings with his officials to 
discuss the situation. At the first meeting, held during the morning, Sir Douglas Allen reported 
that the German Cabinet was not to meet until the afternoon and that it was unlikely that they 
would announce their decision, either to revalue or maintain the present parity, until the 
following day.120 If the French intended to wait for a German decision before implementing 
their devaluation, they would not have been able to move until at least Tuesday. Furthermore
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the Germans had a regular bank holiday on Wednesday 19th and to the Treasury this pointed to 
changes in both parities on the Tuesday night.121
There was no information available on the US attitude, though Jenkin's officials felt that 
Fowler would be very disturbed if  the French moved by 15% and the Germans made no move 
at all.122 For such a situation would have been remarkably close to the conditions that Fowler 
referred to as a ‘wrecking devaluation’. O f course, the Americans would have been even more 
concerned if the UK had decided to move as well, as this would have undermined the whole 
fabric o f the fixed rate system. However, Posner was attracted to the idea o f using a move on 
the part of France and Germany as an excuse for Britain to implement a further 5% 
devaluation of its own.123 Caimcross also ‘had a sneaking inclination to do this’124, which his 
deputy at the Economic Section, Fred Atkinson, shared.125 This course was advocated because 
it appeared that the steam had gone out o f the recovery in exports. If the Treasury planned to 
take action to correct the balance of trade in the near future, a devaluation had a lot to 
recommend, especially as an alternative to quantitative import restrictions.126 If France and 
Germany moved Britain would have had an excuse to do the same and could have dressed the 
decision up as a response to changes in the wider international system rather than as British 
weakness.
However, like Rawlinson in his discussion o f the possibility o f a further devaluation in his 
elaboration of Priam, the Chancellor rejected devaluation as a viable course of action.127 
Firstly, whilst in the long-term devaluation would aid the trade balance, in the short-term it 
would do the opposite. In fact, it would merely have exacerbated the J-Curve effect. Secondly,
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it is highly probable that balance holders would have seen through the pretext o f the move as a 
process o f wider realignment and perhaps have regarded it as merely the first instalment.127 28 
Therefore, devaluation as an act o f  policy had the potential to reduce confidence further and 
aggravate the situation.
However by that lunchtime it had become clear that Herr Blessing, the Governor the 
Bundesbank, was extremely doubtful about getting his political masters to agree to a 
revaluation o f the mark o f as much as 10% and he was in fact doubtful about any move at 
all.129 In short, even if the British authorities had wanted to use the realignment o f the French 
and German currencies as a ploy to devalue the pound, it was unlikely that such a tactic would 
have worked for it seemed that France would be moving alone. In the afternoon, Jenkins 
reconvened his officials to discuss tactics in light o f the new situation. It was agreed that if the 
French acted unilaterally that evening then the British foreign exchange markets should be 
closed on the Tuesday.130 However if the French only announced that they were to close their 
market on Tuesday, further thought would have to be given to British action because there was 
a risk that any pre-emptive action on the part o f the UK would only serve to reduce 
confidence.131 The gathering discussed the techniques for closing the market, as had been 
outlined by Rawlinson in the development o f Priam. It was decided that if the markets were to 
be closed, unlike during the March gold crisis where they used the Bank Holiday tactic, they 
would act through use of foreign exchange regulations to temporarily suspend 
convertibility.132
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From then on the tactics decided upon, in a situation where the Germans could not be 
persuaded to revalue, mirrored the Priam scheme. For as Jenkins reported to the hurriedly 
convened meeting of Misc 205 later that evening:
‘If the French devalued on their own, he [Jenkins] believed our 
only course would be to ‘float’ plus ‘tough measures’. We had 
suffered a heavy run on sterling. Couve de Murville [the French 
Prime Minister] was broadcasting that night and we might have to 
meet later that evening, though none o f  us should create a crisis 
atmosphere by cancelling our engagements. The very fact that we 
had met must be kept deadly secret’.131
To Caimcross it seemed that events were now accelerating out o f control, for in his diary he 
recorded
‘What is it like to be at the eye o f  a hurricane or in a boat 
accelerating as it nears Niagara? I suppose that if there were lots of 
ordinary things and people around to occupy one’s thoughts, it might 
pass almost unnoticed. At any rate it seems hard to believe that 
within a couple o f days we may be floating and that, apart from 
some words from the Governor to Blessing and from the Chancellor 
to Schiller, we’ve been powerless to intervene’.13 34
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Political Intervention
Wilson, however, was not content to simply passively react to the events as they unfolded. It 
seemed to him that if  the French were to devalue it was imperative that the Germans were 
forced  to change their minds and make a move of their own. His strategy in achieving that end 
was the very same as during the gold crisis. It comprised two parts. The first was a rather ill 
timed message to the US president urging him to put pressure on the Germans. In it he stated 
that the US must bring about a policy reversal on the part of the Germans, for without it, it 
would be impossible for Britain to hold the sterling rate. He went on to state that ‘we should 
have no option in these circumstances but to  let our rate float’.135
President Johnson did not take too kindly to Wilson’s position; the Americans had already 
concluded that it would be futile to place pressure on the Germans.136 Whilst Herr Blessing at 
the BundesBank was favourably disposed to  a change in the rate, Johnson was well aware that 
the German leader, Keisinger, would be faced with the resignation of Strauss, the economic 
minister, should he give in and revalue. Furthermore there was great pressure from German 
agricultural interests and ‘the native German dislike of throwing away a strong financial 
position’ to contend with.137
To Johnson, what was more crucial was what happened to the franc. He believed that the US 
was likely to have more success in pushing the French away from devaluation than 
pressurising the Germans into revaluation.13'  In other words, Johnson was suggesting that 
through the judicious use o f carrot and stick it might have been possible to get the French to 
borrow their way out o f their current predicament.
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Wilson, on the other hand, did not share the President’s optimism in the possibility of making 
the French see sense. Instead, he continued to obsess over the possibility o f forcing the 
Germans into line. Two things illustrate this. The first is the fact that in Wilson’s account of 
the episode, in his published record of the 1964-70 government, he refers to it as a crisis 
emanating from the failure o f the Germans to revalue and hardly mentions the pending French 
devaluation.1'9 Second, is that towards the end of Tuesday 19 November Wilson summoned 
the German ambassador, Herr Blankenhom, to Downing Street in order to continue the arm- 
twisting. Jenkins, in his memoirs recalls that he was opposed to the idea because he thought 
that Wilson ‘was too excited’.140
At that meeting, at which Jenkins and Michael Stewart were also present, Wilson conveyed to 
the German Ambassador the degree to which the British government was dissatisfied with 
Germany’s position.141 Wilson was particularly incensed because he had been made aware, 
some hours earlier, that instead of revaluing the Germans were only prepared to make 
modifications to their tariffs and to lower tax rebates on exports so as to achieve results 
equivalent to those produced by a 4% revaluation.142 Such moves would not be anywhere near 
as fast acting as an actual revaluation and it would take several months before any change in 
Germany’s balance o f trade was noticed.
Therefore he rejected this meagre offering stating that it was ‘the equivalent to barely a third 
o f what was required’ and again demanded that Germany revalue, arguing that if it did not, 
Britain would be forced to take unfortunate measures.143 However, unlike during the March 
gold crisis where he did not spell out what those measures would be, Wilson left Herr 
Blankenhom in no doubt. He stated that
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‘During the recent NATO meeting in Brussels, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary had re-affirmed the 
British Government’s determination that the defences of the West should be 
strengthened and our offer to contribute further to that end. But military 
defences were meaningless without adequate economic foundation. If the 
deterioration in the present international monetary situation continued, the 
British Government- and perhaps other governments as well- would find 
themselves obliged seriously to re-apprise their present attitude...They could 
only hope that the German Government would play their part in ensuring 
that such a re-appraisal did not become inevitable’.143 44
One supposes that in the phrase ‘other governments as well’ Wilson was suggesting that he 
was also speaking for the Americans, which of course he was not. At this point Jenkins 
interjected. He explained to Blankenhom that the British government had originally favoured a 
meeting o f the Group of Ten in order to bring about a mutually agreeable resolution.145 Indeed 
the holding o f such a meeting had been an essential part o f the Priam plan.146 However, 
Jenkins had come to the realisation that a meeting would no longer be appropriate given the 
fact that the Germans had already taken their decision, as the decision would have preceded 
the meeting. It was therefore rather unfortunate, from his perspective that the German Finance 
Minister Herr Schiller had called one for the following day, Wednesday 20 November.147 
Jenkins stated that whilst he would attend the session he was doubtful o f its desirability and 
feared that it might simply increase international speculation. For although the major money
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markets would be closed while the conference was taking place, there was a danger that if it 
failed to reach conclusions in line with the expectations that it aroused, an even more 
dangerous situation would be created.148
In fact earlier that day Jenkins had urged Joe Fowler to pressurise the Germans into cancelling 
the meeting, on the advice o f Sir Frank Figgures and Leslie O’Brien.149 However, Fowler 
failed to see how circumstances had been changed for the UK by the German decision and was 
rather bemused a t the reversal in policy on the part o f Britain, as it was Jenkins that suggested 
in early November that if this sort of crisis ever materialised it would be crucial to hold such a 
meeting. The Bank however strongly urged Jenkins both not to attend and not to close the 
markets. However, to keep the markets open when the reserves were dwindling was to Jenkins 
‘perverse’.150
It is likely that Jenkins hoped that the confrontation with the German Ambassador would lead 
to a change o f heart within the German government and ensure that the meeting was more 
useful for Britain. He concluded by reiterating what Wilson had already said and in so doing 
acquiesced with the Prime Minister’s tactics. He explained that
‘In the light o f the speculative pressure arising from the 
Deutschmark French franc position, it might not be possible for 
the British Government to sustain the exchange rate o f  sterling. In 
such circumstances, they would have to allow the sterling rate to 
float, though they recognised that the consequences o f  this would 
be grave both for Britain and for the other major currencies, 
including the dollar....it could become difficult for them [the
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UK] to maintain a military presence in Germany. It was therefore 
essential that, by the end of the Group o f Ten meeting, there 
should have been a redefinition o f the German position’.151
The Bonn Conference
The next morning Jenkins flew to Bonn in a RAF Comet. It appeared though that the Germans 
had leaked the details o f the confrontation with Blankenhom to the press. For Jenkins was 
faced with a group o f  demonstrators with placards bearing such legends as ‘Wilson-hands off 
our D-mark’, when he arrived at the British Embassy in Bonn.152 The conference itself proved 
to be a complete waste o f time, comprising a series o f lengthy meetings 'under Schiller’s 
increasingly inept chairmanship’ that produced no notable change in Germany’s position.153 
As Jenkins recalls, ‘The verbal diarrhoea of Professor Schiller was indeed the most constant 
and maddening feature o f  the conference’.154 In total, he talked from the chair for twelve o f the 
fifty hours of the meeting. The fact that Germany would not consider revaluation at any price 
was also problematic for the negotiations with the French. They were not prepared to devalue 
by a figure of less than 15% unless they could be satisfied that if they did so the Germans 
would meet them part way. Therefore, the majority o f the discussions centred on attempting 
the break the German deadlock so that the French could devalue by an amount that the 
Americans would not regard as wrecking.155 The fact that the Germans would still not move 
was something that astonished the rest o f the delegates. For they found it hard to believe that 
the Germans, having summoned the conference in the first place, continued to remain 
obdurate.156
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When it became clear to the French that the Germans would not move, Ortoli, the French 
Finance Minister approached Jenkins to discover whether ‘there was any chance of our 
covering French devaluation with a small fig-leaf, in other words a little voluntary devaluation 
o f our own’.157 Jenkins refused Ortoli for the very same reasons as he had refused Posner. The 
conference however was to drag on into a second day, where discussions centred wholly on 
what would be considered an acceptable amount for the French to devalue by. The parameters 
were that if the French could accept a figure agreed at the conference and one that was not 
considered by the Americans as wrecking, then they would receive a line o f  credit worth 
$2.6billion to help them sustain the new rate.158 The Bank o f England and the Treasury had 
calculated that sterling could tolerate at 12.5% devaluation and possibility one of 15%.'”  
Although if they were to move down by 20%, it would have amounted to a sterling revaluation 
of 2% and the British authorities would have had to make some adjustments o f their own.
Ortoli opened the new phase o f the discussions by stating that he had been authorised to 
propose a devaluation of 13%, but to go below that if the Germans would offer something on 
their side. However, both the Americans and the IMF were loath to accept anything above 
10%.160 With the American offer o f  a standby credit the French were prepared to meet them 
half way and agreed in principle that they would devalue by 11.11%, even though the 
Germans made no new concessions.161
In his telegram to Wilson outlining the events in Bonn, Jenkins concluded that
‘Nothing which has occurred has caused me to change my opinion
that it was a serious mistake to call the conference in the first place.
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German obstinacy, and Schiller's tactics and personality, have 
made it an extremely trying experience for all o f us. But we have to 
put a brave face on the outcome and do everything possible to 
convince people that we are satisfied with it. At least, now that the 
Germans have resisted all this pressure, speculators should be 
convinced that revaluation is out of the question’.162
Jenkins was correct in his last statement. The fact that the conference resulted in no move by 
the Germans even though the whole affair was ‘billed as the biggest thing since Bretton 
Woods’163 drove home to the speculators the message that the Germans had no intention of 
revaluing. And that they could not be coerced into doing so, even when they were being 
pressured by the vast majority o f the Group o f Ten. Therefore, it became clear that no 
speculative gain was to be made and the movement o f funds from London to Bonn ceased.
The French
In actuality, and much to everyone’s surprise, the French decided not to devalue after all! It is 
difficult to discern the reasons for this U-tum. Caimcross speculates that that they never 
intended to move at all. Instead, the threat of devaluation enabled them to extract a large line 
of credit from the Americans and to justify at home the imposition of drastic fiscal 
measures.164 Caimcross also believed that if the French had devalued, their unions would have 
demanded, and won, a 10% increase in wages that would have offset much o f the gain in 
competitiveness.165
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However a ‘good source’ was able to give officials at the British Embassy in France an 
account o f French Ministerial thinking before and during the franc crisis. It seemed that 
Ministers had been considering devaluation from July 1968, when some in the Cabinet had 
called for a 7% reduction in parity.166 However it was decided by the majority o f the Cabinet 
not to pursue this and up until November 1968, French ministers believed they had avoided 
the need for devaluation. When the speculative movements resurfaced in early to mid- 
November, the Cabinet divided into three main groups. Those who wanted a wrecking 
devaluation o f 20-25%, in the hope that it would bring down the other currencies and lead to 
the revaluation of gold. Those who favoured a relatively small devaluation o f  between 9-11%, 
and those who wanted no devaluation at all.167
At the beginning o f the Bonn discussions, Ortoli, the Finance Minister, apparently believed 
that the French with Anglo-American support would succeed in bringing about a revaluation 
of the mark. When it became clear that this was impossible the French Prime Minister M. 
Couve de Merville’s main anxiety was that France would be unable to obtain a large 
international loan without a commitment to  devaluation. However, when the French 
negotiators reported that they could get their loan without this commitment the Prime Minister 
came down firmly against devaluation.168
Whilst this was occurring there was a leak from a member of the French delegation at Bonn 
and the press were reporting that a franc devaluation was a certainty. It appeared that ministers 
bitterly resented having their hand forced by the press and de Gaulle himself decided that the 
rate would be held.169 It also seemed that the French government believed that
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‘Big business had organised a conspiracy to bring down the franc. Ever since 
the events o f May, businessmen had wanted the competitive advantage 
devaluation would give them, and had made their dispositions accordingly.
This was intolerable from every aspect, and the government would now be 
master in its own house’.170
Conclusion
Even though the November crisis blew over it was a significant episode for two reasons. 
Firstly, it gave the Chancellor ‘the opportunity to make our necessary changes on the home 
front and cover them up with the international crisis’.171 In other words Jenkins was able, one 
year after the sterling devaluation, to enforce his final tightening of the screw and inflict on the 
home a economy a severe deflationary package and one that would hopefully bring an 
improvement in the balance o f  trade. On the afternoon in which he returned from the Bonn 
conference the Chancellor held a mini budget in the Commons in which he unveiled his 
proposals. The Measures were designed to raise an additional £250m per year in taxation. 
Indirect taxes were raised by 5d. on a gallon of petrol, 5d. on a packet o f twenty cigarettes and 
4s. on a bottle o f spirits.172 All rates o f purchase tax were increased by 10% and bank credits 
were to be severely curtailed.173 Most significantly, Jenkins also introduced a system of import 
deposits, requiring traders to deposit for six months 50% o f the value of prescribed imports, 
before customs would release the goods.174 The measures were intended to deflate the 
domestic economy and to prevent it from sucking in an excessive amount o f imports, so that 
the balance of trade could be improved upon. It was to be the last set o f deflationary measures
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implemented by the Labour government ‘before it became apparent that the devaluation was 
succeeding’.175
Second, the crisis itself formally signalled the change in the Treasury mindset. Although few 
relished the possibility o f a floating pound the Treasury were now mentally equipped for it and 
were prepared to recommend it as a course of action if  the speculative pressure became too 
much to bear. By this stage, no one in the Treasury advocated blocking as a policy option 
should it have become impossible to hold the rate. In fact, the only person that even 
contemplated such a course of action was Andrew Graham, the assistant to Tommy Balogh in 
Number 10.176 However, there is no evidence to suggest that anyone took Graham’s 
recommendations seriously.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
In w orks o f this size, it is customary to divide the structure of the analysis in the following 
way, theory: data: theory revisited. With the aim of providing a set o f theoretic premises, 
subjecting them to the data and then reformulating them to make a more precise fit with 
empirical reality. Usually the process o f reformulation takes place within the conclusion. 
However, in this case, this is not an appropriate way to proceed. Firstly, because many of the 
theoretical propositions were devised inductively and secondly, those premises that were 
deduced are ontological in nature and there is no way in which the data can impact on them. 
Instead, it is the ontological assumptions that impact on what is regarded as data. 
Consequently, the conclusion will be organised in the following manner. Firstly, it will 
attempt to summarise the argument developed throughout the thesis and to place it more 
firmly within the context o f the theoretical framework. This will ensure that we have the best 
available vocabulary to make sense o f the data. Secondly, whilst chapter three provides a 
useful backdrop to the management o f  sterling prior to 1968, it is also important to consider 
the w ay  in which decisions made in 1968 impacted on the currency after that period. The 
second part o f the conclusion will attempt this task in terms o f an analysis o f both the break­
up o f  Bretton Woods and the collapse o f the sterling area.
The Argument
The principal argument has been that the scholarly analysis o f sterling in the 1960s is too 
devaluation centric. Little attention has been paid to the aftermath o f the parity change and 
too much attention has been focused on its build-up. Furthermore, the devaluation is in itself 
of little significance. This is because it represented only first order change. It did not 
constitute a (third order) paradigm shift or even the (second order) crafting of new policy 
instruments. Instead, it only amounted to the tweaking of existing instruments. However, in
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the aftermath it became clear to sterling’s managers that the currency was still not working 
within normal tolerances and that the situation was far more severe than it had ever been 
before. Firstly, because the balance of payments had worsened as a result of the J-curve effect 
and secondly, because the sterling area began the process of direct diversification. This, 
combined with the prospect o f  NSA speculation, meant that the currency faced pressure from 
three sources simultaneously. In spite o f this, the Bank, Treasury, and ministers made no 
attempt in the first few months o f 1968, to engage in network relations. Instead, all parties 
hoped that with time the currency would begin to work within normal tolerances. By March 
1968, it became glaringly obvious that this would not occur. The gold crisis that erupted 
severely drained the already meagre foreign reserves to such a degree that it seemed unlikely
£
at the new $2.40 parity could be maintained. It was only during the midst o f the crisis that 
onomic policymakers recognised that the existing first order techniques of amelioration had 
\become exhausted and that fresh action would have to be taken. It was impossible for any one 
actor to work alone, because the Treasury, Bank, and ministers each had resources, required 
by the others, for any action to be successful. The Treasury, recognising this, acted as a 
network hegemon and sought out other players. It required the expertise of the Bank and the 
authority o f ministers in order to implement policy. Although the resultant policy network 
could agree on their first preference, namely securing international financial assistance, they 
could not agree on the course o f action that should be embarked upon if this failed. The 
Treasury advocated the crafting o f a new second order instrument in the form of operation 
Brutus. The new instrument would have amounted to the blocking o f the sterling balances and 
Treasury officials decided upon it because o f their attenuated self-interest. There was the 
collective realisation that if sterling were either devalued or floated it would undermine the 
stability o f  the IMS to such a degree that it would probably unravel. The Treasury feared that 
, they would be dubbed the wreckers o f Bretton Woods and that their domestic and 
international prestige would be dented. Hence, they opted for the blocking, in the belief that 
this would do least damage to the IMS.
r
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The Bank, by contrast, derived its legitimacy and prestige from the fact that it operated the 
world’s second reserve currency and it was closely allied to both the City o f London and its 
sterling area customers. It recognised that blocking would harm both o f these groups. The 
former would see the flow of funds into London cease, as Britain descended into the status of 
a siege economy and in the case of the latter, the Bank would be defaulting on its client’s 
balances. Instead, the Bank argued vehemently in favour of third order change and suggested 
the sterling should be floated. The Treasury objected, not only because of the damage that it 
would do to the IMS but because a floating pound would likely intensify the OSA’s 
diversification bid, thereby pushing the rate to a very low level.
Though the Bank was a valuable networking partner because of its knowledge and expertise, 
the Treasury was able to override it and foist its preferences on the Labour government, 
thereby shaping the context in which Wilson’s Misc 205 made its decisions. The dossier that 
the cabinet committee consulted played down the option o f moving to a floating rate and 
because of this the ensuing ministerial discussion was couched in terms of international 
support verses Brutus. It is almost certain that if Britain had not obtained financial assistance, 
the sterling balances would have been blocked. It is also very likely that Brutus I would have 
failed, because its simplistic nature meant that the balances would still have been run down, 
albeit at a slower rate. Certainly, the Treasury would have attempted to  improve the block, but 
it is doubtful that they would have been able to do so quickly enough. This would have left no 
choice but to float the pound and it is likely that Bretton Woods would have collapsed in 1968 
rather than 1972. In fact, it was probably this prospect that made the US dig deep into its 
coffers and rescue sterling.
In the aftermath o f  the debacle the Treasury took stock and noted four things. Firstly, that it 
was possible that sterling would continue to operate outside tolerable parameters for many 
months and potentially years. Secondly, it was unlikely that first order setting changes would 
become any more efficient and hence stabilise the currency. Thirdly, that during the gold
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crisis they had been caught unawares and because of this the prospect o f implementing a 
successful block would have been slim. Finally, because the likelihood of further crises was 
high, it was essential to  form a contingency planning network, so that fresh second order 
instruments would be prepared if first order setting changes failed. Again, the Treasury 
recognised that it could not complete such a task alone because it would require the 
knowledge and authority of other actors. Consequently, it sought, and received, ministerial 
authorisation to continue with its planning exercises. By the end o f March 1968, the Treasury 
had formed a large policy network that encompassed players from the Board of Trade, 
Customs and Excise, the Cabinet Office, the Bank, as well as from the Treasury’s own ranks. 
These institutions co-operated because in exchange for their expertise, they would have the 
chance to influence the shape of the Brutus proposal. It is interesting that the Bank, with its 
intense aversion to blocking should play such a central part in the discussions. This can be 
explained in terms o f the fact that it was subordinate to the Treasury, and possibly because it 
recognised that if it w as to scupper the exercise this would best be accomplished from the 
inside. Furthermore, i f  the Bank could not discourage the Treasury from blocking, it was 
possible that it could convince it to develop a version that was less harmful to the interests of 
the Bank’s client groups.
The planning exercise, which took place between March and July 1968, was punctuated by a 
high degree of learning on the part o f officials. It soon became evident that blocking would 
require a high degree of skill and precision. Consequently, the Cramner proposal was 
elaborated and developed in such a way that it bore little resemblance to its father, Brutus. 
New versions o f the plan were developed in order to counteract disadvantages with previous 
versions, but they brought with them disadvantages o f their own. In total eight blocking 
schemes were devised. However, by June 1968, the Treasury had come to agree with the 
Bank that blocking w as not necessarily more advantageous than floating. It was quickly 
recognised that the step would have severe domestic and international ramifications. 
Domestically, it would have to be accompanied by import controls, rationing, the mobilisation
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of citizens private portfolio holdings and a complete ban of foreign travel. It would mean the 
imposition of a draconian and isolationist economic regime. Internationally, it would result in 
the abolition o f  the sterling area. It would also severely curtail world trade, because the 
sterling area would have no foreign exchange with which to purchase goods. Its only 
advantage was that it would preserve parity with the dollar and prevent the unravelling of 
Bretton Woods. Therefore, by the summer of 1968, the Treasury had come to see the horrors 
o f the proposal. However, they still balked at the prospect of enacting third order change, in 
floating the pound and unilaterally destroying the IMS.
Meanwhile, a small group of officials within the Bank, recognising the severe danger that the 
OSA balances now posed to both the currency and their own managerial competence, began 
to consider ways to neutralise them. Their aim was to build an internal coalition so that the 
Bank could act as a unified network hegemon and seek out other interested external players. 
With the governor’s approval, McMahon and Raw began to devise a strategy that would make 
the balances inert. The initial proposal was for an international package that could be used to 
fund the windup o f the balances and hence Sterling’s reserve currency role, though not the 
sterling area. However, it soon became evident that if  funding were used to run down the 
balances, the Bank would simply be replacing its liabilities to the sterling area with liabilities 
to the central banks that funded the scheme. Furthermore, the initial consultations with 
interested international funding bodies revealed that it would not be possible to gamer enough 
credit to allow the rundown of the balances in their entirety. This would leave a residue and it 
would have been likely that holders would quickly dispose of this, exacerbating the strain on 
the currency. Therefore, certain officials within the Bank considered the possibility o f  using a 
funding package as a scaffold to stabilise the balances rather than as a mechanism to drain 
them. Dudley Allen, in particular, was o f this opinion and he argued that the Bank should 
attempt to get the sterling area to agree to hold a set percentage o f their reserves in sterling. 
Furthermore, as the OSA would probably be reluctant to do this, because they would be 
voluntarily forgoing their right to conversion, the Bank should undertake to guarantee a large
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percentage o f  the OSA’s balances and agree to write them up if the pound were devalued. 
What Allen advocated would require the building of an international policy network, because 
the Bank would have to court western central banks in order to fund the proposal and then sell 
it to its sterling area customers. Although not everyone in the Bank agreed on the desirability 
o f offering guarantees, their hand was forced because the central banks that would fund the 
scheme were also calling for them.
That so many central banks were prepared to involve themselves is attributable to the fact that 
they recognised the danger that sterling’s instability presented to the IMS. In short, they 
understood that it was in their collective interest to aid the Bank. The Treasury was supportive 
o f the Bank’s initiative and willingly joined the policy network, because it shared the Bank’s 
perception o f the sterling balance problem and the proposed solution did not in any way 
undermine the Treasury’s interests. However, certain elements within the Treasury were keen 
to reshape the proposal so that it actually benefited their interests. Rawlinson in particular was 
concerned about the large-scale capital flights from Britain to the sterling area. This was 
because these flights undermined the balance o f  payments. He suggested that the negotiations 
should also be used to bring about windup o f  the sterling area. For if the sterling area were 
abolished, British residents would not be able to move their capital offshore and the drain 
would be stopped. The Bank however balked at the prospect, partly because it believed that it 
would needlessly complicate the negotiations and reduce the chance of success and also 
because the abolition of the sterling area would greatly dent its prestige. Although the 
Treasury accepted the Bank’s position, it still hoped that it would be possible to dismantle the 
sterling area after the negotiations had been completed. In actuality, no step was taken in this 
direction until the pound floated in July 1972.
By September 1968, the negotiations with the sterling area countries had been completed. It is 
impressive that the Bank and the Treasury managed to obtain consent from the majority o f 
OSA countries for the implementation o f the scheme. It is however surprising that the 1968
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Basle agreement should receive such scant treatment in the analysis o f economic policy 
during the 1960s. For in many ways it was far more significant than the devaluation. This was 
because it did not represent the mere tinkering with first order settings but the actual 
development o f a new second order instrument. Furthermore, the agreement reinvigorated, for 
a short time, sterling’s reserve currency role. After implementation direct diversification 
stopped and the sterling balances actually increased in size. Therefore, although the Bank had 
set out to remove the reserve currency role, because it could not gain a support package of 
j large enough size to achieve its aims, it ended up doing quite the opposite.
The successful conclusion of the 1968 Basle agreement is also significant for another reason. 
Namely, that it altered the context in which the sterling contingency planning network 
operated. Before the agreement was completed, Treasury planners recognised that under the 
circumstances o f an insurmountable sterling crisis, the only course would be to block. O f 
course, as time went one, they became increasingly reluctant to countenance such a move. 
However, with Basle concluded the desirability o f forced blocking receded. This was because 
the agreement actually met many o f  the central objectives of Brutus-Cranmer. Whilst Basle 
did not represent the forced blocking of the sterling balances it amounted to a partial 
| voluntary block. The official sterling area holders had to agree to hold a minimum portion of 
their reserves in sterling, in exchange for the guarantee. Although the OSA would be free to 
use the currency for balance o f payments purposes, they would have to draw in equal measure 
on their non-sterling holdings. This meant that they could not simply run down their balances.
f
irthermore, where the balances w ere reduced, it would be the Basle facility rather than the 
serves that would take the strain.
The Treasury now recognised that the sterling area was no longer a source of pressure on the 
reserves. If another sterling crisis materialised it would be because o f balance of payments 
difficulties or shifts in hot money and Brutus-Cranmer would not alleviate these any more 
than Basle would. Consequently, a  significant body o f opinion, in both the Bank and the
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|  Treasury, had come to recognise that a move to floating rates should no longer be discounted. 
Firstly, because there would be little alternative. Even during the March gold crisis 
discussions, officials accepted that if blocking failed to hold the rate there would be no 
alternative but to float. Given that a system o f partial blocking had now been put in place, 
floating was the only available mechanism for use in crisis conditions. Secondly, the move to 
a flexible exchange rate was not incompatible with the successful operation o f the Basle 
agreement. Finally, because o f this it was likely that the rate would not fall too far, because 
the sterling area, with its guarantee, would not dispose of the currency. This meant that the 
only objection to floating rates was that it represented third order change and that it would 
undermine the IMS. It was this objection that prevented officials from advocating it as a 
policy option in its own right, but with the sterling area problem now negated, they were 
prepared to consider it as the option of last resort in place of Cranmer.
Therefore, officials began to plan for a move to floating rates under the code name Hecuba, 
during the autumn and winter o f 1968. The Treasury acted as hegemon but sought out fewer 
players than it had done during the blocking exercise. This was because a move to flexible 
exchange rates was technically much simpler than blocking. In fact, the only other player to 
participate was the Bank, because its knowledge and expertise in the management o f the EEA 
made it a useful partner. Furthermore, the Bank shared the Treasury’s view on the importance 
o f this kind of planning and had argued all along that it should be floating rather than 
blocking that should be enacted during a severe crisis. Although Hecuba was not 
implemented during the Wilson government’s term of office, the fact that it was planned for 
is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it marked a watershed in official thinking. It signalled 
that the Treasury had undergone a radical transformation in its mindset and was finally 
prepared, under extreme circumstances, to embark on third order change and jettison its 
adherence to the existing rules o f the game. Secondly, it is clear that Hecuba was not an 
empty exercise. For although the move to a floating rate was not made until 1972, it was 
Hecuba (by then renamed Palinuros) that formed its basis.
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Hecuba was not however the only contingency plan devised by the Bank-Treasury network 
during the autumn at winter o f  1968. They also developed a proposal called Priam. This was 
designed for implementation under conditions where pressure bore down on sterling because 
of either the weakness or strength o f another currency. In other words, it was possible that hot 
money would leave London if  a weak currency, such as the French franc, devalued because 
holders might fear that the pound would be forced to follow her down. Equally, there was also 
the risk o f capital flight if it was believed that a strong currency, such as the German mark, 
was to be re-valued. In this case, balance holders would switch into marks, so that they would 
/make a speculative gain. As the sterling balances had been neutralised, it would only be 
possible for movements in NS A holdings to damage the reserves. Although by the autumn 
these were not substantial, in combination with the balance o f payments deficit, they could 
still wipe out all o f the remaining reserves. Whilst both the Bank and Treasury doubted the 
'I likelihood of a Priam type situation emerging they still planned for it, partly because they 
recognised that it would be prudent to do so but mainly because it provided a useful pretext to 
engage in dialogue with their opposites in number in the United States.
In implementation, Priam would have amounted to a mini-Hecuba. This meant that if the side 
winds of another currency crisis impacted on sterling and the reserves looked near exhaustion, 
the pound would have been floated so that the rate rather than the reserves took the strain. 
Unlike Hecuba, the move was not intended to be permanent. After the crisis rescinded, 
sterling would be re-pegged at the pre-existing rate. However, as the development o f the 
Priam scheme progressed, officials became increasingly convinced that they were engaging in 
an empty exercise. For although the mark was clearly undervalued, it was improbable that the 
Germans would re-value as this would undermine their competitive export position. 
Furthermore, the devaluation o f the franc appeared unlikely because the French government 
also appeared totally opposed to any change in parity.
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However, by 15 November 1968 it seemed that that the improbable contingency was about to 
become a reality. The French franc came under intolerable strain and it appeared that the 
French government was to consider devaluation. Furthermore, the German mark had broken 
through its ceiling and speculators believed that it would be re-valued. Over £337m was lost 
from the British reserves as speculators herded out o f the currency, believing that sterling 
would most likely follow the franc down and that a speculative gain could be made by 
switching into marks. The Treasury hoped that both currencies would change their parities. If 
they did so, the mutual adjustments would cancel one another out and negate the need for a 
competitive sterling devaluation. Furthermore, the re-valuation of the mark would halt the 
shifts in hot money to West Germany and it was possible that holders would switch back into 
sterling. If the Germans could not be persuaded to re-value then the Bank, Treasury and Mise 
205 accepted that there would be little alternative to  Priam. Although the crisis was quickly 
contained, because both the French and Germans maintained their parities, it formally 
signalled the change in the Treasury’s mindset. Although few officials at Great George Street 
actively embraced the prospect o f a floating pound, they were prepared to plan for it and in 
certain circumstances recommend it.
Beyond 1968
Obviously, the story of sterling and its managers does not end in 1968. The remainder o f this 
chapter will briefly attempt to chart the management o f the currency between 1969 and 1972 
so that the events of 1968 can be placed in a w ider context. Although Treasury and Bank 
officials solemnly continued to pursue contingency planning beyond 1968, the timing was not 
^et right to deviate from the rules o f the game. Instead, they chose to increase their debts. By 
January 1969, Britain's medium and short-term debts were greater than £3,400 million, 
officials envisaged another serious crisis costing £500 million, which would place the
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Treasury in a hole from which they were unwilling to borrow their way out.1 Later that year 
they recanted and the British government began negotiating with the IMF in order to obtain a 
credit o f $500 million received at the end of June 1969, and another $500 million that would 
be spread out over the following period to May 1970. It was thought that without these 
credits, there would be serious repercussions on sterling.2 Throughout the planning exercises, 
the condition o f sterling never deteriorated to an extent that demanded immediate action, 
because the balance o f  payments had finally swung into surplus. Instead pressure on sterling 
simply sustained itself, and worked slowly to undermine the stability o f the pound, and 
thereby the stability o f the IMS.
Now, fully understanding the weaknesses of Bretton Woods, HM Government intended to 
pursue change without conflict. This was because British policymakers were not prepared to 
take any unilateral action that would undermine the IMS. Instead, during 1969 the Treasury 
attempted to devise a multilateral solution to their problems that would loosen, although not 
remove the Bretton Woods straightjacket. On March 3, 1969, US Treasury Under-Secretary 
for Monetary Affairs, Paul Volcker, and Frank Figgures, working under HM Treasury, agreed 
in Washington to set up bilateral talks between the United Kingdom and the United States in 
order to exchange ideas that were being canvassed for a more flexible exchange rate system.3 
A US team arrived in London on 25 March and began the first o f a series o f discussions, 
which intended to establish a continuing dialogue between the USA and UK regarding the 
restructuring o f Bretton Woods. During the ensuing discussions, the Treasury proposed two 
alternatives for reform.
The first was to widen the dealing margins for currencies. Under Bretton Woods, currencies 
were only permitted to fluctuate in terms of their exchange value by 1 per cent either side o f 
official parity values. The Treasury believed that if these margins were multilaterally widened
1 PRO T 295/607, ‘Hecuba: The Question of Further Borrowing’, Ryrie to Rawlinson, 27/1/69.
2 PRO CAB 130/497, MISC 205 (68) 10'*’ meeting held on 13/11/68.
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to 5 per cent, above and below, then it would improve their ability to manage spot and 
forward market rates for sterling. Such a move would also secure some o f  the advantages of 
floating exchange rates as a component o f balance o f  payments adjustment, without altogether
with the United States, it became clear that it would be impossible to gain international 
approval for such a change. This was because wider dealing margins might result in exchange 
rate competition, which was a feared consequence Bretton Woods was intended to avoid; it 
was also likely that the European Economic Community countries would reject such a move
CAP, food prices were fixed in terms of a gold unit o f account and any intra-EEC exchange 
rate movements would undermine this.
After ruling out wider margins, the two teams began discussion on a crawling peg scheme. At 
heart, the proposal involved fixing all convertible currencies within a narrow range of 
fluctuation and implementing par changes gradually over time, in a number of small steps so 
the process o f exchange-rate adjustment was continuous.6 The Americans seemed to favour it 
because it would make it easier to avoid situations in which rates that become unrealistic were 
defended against devaluation, which put considerable costs on both output and reserves.7 The 
' preferred the plan because it would do less damage to their CAP. Yet the British 
'ere adamant that it was impractical, on the grounds that it ‘would clearly be
to apply even qualitative principles on a day-to-day basis and the only possible 
criterion o f  judgement would be to consider post facto the movement o f  a  country’s exchange
3 PRO T312/2334, ‘Discussions with Americans about Monetary Reform’, Rawlinson to Ryrie, 3/3/69.
4 PRO T 312/2334, IM (69) 16, ‘Anglo-US Talks on the International Monetary System May 13-14, 
1969’, 27/5/69.
5 ibid
6 Williamson, The Crawling, p. 2.
7 PRO T 312/2334, ‘Talks with the Americans’, Ryrie to Figgures, 19/3/69.
^sacrificing the confidence and stability o f fixed exchange rates.3 4 However, in the discussions
because their Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would become skewed under it.5 Under
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rate in relation to the change in its reserves so as to judge whether or not intervention policy 
had been o f the kind which appeared to frustrate the objective o f  the system.’8
The UK could not act unilaterally or she would be damned by the world community and it 
was clear that no multilateral solution could suit every player whilst at the same time 
preserving the system o f  international rules that had been established in 1944. Although no 
agreement had been made with the US, it was clear that the UK had to prepare for the 
collapse of Bretton Woods. Firstly, because of the difficulties o f managing sterling within it 
and secondly, because the system itself had become inherently unstable. The success of 
Bretton Woods relied on the US commitment to sell gold to both the private market and 
central banks at a rate o f  $35 per ounce. By March 1968, the US gold stocks had become so 
depleted that the pledge was only to hold good for central banks. Furthermore, the continual 
US trade deficits meant that central banks now held an excess o f dollars. If they attempted to 
convert them, the US gold stock would be wiped out in its entirety. Consequently, the IMS 
faced the possibility o f  demise because of the inherent instability o f  both of its reserve 
currencies.
During the second half o f  1969, the contingency planning network began to prepare for the 
demise o f Bretton Woods under the code name Palinurus.9 Operation Palinurus, the floating 
of the pound, was essentially based on Hecuba. The key difference between the two schemes 
was that Hecuba was intended for implementation in a severe crisis, whilst Palinurus 
presupposed using discretionary measures to float. Planners also devised another plan, 
operation Baytown, based on Patriarch, which amounted to a  fixed rate devaluation.10 During 
crisis conditions, the tw o operations were designed to be run side by side, until ministers 
could decide on the most appropriate course. Baytown would have preserved Bretton Woods
8 ibid.
9 PRO T 312/321J, Rawlinson to Allen •Palinurus’, 10/6/70.
10 PRO T 312/3215, ‘Baytown’, draft paper, 12/12/70.
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by simply decreasing sterling’s parity, whereas Palinurus would result in the termination of 
the IMS.
Within the context of Britain’s third bid to join the EEC, the Treasury appeared to be more 
disposed to Palinurus." For the UK’s desire to enter the community made a step change less 
desirable because it would likely signal another such change later down the road, and a step 
change might have had to be larger than necessary to be credible.
Unknown to the Treasury, the US government undertook contingency planning exercises of 
their own in the wake of the Anglo-American discussions. By August 1971, the true extent of 
US planning became evident. On 6 August, the US Congress Joint Economic Committee’s 
Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments issued a report titled ‘Action Now to 
Strengthen the US Dollar’. It presented the ‘inescapable conclusion’ that ‘the dollar is 
overvalued’ and that this ‘overvaluation leads to the perpetuation of US deficits and thus 
increases the risk of an international crisis that would break the system apart’.1 2 One week 
later a new wave of dollar selling began on international currency markets. The US was 
facing three simultaneous problems for which a cure for any one would have counter­
productive side effects for the others: high unemployment, continued inflation, and a weak 
balance o f payments.13 The suspension o f dollar convertibility into gold, the adoption of 
protectionist policies (an import surcharge) -  a form o f coercion with the hopes o f inducing 
the EEC and Japan to adopt more liberal trading policies -  was the comprehensive program 
the US administration chose. The package amounted to the termination o f Bretton Woods.
In response to this, on 20 August 1971, it was agreed by ministers, the Governor o f the Bank 
and the Chancellor, that the official parity o f the pound sterling would remain unchanged at
11 ibid
12 James. International, pp. 217-218.
15 PRO PREM 15/309, ‘US Economy President Nixon's Announcement' Telegram, Washington to 
London’, 16/8/71.
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$2.40 = £1. However, the market rate would be free to rise above its existing ceiling o f  $2.42, 
allowing for the rate to reach $2.46 before the Bank started intervening, with hopes that the 
rate would not rise above $2.50 -  an unofficial ‘snake in the tunnel’.14 What this amounted to 
was a managed float for sterling. In the days following this agreement, the pound was trading 
at $2.4375 on August 23, on the 24, $2.4435, and from August 26 to 27 the pound went up 
from $2.4645 to $2.4740.
What is difficult to understand, is why Britain’s initial experiment with floating exchange 
rates was so short lived and why economic policymakers aborted it in preference to the return 
to a deformed version of Bretton Woods. But abort they did and in December 1971 the UK 
became a signatory to the Smithsonian agreement which attempted to resurrect Bretton 
Woods in an attenuated form via a revaluation o f  gold and the widening of dealing margins 
from 1 per cent to 2.25 per cent either side o f parity. One can only conclude that British 
policymakers had become so used to the rigidity o f the Bretton Woods system that they had 
over time come to treat it not as a straightjacket but instead as a comfort blanket. Like 
prisoners they had become institutionalised into the routine of the flawed international 
monetary paradigm and preferred to rebuild an imperfect replica of their prison than to adjust 
to life on the outside.
It was not until 23 June 1972, that the pound was eventually allowed to float. The decision 
was taken because an exchange crisis had erupted that had seen over $2billion flow out of the 
foreign exchange reserves between 16 and 22 June. 15 This occurred in spite o f the fact that 
the British economy was on a sound footing and the current account was in surplus.16 Under 
such circumstances and with no likelihood of the ‘irrational speculation’17 ending, 
policymakers recognised that it would be necessary to act in order to conserve the remaining
14 PRO PREM 15/309, ‘International Monetary Situation', Note of Meeting, 20/8/71.
15 PRO PREM 15/813 ‘Note for the Record: Floating the Pound’, undated.
16 Ibid ‘Note of a Meeting Held in Two Parts in the Prime Minister’s Room at the House of Commons 
on Thursday 22 June 1972’, 23/6/72.
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( reserves. To devalue would make little sense because it was clear that the pound was not 
actually overvalued and it would be impossible to choose a new fixed rate. The solution was 
to float. Although the Bank and Treasury envisaged the move only as a temporary expedient, 
it quickly became evident that it would be permanent. The move to floating rates was also 
accompanied by the extension o f  exchange control to the OSA [Brandon] and the sterling 
area, though not its balances, ceased to exist. Therefore, the events o f 1968 are important not 
only because they were more significant than the devaluation of 1967 but also because they 
paved the way for the break up o f Bretton Woods and hence the initiation of third order 
change.
IT ibid
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Appendix
The Research Process
This appendix provides an account o f  how the thesis was produced. It is divided into four 
sections. Section one outlines how the research topic was chosen. Section two assesses the 
problems related to gathering archival and interview data, whilst sections three and four 
examine the process o f writing up and the development o f the theoretical framework.
Choice of Topic
The choice of research topic was conditioned by the fact that, like Jim Bulpitt, I believe that 
political science should embrace the past and engage in more historical research.1 I do 
however accept that there are difficulties in delineating between the present and the past. It is 
arguable that all inquires, bar those that attempt to predict future outcomes, are in essence 
assessments o f the past, because they are analysing action that has already taken place 
(whether this be the management o f  the economy in the 2004 or 1904). It is, however, 
arguable that the analysis w ill be more rigorous the further into the past that the object of 
inquiry rests. Firstly, the m ore distant the event, the more likely it will be that the researcher 
is able to distinguish the wood from the trees and determine whether they are analysing events 
that have long-term, rather than passing, significance. Secondly, when at least thirty years 
have elapsed there is a greater body o f  data available to the researcher. This is because it is no 
longer necessary to rely on memoirs, interviews and newspaper reports, as declassified state 
papers can also be consulted.2
1 Bulpitt, J. ‘Historical Politics: Macro, In-Time, Governing Regime Analysis', paper given at the PSA 
Annual Conference, University of York, Easter 1995, in the Political Science Specialist Group Panel on 
‘Politics, Contemporary History and History’. See also Johnson, N. The Limits of Political Science. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.35-S6.
2 However, the provisions of the 2002 Freedom of Information act (FOI) saw the disappearance of the 
30-year rule from January 2005. Instead, records will be accessible on transfer to the National Archives
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Furthermore, given that I also have a long-standing interest in the politics o f economic 
management in Britain, it seemed that this interest could be nicely combined with my 
predisposition for historical research. Consequently, I originally proposed to investigate the 
1955-59 Conservative government and the policies that it pursued in order to control inflation 
during the summer of 1957. It soon became apparent, however, that this would not be a viable 
research theme. The case study proved too narrow and the archival documents did not allow 
for a re-interpretation o f events that differed to any great degree from the existing accounts. 
Thus for a few months, I had no clear research topic and my time was spent examining the 
literature on British economic management in the post-war period.
By the end o f the second term o f the first year, I had decided to focus on the Wilson 
government’s management o f sterling in the aftermath of the 1967 devaluation. This change 
of direction occurred after I stumbled upon the files relating to post-devaluation sterling 
contingency planning at the National Archives. It quickly became apparent that this was both 
a highly interesting and under-researched episode.
The Process of Data Collection
Given that this thesis is historical in nature, the main source o f data was declassified archival 
documents held that the National Archives and the Bank of England. Whilst these files 
provide a useful alternative and/ or addition to memoirs and newspaper accounts, four issues 
must be considered. Firstly, not all archival papers actually reach the National Archives; the
unless they contain information covered by an exemption. It is likely that the new regulations will 
herald the introduction of a de facto 20 or 25-year rule. However, it will also be possible to put in FOI 
requests for documents that are still in use by departments and complain to the Information 
Commissioner if they are not provided. Although in reality, it is likely to prove difficult to obtain 
information on business in progress, because of issues relating to national security. See 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/ac ts2000/20000036.htm#aofs for the provisions of the FOI
act.
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vast majority o f papers are destroyed during the initial selection procedure.3 Secondly, in spite 
o f  the ‘thirty year rule’ which was in operation for much o f  this project, the core executive 
was still able to deny access to important papers, even when three decades had elapsed. This 
could be accomplished by restricting access for 75 years o r by departments refusing to hand 
over files to the archive, on the grounds that they were still in use. Thirdly, with the advent o f 
the telephone, it has been suggested that less and less o f  the business transacted is actually 
recorded in the documents.4 This means that those documents that have been preserved form 
only a partial data set. Our interpretation o f the past might be different had alternative 
documents been earmarked for preservation and had officials kept a more accurate record in 
those files that do remain. Fourthly, in spite o f this, archival documents still remain a valuable 
source of evidence. In fact, without access to the state papers it would have been impossible 
to gamer sufficient data with which to produce this thesis. The available press reports for the 
period shed little light on affairs o f  economic management and almost entirely concerned 
themselves with political infighting, rather than the substance of policy deliberations. Many 
o f  the officials publications also proved to be suspect. For example, it emerged that the Bank 
o f  England regularly doctored the foreign exchange figures in order to improve confidence in 
sterling.5 The available memoirs tended to be thin on detail, at times contradictory and they 
often overemphasised their author’s role in the events. In short, it is difficult to understand 
how practitioners o f political science can engage in meaningful analysis without the relevant 
papers.6
Indeed, the principal problem that I faced during the research problem was not a shortage o f 
archival documents but a glut. During the course o f this investigation, I examined more than 
two hundred individual files, most o f them book length. The actual mechanics of the research
3 See www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/recordsmanagement/selection/acauisition.htm accessed 4/9/04; 
Report of the Committee on Departmental Records. Cmd 9163, (HMSO, 1954) and Mowat, C. Great 
Britain since 1914. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), p.68.
4 Lord Greenhill of Harrow, letter to The Times. 7/5/1977 and interview with Anthony Glover.
5 Interviews with Sir Jeremy Morse and Sir Kit McMahon
6 See Elton, G. The Practise of History. (London: Fontana, 1969).
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undertaken in the National Archives and the Bank took the following form. Firstly, I spent 
several weeks familiarising myself with the procedures, cataloguing systems and holdings of 
the respective archives. After a thorough examination o f the catalogues, I produced a ‘master 
list’ o f useful documents based on the descriptions compiled by the archivists. I would then 
order the documents and determine whether they were relevant. Where the files were of use, I 
would transcribe them and enter a short summary of contents and usefulness on the master 
list. I would also search for additional keywords within the documents that would allow me to 
lengthen the master list. To ensure that the transcriptions did not go astray I found it useful to 
devise a cross-referenced filing system. The process of transcription was, however, laborious 
and in general, it was not possible to transcribe more than three files per day.
O f the two principal archives that were utilised, the Bank proved to be the least user friendly. 
Visits had to be booked weeks in advance, the cataloguing system was confusing and could 
not be accessed off site and Bank employees tended to sign documents with their initials, 
making it difficult to trace authorship. Furthermore, part way into the project the National 
Archives began to permit the use of digital cameras in its reading rooms. This advance 
allowed for the abandonment o f transcription; instead, I was able to photograph entire files at 
a rate o f fifteen per day. Sadly, because o f security restrictions, the Bank was not to make the 
same concession until after the research gathering stage o f this project had ended. However, 
the change in policy at the National Archives significantly speeded up the process of 
gathering data and allowed me to greatly expand the entries on the master list.
Archival analysis was complemented with a number of semi-structured interviews.
Generally, political scientists complain that three problems emerge when attempting to 
conduct elite interviews. Firstly, they must determine who the important actors are. Usually 
this is accomplished via a snowball sample.7 Secondly, they must gain access. As potential
7 Grant, W. ‘Elite Interviewing: a Practical Guide', (University of Birmingham: Discussion Paper in 
German Studies, no.2000/11), p.3
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respondents are still active, it can be difficult to find a window of opportunity and it is often 
necessary to skilfully bypass gatekeepers.8 Thirdly, where access is granted, much of the 
information given will be ‘off the record’; the respondent will be fearful o f breaching 
confidences and /or the Official Secrets Act.
In my research, I did not encounter any o f these problems. The important actors could be 
traced by examining the minutes o f meetings held on file in the National Archives and at the 
Bank. Consequently, the need for a snowball sample was made redundant. With the relevant 
names, it was relatively easy to make contact. Home addresses and telephone numbers were 
obtained from Who’s Who and letters requesting interview dispatched. Furthermore, because 
many of the individuals in question had retired from public life, they did not have busy 
schedules to juggle and were often keen to meet at short notice. Respondents were also happy 
to  talk on the record and to be taped.
Before I interviewed my respondents, I produced a list o f questions with which to guide the 
interview. However, in practise, I found best to allow the respondents to talk at length about 
the issues that they felt were important, as this often provided new lines o f inquiry. When 
interviewees dried up I returned to my list o f questions and worked through issues that had 
not been covered. Each interview was taped (almost thirty hours in total) and I made backup 
notes.
O f course, since the episodes these individuals were involved in took place in the distant past, 
there was the very real possibility that their recollections o f events would be inaccurate or that 
they will project their current belief systems onto their younger selves. There was little way to 
guard against this, except through triangulation and comparing their oral comments in the 
present with their written comments in the past, in order to check for consistency. However,
* Goldstein, K. ‘Gening in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews', Political Science and 
Politics. Vol.24,2002, p.669.
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even when respondents were poor on detail, they were still able to provide useful background 
to an episode, explain the organisation o f their department, its links with other bodies, and 
provide some insight into mental processes of their colleagues. Nevertheless, with hindsight, I 
would recommend that future researchers send interviewees copies o f  relevant archival 
documents before meeting them, as an aide memoir.
The Process of Writing Up
Many researchers draw a distinction between the ‘research stage’ and the ‘writing up stage’. 
In other words, they begin by harvesting all o f the available data and once this has been 
collected, they proceed to write up their findings. However, I never worked in this manner. 
Although my research area was relatively uncharted, I was able at an early stage to view the 
period from a macro perspective. This was because I began by examining the Cabinet Office 
(CAB) and Prime Minister’s (PREM) files. These papers contained summarised briefs o f the 
important discussions relating to the management o f sterling post-devaluation. Had I began 
with the departmental files my ability to develop a macro overview, early on, would have 
been hampered, because Treasury and Bank files tended to provide detailed and highly 
technical accounts o f much smaller pieces of the jigsaw. My examination of the CAB and 
PREM files enabled me to divide the research exercise into discrete compartments, which 
correspond with the chapter breakdown o f the thesis. Once I had decided on this breakdown, I 
gathered all the necessary information for a particular chapter. After I had garnered the data, I 
found it useful to re-order my transcriptions and digital copies and weave them together 
chronologically, rather than view them file by file. With this accomplished, I would write a 
chapter draft in narrative form, in an attempt to reconstruct the past. On average, this took 
three to four weeks. I found it difficult to fit my writing around other activities, like teaching, 
and tended to leave it until I had a significant block of time that I could devote to it. However, 
this meant that several weeks could go by without me writing anything. Thus the prospect of 
resuming work on the thesis was often daunting and I found that the first few paragraphs of a
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new chapter could take several days to produce. Although, once this hurdle had been 
overcome I found the writing process to be immensely enjoyable. When a chapter was 
completed I would make revisions and submit it to my supervisors for discussion. This 
usually resulted in more research and in restructuring, before the chapter would again be 
submitted for comment. This procedure was followed for each chapter, so that by early on in 
the third year I had a series o f  rough chapters that provided a  narrative of sterling’s 
management in the aftermath o f  the 1967 devaluation.
The process o f editing these chapters was a difficult one, given that I had been so close to the 
material for the previous two years. Therefore, once a chapter had been accorded the status of 
a working draft I would not re-examine it for a period of at least two months. This ensured 
that when I re-worked it, it was with a fresh eye. I found that the early chapters required the 
most revision, in terms of their phraseology. For as the thesis progressed and my writing style 
developed, these chapters looked ill conceived and immaturely written.
The Development of the Theoretical Framework
The process o f theory construction occurred in two stages. During the first stage, which came 
early on in the research, I outlined the deductive premises upon which the research would be 
founded. These were:
• Firstly, that the world exists independently o f our perceptions o f  it.
■ Secondly, that we only come to understand and make sense of the world through 
language, perception and beliefs and that through human interaction we come to 
construct our understanding o f  the world.
• Thirdly, that the aim o f the research should be to reconstruct the constructions of 
sterling’s managers so that they could be described in great detail.
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These premises, and especially the third one, guided the process o f data collection and the 
writing of the narratives. My aim was to become immersed in the data and to attempt to 
acquire the worldview of those 1 observed. I found the elite interviews to be a useful way of 
bringing the documents to life and allowing fuller immersion. Initially the narratives that I 
produced were devoid of any explicit theorisation. However, after each of the main chapters 
had been completed, I began stage two of theory generation. I examined as much political 
science literature as I could, in the search for conceptual vocabulary that would aid the 
process o f reconstruction and enable me to place the narratives within a more intelligible 
framework. This took more than three months, but once it had been completed I wrote the 
theory chapter and wove the conceptual vocabulary, that had been outlined within it, into the 
previously atheoretical narratives. After I had accomplished this, I wrote the introduction and 
conclusion, re-edited the thesis, produced the bibliography and prepared the work for
submission.
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